Has US-Russian cooperation in space, including the International Space Station (ISS) and commercial investment, advanced American technological, scientific, and security objectives? Has the inducement of space cooperation helped Russia adhere to non-proliferation norms? Have US-Russian relations benefited from these efforts?
As part of the Eisenhower Institute's project on the growing importance of space for American interests, the Institute convened a meeting in July 2001 to address these questions through its two year project entitled, "Ten Years Later: An Assessment of US-Russian Engagement in Space." (Click here for a listing of the workshop participants with short biographies)
One area in which US-Russian space interests converge concerns issues surrounding the topic of ballistic missiles. Space cooperation and ballistic missiles are interrelated topics that are both central to the US-Russian relationship. But officials and experts from the civilian space sector say they have had little interaction with their international security counterparts. By bringing together a group of insiders who represent the combined interests of business, security and the space sciences, the Institute initiated a dialogue among an unprecedentedly diverse group that includes senior representatives from the aerospace industry, former NASA personnel, individuals from the National Security Council, representatives from several private space and non-proliferation institutes (see below) as well as those from the Commerce, State, and Defense Departments. The Institute will be reconvening this group at a later date for additional meetings.
The following is a summary of the various points and issues raised during the discussion, but does not represent a consensus document.
US-Russian space cooperation dates back to the early l970s through the Apollo-Soyuz program. Russian technological advancement and the economic/scientific advantages of bilateral cooperation provided mutual benefits back then and have had an impact on cooperation ever since. It was noted that a US-Russian partnership on the ISS provided a way for the US to garner financial and technical gains, counter dwindling Congressional support for a US space station, and give NASA a new mission to justify its funding.
Linkage to specific political-military objectives, such as non-proliferation, did not occur until the early l990s. But cooperative space programs have never been free of geopolitical pressures. Like arms control, cooperation in space has always been held hostage to the ebb and flow of the bilateral relationship and domestic politics, regardless of the scientific or economic merits. Apollo-Soyuz, for example, was cancelled in l977 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in l992, initial steps were taken in the US and Russia to promote government-to-government space cooperation and joint commercial ventures, but these were modest and ad hoc.
During the Clinton administration, cooperation with Russia's space industry became a strategic interest-seen as a way of transcending decades of bilateral animosity and helping the crumbling Soviet space industry, a cornerstone of Russian national pride and a potential source of weapon technology proliferation.
Inspired by extensive conversations between Roald Sagdeev, former director of the Russian Space Research Institute, and Leon Fuerth, then-Senator Al Gore's senior adviser in the early 1990s, Vice-President Gore spearheaded efforts to advance bilateral cooperation. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) was established in l993 and provided a locus for decision-making on many bi-lateral issues, including space initiatives. This informal grouping served as the channel for high-level coordination of US-Russian space ventures, including the ISS, arrangements for Russian commercial space launches, and agreements to prevent Russian exports of missile-related space technologies.
Prompted by a pending Russian sale of cryogenic rockets to India that the U.S. Administration said would have violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Clinton administration persuaded the Russian government to accede to the terms of the MTCR in 1993. Although not explicitly stated, joint space ventures became a part of America's non-proliferation strategy by helping the Russian government to prevent its scientists and engineers from selling their services to "rogue nations" and discouraging illegal missile-related exports.
For the U.S.
- Good evidence indicates that large Russian aerospace companies have abided by a high standard of non-proliferation behavior because they see their interests served by US-Russian partnership in space. Smaller companies, however, have been known to engage in illicit trade. Whether or not this is sanctioned by Moscow, it represents a failure in Russia's fledgling export control apparatus and stands as a core issue of the US debate.
- Efforts to dissuade Russian proliferation through the positive inducements of space cooperation are opposed by many defense officials and members of Congress who believe that the Russians exploit space cooperation to avoid proliferation sanctions. The 1990 Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act requires immediate imposition of trade sanctions on any entity exporting high-level MTCR-restricted goods unless the President grants a waiver. However, according to one participant, "the US softened its terms and magnified its incentives" in the Indian case, setting a precedent of rewarding bad behavior.
- The absence of a strong policy voice in NASA or any Executive Branch agency advocating the economic, scientific and national security benefits of space cooperation has allowed protectionist Congressional opponents of technology transfers to Russia and China to dominate the debate. Unlike Nunn-Lugar programs, which are supported by the Pentagon and the State Department, the space community lacks an effective advocate.
- Jurisdiction for space policy falls to congressional committees occupied with trade and export control issues, not the more powerful Armed Services or Foreign Relations Committees, which both have broader mandates. Without a national security rationale for the ISS, its supporters have been caricatured by some members of Congress as apologists for Russian missile proliferation to Iran.
- Without a Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission or equivalent body, there is no longer a high-level body to represent space interests.
- Fearful of investigations, especially after the sanctioning of the Loral Corporation for alleged illegalities in its satellite projects with China, US industry has been reluctant to challenge critics. This has added to the dearth of information about US commercial benefits gained through joint ventures.
- Growing protectionist sentiment in Congress, as well as in the Executive Branch, not only has had a chilling effect on the domestic satellite industry but also has given an advantage to European counterparts, both in terms of market share and access to some very advanced Russian technologies. In addition, it was noted by one participant that US industry's competitive edge has been blunted by the time-consuming process of gaining approval from multiple agencies within the US for any foreign commercial activities.
- Even though the US is a beneficiary of Russian technology in the joint space programs, Congress consistently seeks penalties against the Russian Space Agency for suspected missile proliferation. As noted by one observer, however, this is inconsistent with the approach taken by the US government towards nuclear threat reduction programs. In many cases, reports of attempted nuclear smuggling have prompted increases in threat reduction funding to bolster Russia's technology export control apparatus-not punitive cuts like those experienced on the Space Station.
- Political controversies about specific exports, one participant noted, are often really about opposition to technology cooperation as a whole, especially with Russia and China. The US has been unable to accept that technology cooperation inevitably involves exchanges of goods or expertise that may exceed the terms of formal agreements. "Cooperation," he said," takes place at the engineering level, not at the policy level, and by their nature, engineers work to solve problems." It could be said that the US has wanted the benefits of cooperation without the risks.
- The technology dilemma is compounded by the lack of technological expertise among policymakers. With the demise of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export controls (COCOM), there is no coordinating body to set guidelines about sensitive technologies or to adjudicate allegations of illegal transfers. At its core, the problem is that the pace of technological innovation far outstrips the speed with which the policy community can regulate and manage it.
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For Russia
- Russia first created a space agency in l992 (RSA), which has since been expanded to include several hundred entities.
- Consolidation of the Russian aerospace sector suffers from a lack of mediating mechanisms between the large Cold War ministries, such as the Ministry of General Machine Building and the smaller firms that produce all of the individual parts. Furthermore, there is still no middle management structure to allow for communication between the two sectors.
- Any sort of comprehensive coordinating effort, including a centralized MTCR export control system, is therefore extremely difficult to implement. There are inevitably small or marginal players who are not part of the system and who may, in turn, decide to sell their technologies on the open market.
- This disconnect is heightened by two conflicting cultures in Russia: an emerging culture of entrepreneurialism on the one hand and the traditional supporters of centralized government controls on the other. State control of the aerospace industry may help control the diffusion of technology, but it is unlikely to be conducive to the promotion of free and competitive enterprise.
- Small corporations with no access to mainstream Russian technology did continue to interact with Iran after the establishment of the RSA, but because these companies were outside the classified sphere of the space technology industry, the Russian government thought they posed only marginal proliferation risks.
- Reacting to US criticism, the Russian Security Council has become more involved in export control issues and is spearheading an interagency study to close the remaining loopholes. The concept of export control is still new in Russia, and the government has little experience in regulating private industry, but is slowly becoming a champion of anti-proliferation and is cracking down on small firms and research institutes as a way to play up to the US.
- American business has had a difficult time promoting profitable commercial space ventures, in part because of regulatory obstacles, but large companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin have benefited from commercial spin-offs generated by these programs.
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An estimated 500,000 Russian engineers and scientists, in dozens of major enterprises and hundreds of smaller enterprises, now work on the ISS-approximately one-fifth of Russia's "best and brightest." Although it is hard to prove any direct correlation, this suggests that the ISS has kept Russian individuals and firms from selling their expertise to other countries. |
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The promotion of space cooperation as a positive instrument for national security is not well understood in Washington, nor has it been developed conceptually:
- The American satellite industry has been hurt by ill-conceived legislative initiatives to stall technology cooperation with Russia. A fear of being targeted for investigation has silenced the business community at a time when its advice and expertise is most needed.
- The space community has no effective policy voice in Washington. It is essential that the US has an individual of national stature and credibility who has a direct line to the president and who can represent the community. As part of the discussion, the group looked at the possibility of creating the position for such a person under the auspices of White House Science Adviser or within a reconstituted NASA that has clear national security and foreign policy authority.
- Successful space cooperation can only be sustained if it has an efficient institutional framework, clear channels of communication among relevant actors, and strong leadership.
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However, the creation and successful implementation of such an organization would be impeded by several factors:
- The atavistic division between civilian and military space programs, embodied in the organization of NASA and the Pentagon. Development of missile defenses already demonstrates a need for the active coordination of space activities.
- Insufficient collaboration between government and private industry, leading to governmental regulations that impede commerce and are injurious to American economic and security interests.
- Outmoded concepts of technology controls, which assume that the supply of technology can still be controlled exclusively by national governments.
- Continued hostility towards potential partners such as Russia and China.
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In the final analysis, the key stumbling block in the US to continued space cooperation is Russian compliance with the MTCR. That being said, in order for Russia to comply, continued US engagement on the ISS project and other joint ventures is essential. |
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