Susan Eisenhower

Russia and the Cold-War Warhorses

Susan Eisenhower

With the Helsinki summit at hand, it is vital that we rethink the motives behind many of the influential voices who say we should stand tough against the Russians.

Henry Kissinger, never one to beat around the bush, has come forth this week on NATO expansion. Supporting the alliance's eastward expansion--despite what he terms "dangerous conditions"--he said: "Whoever heard of a military alliance begging with a weakened adversary? NATO should not be turned into an instrument to conciliate Russia, or Russia will undermine it."

Perhaps Kissinger hasn't got the word that the Cold War is over. "'Adversary" is hardly a contemporary way to characterize a country that has moved forward with market-oriented reforms, held free and fair democratic elections, withdrawn from a bloody civil war and worked closely and productively with the United States under U.S. command in Bosnia. This week Boris Yeltsin appointed a new Council of Ministers, giving greatest power to two prominent Westernizers, former privatization czar Anatoly Chubais and regional radical reformer Boris Nemtzov.

Kissinger's comments and similar rhetoric used by Zbigniew Brzezinski are outdated. But at least they are honest about how they view Russia. Others have been less direct. In fact, the one part of the NATO expansion debate that has not been openly analyzed is the extent to which the expansion advocates have been driven by unreconstructed Cold War attitudes. There is much more of that than Americans living outside the Beltway might imagine. Many of the arguments used in Washington to debate this issue have an old-fashioned ring to them: "Don't appease Russia" and "No new Yalta."

Behind the old-fashioned labels is the view that says all relationships Russia has with the former Soviet republics or its former allies are open to suspicion and that only America should be allowed to dominate the post-Soviet world. "Is Russia really seeking a residual sphere of influence and to dilute the U.S. presence in Europe?" Brzezinski has asked rhetorically. Many who believe this will be happy only when Russia is isolated and excluded from Europe altogether.

Even if Russia had not changed an iota, the country has a legitimate right to be concerned about European security; it is, after all, a European country as well as an Asian one. But with the Soviet Union's agreement to the unification of Germany and acquiescence to Germany's desire to remain in NATO--as well as the Soviet and then Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Baltic Republics--the Russians have earned the right to be part of European decision-making. Instead of being part of the new security architecture for Europe, however, Russia has had to swallow the bitter pill of NATO enlargement.

The spirit of the Two Plus Four Treaty, which unified Germany, implied that eastward expansion of the Western alliance would stop there. As the Warsaw Pact was still in place at that time, the Soviets did not think to seek further assurances. The Russians know now, to their chagrin, that agreements with the West are worth nothing unless every contingency is spelled out in writing.

Many in Washington believe that we can call the shots on NATO without compromise because the United States won the Cold War and remains the world's only superpower. Regrettably, those who hold such chauvinistic ideas miss a crucial point: The Russians don't feel that they were defeated in the Cold War; they believe that the Cold War ended because they changed. Anyone who observed the elections results last year would have to agree. Despite horrendous living conditions among a significant portion of the population, the electorate resolutely refused to return to the past, thus defeating Yeltsin's communist rival.

The failure to see the end of the Cold War in the Russian context--as a victory over senseless military expenditures and unnatural domination--will prompt us to make perhaps the biggest mistake of the post-Cold War period: rushing to expand NATO without satisfactorily resolving our relationship with Russia first.

In this new era, Russia is needed to serve as a full partner in reducing weapons of mass destruction, tracking and apprehending terrorists, curbing organized crime and drug trafficking, and working with the rest of the world on issues related to energy security.

President Clinton will be right if he seeks accommodation with Moscow. As for the Russians as "adversaries," we must take such labels for what they are: anti-Russian rhetoric whose time, thankfully, has come and gone.

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