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Alexei Arbatov on NATO Expansion and Russia
During the week of March 21-27, 1998, Alexei Arbatov visited Washington, DC as the guest of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
First elected to the Russian State Duma in 1993, Alexei Arbatov is a member of the leadership of Yabloko, Russia's largest unimpeachably democratic party. Since 1995, Arbatov has been Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian parliament. He is a strong proponent of cooperation with the West and is a leader in the effort to ratify the Start-II treaty in the Russian Duma. His principal areas of interest as a parliamentarian are 1) arms control issues with the United States and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); 2) military reform and defense budget issues; and 3) Russian policy dealing with areas of conflict in countries that were formerly part of the USSR, as well as within Russia itself. Arbatov's current Duma assignments grew out of his experience in arms control beginning in the Gorbachev era. After writing his doctoral dissertation on U.S.-Russian security and arms control efforts, he became involved in the START-I negotiations in Geneva, and later served as a consultant on all the major Soviet-American and Russian-American arms control issues, including the START-II and CFE treaties.
While in Washington, Arbatov gave interviews to the news media (including an appearance on NewsHour with Jim Lehrer), made a presentation before the Washington Council on Foreign Relations, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and spoke or met with nearly two dozen other senators and congressmen, as well as another dozen or more analysts and foreign policy experts. His remarks centered around three topics: 1) Russian President Boris Yeltsin's recent sacking of his entire cabinet; 2) general issues regarding arms control and Russian military reform; and 3) the impact of NATO expansion on Russia.
This report, which Arbatov has approved, outlines his comments in some of these meetings, drawing special attention to his remarks on NATO expansion.
Contrary to what is being said by many Western proponents of NATO expansion,
Russians do care about NATO expansion, and they are almost unanimously opposed;
It is true that most Russians, like most Americans, are primarily concerned about everyday things and making ends meet. But almost everyone who has any interest at all in foreign affairs is very concerned. Millions of pensioners who remember World War II, all the military, workers in defense industries, intellectuals, government and political elites care very deeply about this issue. And nearly the full spectrum of Russian politicians is opposed to the expansion of NATO.
One of the main reasons Moscow opposes NATO expansion is that it will impede its efforts at reforming and scaling back its military. As the military capabilities of NATO increase and approach the Russian border, Moscow will be less willing to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction, reduce troop levels, and shift its remaining forces to defend against Russia's "real" threats, to the south and east. This would be a tremendous waste of resources.
Russians have not accepted the expansion of NATO as a fait accompli;
The decision to expand NATO is still affecting policy decisions in the Russian Duma: Senate ratification of the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic may lead to problems with the Start-II ratification vote. The Duma is pushing for a quick ratification of the Start-II agreement after their current recess. A debate is scheduled for April 24, with a vote expected no later than May 22, 1998. The timing and outcome of a Senate vote on NATO expansion could have a major impact on whether the Duma passes Start-II.
Arbatov said that after the votes of those Duma members either solidly "for" or solidly "against" Start-II have been taken into account, another 70-90 votes will be needed from Communist "swing" voters in order to achieve ratification. Although he is a strong supporter of Start-II and believes the treaty should be passed on its merits, Arbatov pointed out that these "swing" voters are not arms control experts. It is more likely that their vote for or against ratification will be based on their general impression of U.S.-Russian relations rather than strictly on the merits of the treaty. Therefore, an April or May decision in the Senate to push ahead with the expansion of NATO may lead to a Russian rejection of Start-II, or at the very least a delay of several months in the Russian vote.
Even if the Duma ratifies Start-II, Arbatov indicated that ratification would likely be conditional. Ratification will likely be contingent on the inclusion of a list of conditions under which the Russian president could, in the eyes of the Duma, "justifiably" withdrawal from the treaty. This list of conditions will almost certainly including a provision regarding NATO expansion. Without such a list, Arbatov indicated that it would be totally impossible to get enough support to ratify the Start-II treaty.
The prospect of NATO expansion has damaged U.S.-Russian relations;
NATO expansion has proceeded over Russian objections. For the past decade Russians were assured by the West that if Russia behaved itself, committed to domestic reforms, and resisted any moves to reestablish its empire, Russia would be taken into account as an equal partner in the international sphere. But Russia's views clearly have been disregarded on the issue of NATO expansion, and those who have advocated cooperation with the West feel betrayed.
The USSR under Gorbachev and the Russian Federation under Yeltsin did a lot to improve relations with the West, including withdrawing voluntarily from Central and Eastern Europe and signing arms control agreements that called for Russia to make larger force reductions than the U.S. Russia has taken American interests into account and has sacrificed on many issues for the sake of good relations. But on NATO expansion, an issue that is very important to Russia, Russians feel like their interests have not been taken into account.
If Russians saw a clear and logical reason for expansion, perhaps their reaction would be different. But Russia does not understand what the reasoning behind NATO expansion is. If NATO is for collective defense, Russians ask, who is NATO defending against with this expansion? If NATO is to be a new multilateral peacekeeping organization, why has Russia not being asked to join as soon as possible? Moreover, Russians do not understand why there is such a hurry to expand NATO now. Some in the West say that NATO is changing, but no agreement has been reached about its new strategic concept. Let NATO change first, and then expand--rather than expanding first while asking Russia not to react.
Arbatov said Russians were also troubled by the American rejection of a proposed treaty banning tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. If NATO has peaceful intentions, then why do they need to preserve an option to move their nuclear arsenal further east?
A likely Russian response to NATO expansion would be military alliance with Belarus. And, of course, Moscow would assure the West that the alliance was not aimed at them. Russian willingness to cooperate on regional issues like the Balkans and Persian Gulf, as well as on non-proliferation at large, would be hampered.
NATO expansion will remain a permanent seed of mistrust, controversy, and deadlocks on a wide range of international issues.
NATO expansion is not good for Russian democrats;
the only Russians who would benefit are nationalists and Communists.
Arbatov, himself a representative of Russia's only unimpeachably democratic party, Yabloko, said that the expansion of NATO would not topple Russian democracy, but it would certainly make the goals of Russian democrats harder to achieve. The extension of NATO would undercut Russian democrats, whose reform policies are predicated on cooperation with the West. Those who have advocated cooperation would be held responsible for what is universally seen in Russia as a major defeat of Moscow's policy of partnership with the West. Opponents of such cooperation will claim vindication and will try to move Moscow closer to anti-Western regimes and rogue states.
Other points made by Arbatov are outlined below.
On the argument that senators cannot afford to be seen as caving in to Russian demands, because "the American people cannot distinguish between the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union":
If Americans are able to distinguish between contemporary Germany and Nazi Germany, they should be able to do the same for Russia and the USSR. While the USSR imprisoned the "captive nations" of Central and Eastern Europe, it was Russia that freed them--not the U.S. or anyone else. This is just one of many significant differences between the Soviet Union and democratic Russia.
Regarding the argument "the train has left the station" and that the Senate has no choice but to vote for ratification of the accession protocols:
There is an alternative. The vote on expansion could be postponed at least until Fall of this year. NATO could begin a negotiation process with Russia on the conditions of Russia's possible entry into NATO, thereby taking Russian interests seriously into account and including her in the planning of Europe's future security infrastructure--without prematurely committing either side to Russia's inclusion in NATO. This would allow Russia to judge NATO's intentions and its sincerity in proclaiming an "open door" policy.
If Moscow really wants closer cooperation with the West, why doesn't it indicate an interest in joining NATO?
If Russia lobbied to join NATO, all of the former Soviet states would then rush into NATO, slamming the door shut behind them before Russia could join.
On the argument that Start-II and Start-III are not really important anymore, given Russia's economic constraints and its shared interest with the West in reducing military costs.
Start-II is important for at least three reasons: 1) it implies a corresponding U.S. reduction (rather than a unilateral Russian reduction for economic reasons); 2) it will influence decisions about Russian weapons programs: without Start-II, there would be a growing pressure in favor of turning back to MIRVed ICBMs because they are so cost-effective; 3) it opens the way to Start-III, which would allow Russia to allocate more of its defense spending to military reform, rather than the construction of either numerous and expensive single-warhead missiles or new MIRVed ICBMs.
Even if the U.S. was transparent and reduced its forces unilaterally, Russia might still consider MIRVing. Based on the recent record of political cooperation, especially regarding the reunification of Germany and NATO expansion, Russia is increasingly skeptical of informal agreements and unwritten assurances. Russia can make key security decisions for the next 10-15 years with confidence only with legally binding assurances.