NATO's Credibility

"NATO at Fifty"

NATO's Credibility: Past, Present, and Future

Jeremy D. Rosner

One of the dogs that did not bark during the Senate's debate over NATO enlargement was the argument that NATO is not needed. Not a single Senator argued against adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance on the grounds that NATO is militarily ineffective or no longer relevant to trans-Atlantic security. Not one called for NATO's abolition. Indeed, many on the losing side of the Senate's 80-19 vote, such as Senator John Warner (R-Va.), went to great lengths to note their strong support for the Alliance.

The absence of serious attacks on the Alliance is a token of NATO's broad credibility and legitimacy. Its political and military importance during the Cold War is scarcely doubted. Its role in Bosnia was essential to stopping the fighting. NATO's credibility and legitimacy, in turn, are helping to establish the Alliance as the clear instrument of choice when the United States and its trans-Atlantic allies and partners need to act together militarily.

For these and other reasons, solid majorities of the American public have consistently expressed a favorable impression of the organization. Opinion is more variable across Europe, but NATO is still widely respected on the far side of the Atlantic as well. The public in Great Britain, rates NATO more highly than virtually any other international institution.

It is increasingly clear that NATO's first expansion of its membership since the end of the Cold War will enhance and not harm its strong reputation. Months, now, since the completion of the ratification process, the dire predictions made about enlargement during the American debate have proved to be empty.

The impact of enlargement on Russia-the biggest worry-has been virtually nonexistent. To be sure, Russia's economy was decimated by the Asian flu and its own structural flaws, reformers were purged from the government as Yeltsin's health declined, and the Communist-dominated Duma once again delayed ratification of START II after the U.S. bombing of Iraq. But NATO's enlargement played no role in any of this, and it certainly did not push us to the nuclear precipice with Moscow, as some enlargement critics rashly suggested it might. On the contrary, enlargement helped deepen Russia's commitment to behave as a satisfied power and responsible neighbor.

Nor has enlargement set loose any arms race in Central Europe. The states not invited into the Alliance have not been destabilized. Rather, they are more secure now that the process of enlargement is under way. And with the three new members fulfilling their promises to invest heavily in their own military modernization, there is no indication the American taxpayer will somehow be left holding much of the tab for NATO's expansion.

It may be too early to say how NATO's decision making will work at nineteen members rather than sixteen. Yet the early signs suggest that it is current members, such as France, more than new members, who are most likely to stand in the way of muscular and coherent NATO decisions.

Indeed, enlargement is strengthening NATO's standing and legitimacy. The process proved NATO's value in addressing Europe's most important security challenge after the Cold War: integrating the continent's post-Communist states into the community of secure market democracies.

Enlargement has also provided an anchor for centrist politics in Central Europe and has encouraged states in the region to play a mature and outward-looking role in the region's security. A broad number of Polish leaders recently have expressed the view, for example, that having been helped by the United States and NATO, they now have a responsibility to help others in the region, such as Lithuania and Slovakia.

NATO's enlargement, in the end, will be seen as an appropriate, responsible, and constructive step for the Alliance. Yet that is hardly enough to ensure that the Alliance will retain the credibility and legitimacy it has enjoyed for the past half century.

The key to the continuation of NATO's credibility is its effectiveness. To be effective as the guarantor of trans-Atlantic security, NATO must continue to prove that it is both willing and able to act decisively in the face of serious security threats. It sounds like a simple prescription, but it is by no means a foregone conclusion.

It seems obvious that NATO must confront whatever threatens its members. NATO was not created simply to fend off a Soviet invasion, although that became its principal mission during the Cold War. The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty sets out a far broader mission: "to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area ... [and] to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security." NATO's members learned at great cost during the early days of the Bosnian conflict that the Alliance suffers badly if it neglects that mission and stands idle in the face of genuine threats to trans-Atlantic security and stability.

As President Bill Clinton and other allied leaders have stressed, NATO's core mission remains collective defense. The possibility of a major power attack on NATO's members in the future cannot be completely dismissed. Yet we can hardly turn NATO into the MaytagTM Repairman of trans-Atlantic security-asking it to sit back and wait endlessly for the phone to ring in case "the big one" comes. (In the lead up to the NATO ratification effort, one Senator suggested we should keep NATO out of minor conflicts and save it for "real aggression," as if what the Serbs did in Bosnia did not fit that bill.)

Today the threats to trans-Atlantic security are diverse, and they require that NATO look and act outside its own borders. The most important security project on the Continent remains the progressive integration of the post-Communist states, including Russia, into Europe's fabric of market democracy. NATO has played a key role in that effort. It is no accident that the European Union (EU) finally moved to begin its integration of these states only after NATO got the enlargement ball rolling-and it needs to continue in the vanguard. At NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington in April, the Alliance must not only state that the door to NATO membership remains open, but also commit to concrete steps that will help prepare additional states for membership. It should begin to suggest-although not commit to-a timeframe for the next invitations.

NATO needs to find stronger ways to act decisively against incipient threats to the shared interests and security of its members that originate from outside NATO's borders. That is why a forceful response was essential in Bosnia and remains essential in Kosovo. In addition to the tinder box of the Balkans NATO's members face the threats from state-sponsored terrorism, the disruptions of vital energy supplies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the development by rogue regimes of ballistic missiles. There is no reason NATO should consider any of these beyond its concern or scope of action.

At the Washington summit, the Allies need to adopt a new strategic concept that acknowledges NATO's need to prepare and act to deter such threats against the security and interests of its members. This would not be a formula for a "global NATO" that gets dragged into far-flung conflicts. NATO operates by consensus, which ensures its operations will stick close to the security priorities of the United States and other members. Even so, to gain support from all our Allies for this new strategic concept, President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will need to apply every ounce of the impressive leadership and persuasion they applied in their successful efforts to bring NATO enlargement to fruition.

Some have lately argued that the United States cannot expect European Allies to join in military action in the Middle East and elsewhere outside Europe. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tex.), for example, recently suggested that we should expect to conduct such missions largely on our own, as we recently did (along with the British) in Iraq. We should, therefore, insist on a division of labor that "makes the European members primarily responsible for security on the continent." Hutchison ultimately voted for NATO's enlargement, but has been a vocal critic of the NATO mission in Bosnia and has incorrectly implied, along with others, that the United States is carrying the lion's share of the load in Stabilization Force (SFOR) there.

Yet this attitude-"if you won't, then we won't"-is a recipe for European crisis and NATO dissolution. If we plan not to serve alongside Europeans when Europe is threatened from within, and if they plan not to act with us when the threats come from without, then why do we need an alliance? Moreover, if the United States refuses to serve on the ground in European conflicts, then others will refuse as well. Tensions will fester and conflicts will tend to burn out of control. Europe may now have a common currency, but it is unlikely to have a common security policy or military will at any time in the near future.

Hutchison is right to be concerned about the reluctance of our Allies to join us in tackling security threats outside Europe. But the solution is not to answer their foolish attitude with folly of our own. Rather, we should be working to change the policies of those of our Allies who have so far adopted a head-in-the-sand outlook.

A new strategic concept is part of the solution, for it will make clear that the Alliance and all its members see such action by NATO as appropriate. More of the Allies also need to follow the example of the Blair government in launching military reforms that will make Britain's forces more mobile and more able to contribute meaningfully to operations outside Europe. The growing disparity in military capabilities between the United States and the other Allies, if not remedied, will ensure an increase in Europe's military free-rider mentality and a corresponding erosion of American political support for our trans-Atlantic ties.

Critics of this program already argue that there is not sufficient political support, especially in the United States, for additional rounds of enlargement and a new strategic concept that would commit NATO to a broader role in and around Europe. The evidence suggests otherwise.

Indeed, on the question of a new strategic concept, the Senate has already voiced its support. On April 28 during the enlargement ratification debate, the Senate voted by an overwhelming and bipartisan 90-9 margin in favor of an amendment by Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) that stressed the need for a revised strategic concept. The amendment reaffirmed the centrality of collective defense but also called for the new strategic concept to address other threats, from disruption of energy flows to "transnational threats." Two days later, the Senate cast an overwhelming vote against an amendment by Senator John Ashcroft (R-Mo.) that was seen as an effort to discourage out-of-area missions.

Even before such amendments were voted, the resolution of ratification adopted by the fairly conservative Foreign Relations Committee of Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) included language that was seen as accepting a broad view of NATO's role. The committee approved a clause, preserved in the final resolution, which says that NATO may engage in "other missions [than collective defense] ... when there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members" [emphasis added].

The political dynamics of going beyond nineteen members are more difficult. It certainly will not be easy to get the Senate to support adding further new members to NATO. It was not easy this time. Moreover, the Senate is unlikely to provide its advice and consent-indeed, it should not-until two additional factors are present. First, there will need to be some evidence that the integration into the Alliance of the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Czechs is proceeding according to plan. Second, there will need to be additional applicants who can put forward the same kind of strong political, economic, and strategic credentials that made these first three such attractive candidates.

Once these two conditions are met, however, there is every reason to believe that public and Senate support can be mustered, as they were this time. Some argue that without Poland in the mix, a ratification drive will lack support from Polish Americans and, therefore, will fail. Nonsense. For one thing, just as Poland (along with Hungary and the Czech Republic) has been a leader in the effort to keep NATO's door open and to reach out to other NATO aspirants, so Polish Americans (along with other ethnics) have been leaders here at home for the continuation of the enlargement process.

There is a more fundamental point. The Senate did not support NATO enlargement because of domestic pressure from ethnic Americans, as important as their support was. This was not a Pole-driven exercise. The Senate supported enlargement because it made sense for America's security. Domestic political considerations have been hugely overstated. Just ask former Senators Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.) or Carol Mosely-Braun (D-Ill.), whose votes in favor of enlargement did nothing to prevent them from losing their Senate seats. Or ask Senators Arlen Specter (R-Penn.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), who easily won reelection in 1998 despite their "no" votes. Or ask the dozens of Senators who voted in favor of enlargement despite the paucity of ethnic voters in their states.

Moreover, when the next rounds of enlargement come to a vote, supporters will be able to make a strong argument that the Senate in April 1998 voted not only for three members, but also for a process. By rejecting Senator Warner's amendment that would have imposed a moratorium on the enlargement process, the Senate made clear that it anticipated this past round would not be the last. Certainly, the Senate ceded none of its right to review the next applicants and judge their fitness. But the basic case for the process of enlargement has now been successfully made in the Senate, and much of the educating and debating that occurred during this past round will help lay the ground for the next.

Congress ultimately treated NATO enlargement with great seriousness and made vital contributions to the policy. The quality of the Senate resolution, amendments, and debate; the more than one dozen hearings on the issue in both chambers; the diligent work of the bipartisan Senate NATO Observer Group; the participation of House and Senate members in the previous NATO summit in Madrid-all these reflected the seriousness with which the United States and its leaders regard the NATO Alliance as it enters its sixth decade.

For NATO to continue enjoying that high regard, it must be willing to face the new and broader range of security threats that affect the interests we share with our trans-Atlantic Allies and partners. If NATO is willing to tackle that challenge with us, then it likely can count on continuing support from both American political parties and both branches of government.

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