Doorey

"NATO at Fifty"

Maintaining NATO's Military Preeminence

Timothy Doorey

"Even the bravest cannot fight beyond his strength" - Homer, The Iliad

In March 1998, more than 50,000 troops from fifteen NATO and ten Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations participated in NATO's major triennial field exercise, "Strong Resolve 98." Unlike earlier NATO exercises, Strong Resolve 98 involved two simultaneous crises in separate geographic regions. Each crisis required a tailored military response and command arrangement.

In a sense, Strong Resolve 98 was a "dress rehearsal" for NATO's military future-a vision of the range of missions and military capabilities the Alliance will need in the coming decades if it is to remain relevant to the security concerns of NATO members and PfP countries.

Strong Resolve 98 was jointly planned and executed by the two major NATO Commanders, SACLANT and SACEUR. The exercise forced the participating NATO and PfP militaries to perform a range of military operations from traditional (Article 5) territorial defense in Crisis North, to more likely out-of-area (non-Article 5) missions of evacuating noncombatants from a strife-torn nation, while providing humanitarian assistance and other peace support operations in Crisis South.

In Crisis North, conducted in a remote area of northern Norway, ten NATO allies faced an "opposing force" while also dealing with extreme cold weather, and transportation and supply challenges-all valuable training when one considers how these same problems hampered NATO's original Implementation Force (IFOR) when it first deployed to Bosnia in December 1995.

Meanwhile, in the southeastern Atlantic, western Mediterranean Sea, and Iberian Peninsula (simulating fictitious countries located beyond NATO's traditional area of responsibility), the eleven NATO and ten PfP militaries participating in Crisis South conducted a complex peace-support operation. Under the command of a sea-based, NATO-led Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), this part of Strong Resolve 98 demonstrated the viability of the maritime-based CJTF concept. It also proved, once again, the value of having NATO and PfP militaries working together-as they have in Bosnia-in a "coalition of the willing" type of arrangement.

By all measures, Strong Resolve 98 was a success. This was an even greater feat when one considers that NATO also had 35,000 troops (29,000 from NATO countries and 6,000 from non-NATO countries) deployed in Bosnia as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) during the exercise.

If one judges solely from NATO's accomplishments in 1998, it would appear that the Alliance is well positioned to meet the military challenges of the next decade. However, despite recent achievements, a number of disturbing trends are eroding NATO members' aggregate military capabilities. Failure to adequately address these negative trends will cast doubt on NATO's future efficacy, as well as on the collective political will of member nations to field and maintain the forces required to perform the very missions exercised in Strong Resolve 98.

To complete NATO's transformation from a Cold War, static, collective defense organization to the flexible and effective crisis management force demonstrated in Strong Resolve 98, the Alliance must overcome three significant obstacles:

• The Alliance's existing conventional force posture is ill-suited for the unconventional Article 5 and out-of-area non-Article 5 challenges it will most likely face in the future. New capabilities must be acquired, and those no longer needed should be shelved or discarded.
  
  
• NATO's integrated military structure and its command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) technology are inappropriate for most of the Alliance's future tasks. The key to NATO's future military effectiveness in non-Article 5 operations is the integration of the Alliance's CJTF concept and PfP program. Neither is fully developed, and both lack sufficient high-level support and funding prioritization to reach maturation.
  
  
• Members' defense budgets are in a death spiral. Combined with misplaced spending priorities for those meager funds remaining, these trends exacerbate the problems outlined above, causing a steep decline in NATO's military effectiveness.

Future Security Challenges

Fortunately, North America and Europe no longer face a credible conventional threat to their territorial integrity. For the foreseeable future, the primary security threats facing Alliance members will be unconventional attacks either by rogue nations or by terrorist groups, which will possibly employ weapons of mass destruction or information warfare tactics. In addition, most of NATO's southern flank will soon be within range of theater ballistic missiles, possibly by as early as 2006.1 Since these types of Article 5 threats to Europe and North America are relatively new developments, NATO can be excused for not having an Alliance-wide response capability already in place. However, failure to confront these threats in the years ahead, in a coordinated fashion, will undermine political support for the Alliance.

Secondary security challenges facing both Alliance and PfP nations include instability on NATO's periphery and threats to Europe and North American economic and energy lifelines. According to former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry:

To deal with such threats, Alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory. This concept is not new. Such a "coalition of the willing" made up the Implementation Force in Bosnia under Alliance command and control, and another made up the war-fighting force in Desert Storm, which drew heavily on alliance training and procedures.2

As the Gulf War and Bosnia demonstrated in the early 1990s, NATO and PfP nations need different military capabilities in order to respond to security threats outside their European Central Region "comfort zone." Yet, almost a decade after the Gulf War, what is the state of NATO's out-of-area military capabilities?

According to Michael O'Hanlon, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution, "... the European arm of the alliance is physically incapable of deploying and operating significant military force beyond its own nations' borders." Most NATO members lack the strategic air and sealift required to project power, nor do they have the logistics capability to sustain large forces once deployed.3 Today, some NATO countries find it difficult to sustain more than a battalion-sized deployment.4

Even the United Kingdom, one of a handful of European militaries capable of deploying large military forces abroad-as it did in the Gulf War and Bosnia-admits to shortcomings. In a recent interview, George Robertson, the United Kingdom's Secretary of State for Defence, pointed out that as late as mid-1997 the Ministry of Defence found the following:

... on the configuration of our forces, there was a general feeling we still were largely in a Cold War posture, configured for yesterday's enemies-not tomorrow's threats. What we needed to do was reconfigure our forces for the kinds of problems and crises that we are going to have to deal with in the future. That required a Strategic Defense Review (SDR) that started from an assessment of foreign policy.5

The first challenge for NATO's continued transformation is the further development and integration of the Alliance's two major post-Cold War initiatives: the Partnership for Peace program and the Combined Joint Task Force concept. Despite the PfP and CJTF programs' contribution to IFOR, SFOR, and Strong Resolve 98, both programs are in desperate need of high-level support and increased funding.

Launched in January 1994, the PfP effort has been instrumental in building stronger working relations between the militaries of NATO and the twenty-eight former Warsaw Pact nations, Soviet republics, and heretofore-neutral countries like Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Despite its ambitious charter, the PfP program is still allocated only a sliver of the Alliance's estimated $1.8 billion common-funded budget pie. If NATO is indeed serious about building closer working relationships with the twenty-seven PfP nations' militaries, the effort will need additional resources and higher visibility.

During its 1996 Berlin Summit, NATO approved the CJTF concept as the Alliance's command arrangement for out-of-area operations. Since then, with the exception of a few trial exercises, the CJTF concept has languished. For all practical purposes, implementation of the concept remains largely unfunded. For the CJTF concept to work, member and partner militaries must have, as a minimum, access to modern, mobile, secure, and interoperable communications. Today, most of NATO's communication systems are hopelessly antiquated and remain tethered to fixed NATO headquarters. The interoperability gap among Alliance members is actually growing as members invest vastly different sums on disparate communication and computer systems.6 General Klaus Naumann, the chairman of NATO's Military Committee, has warned of a "strategic disconnect" that is opening between the United States and NATO's European members. Noting U.S. moves toward new, high-tech weapons and information-warfare systems, Naumann said, "I am beginning to worry that one day we will wake up and find that our armies can no longer work well together."7

The second, and by far the most troubling, challenge standing between NATO and the military capabilities it will need in the coming decades is the steady decline in members' defense budgets. At the end of the Cold War, NATO nations were quick to cash in their "peace dividends." Across the Alliance, defense budgets dropped precipitously as nations shed forces, armaments, and military personnel.

If we compare in constant prices, NATO nations' defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product have declined from 4.6 percent (average 1985-89) to 2.7 percent in 1997.8 While the dramatic and positive changes in the European security environment justified large reductions in defense spending in the early 1990s, these cuts have continued long after Saddam Hussien and Slobodon Milosevic demonstrated to the world that the post-Cold War era was not going to be nearly as peaceful as most policy makers had hoped. Current reductions in defense spending are no longer linked to favorable developments in the security environment, but appear to be driven by efforts to balance budgets or meet the Maastricht Treaty's strict economic criteria for membership in the new European Monetary Union.

It is important to understand the cumulative impact that defense cuts have had on NATO's force structure and readiness levels. One must also consider the effect that further cuts will have on NATO's military cohesion and utility if reductions continue into the next decade. Between 1990 and mid-1997, according to NATO statistics, the Alliance saw the following changes to the size and readiness levels of its land, sea, and air component forces:

• Land Forces-Major combat units available to NATO have been reduced by 35 percent. Only 35 percent of this reduced force is kept at thirty days or less readiness levels, compared to 90 percent maintained at two days or less readiness in 1990.
  
  
• Maritime Forces-Major naval combatants available to NATO have been reduced by 32 percent. Fewer than 60 percent are now at thirty days or less readiness levels, compared to three-quarters maintained at two days or less readiness in 1990.
  
  
• Air Forces-Combat squadrons available to NATO have been cut by 41percent. Only about half are at thirty days readiness or less, compared to nearly 70 percent at twelve hours readiness in 1990.9

Further reductions in defense spending will cripple most European members' military contribution to the Alliance. At a time when most of Europe is moving away from conscription toward an expensive professional force, little funding will be available for the purchase of new military capabilities. For example, Britain and the United States currently spend approximately 38 to 40 percent of their total defense expenditures on personnel (allowing 25 to 26 percent for new equipment purchases). By comparison, many continental European nations allocate between 60 to 78 percent of their defense budgets to personnel, leaving only 5 to 20 percent for the procurement of new equipment.10

Certainly, the deficiencies noted above are not lost on NATO's potential adversaries. One needs only to remember the unhappy experience of the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia to know what happens when undermanned and ill-equipped military forces (with fuzzy mandates) are placed in harm's way. It is time for all NATO and PfP nations to embrace the lessons of UNPROFOR and acquire the robust military capabilities needed to be effective in a dangerous world.

Facing the Problem

To date, NATO's official response to members' declining military budgets and capabilities has been to change the subject. Instead, most of NATO's discussions focus on solving the problem of Kosovo, enlarging NATO, enhancing European Security and Defense Identity, and restructuring and reapportioning commands (and commanders) in the Alliance's new integrated military structure. As important as these subjects are, they will not determine the Alliance's military relevance in the twenty-first century. By keeping discussions in the political and theoretical realm, NATO avoids the uncomfortable subjects of inadequate defense budgets, burden sharing, and the pressing need to acquire new military capabilities.

Even NATO insiders are concerned by the misplaced emphasis. In October 1996, Sir John Goulden, the British Ambassador to NATO, warned the Royal United Services Institute in London, "NATO cannot live by high policy alone." He stated that operating in Bosnia, admitting new members from Central and Eastern Europe, and forging a European identity within NATO were "grabbing too much of NATO's attention" at the expense of less-glamorous but longer-term problems like shrinking defense budgets.11

Some will argue that after the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance's military dimension is no longer that important; NATO's political and diplomatic strengths can guarantee member nations' security. However, it has always been NATO's impressive military capabilities that set the Alliance apart-and a cut above-all other security organizations. In other words, NATO's unique military capabilities have given the organization credibility in an unruly world. Failure to understand this linkage between credible military capabilities and NATO's political clout will eventually turn NATO into a paper tiger and will undermine the Alliance's security guarantees.

Throughout the Cold War, the Alliance has found it difficult to fulfill its own conventional force structure requirements or goals.12 The security situation today permits no such leeway because the Alliance's nuclear deterrent cannot compensate for shortcomings in its conventional forces. If the Alliance is content to do no more than guarantee members' territorial integrity from a conventional attack, then little change is necessary since no credible conventional threat is likely in the foreseeable future. However, if NATO intends to have the option of responding to unconventional threats to its territory, or threats to NATO and PfP nations' common interests abroad, a radical transformation in military strategy and reapportionment of resources is required.

The Way Ahead

The first step toward building an effective military alliance is for NATO to envision the military force it seeks to achieve. NATO nations must focus their energies and resources on developing the range of capabilities demonstrated in Strong Resolve 98, while emphasizing the development and integration of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, and the Alliance's Partnership for Peace program. The Alliance must then find a way to fund those key military capabilities and training efforts that are essential to fielding such a mobile and capable force.

Keeping NATO militarily robust, versatile, and relevant to the security challenges of the next decade-in a fiscally constrained environment-is a daunting, but crucial, challenge. Like the United Kingdom, member nations-including the United States-need to reexamine and reconcile their own security requirements with those of the Alliance, and then make the difficult choices regarding defense spending priorities, future force structure, readiness, and doctrine.

Conclusion

NATO, at fifty, is suffering an identity crisis. Having outlived its original purpose and no longer facing 175 Warsaw Pact divisions across the inter-German border to focus its attention, it has yet to decide what its military role should be in the future. Continued indecision will cause NATO's collective military capabilities to dissipate. Since military structure follows political purpose, NATO's soon-to-be nineteen members must focus their attention on preparing the Alliance to respond to the security challenges of the next century. Adapting NATO's military capabilities over the next decade-in an era of relative peace, globalization, and declining defense budgets-is essential if NATO is to play a constructive role in the world.

Fortunately, there are signs of hope. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has demonstrated a willingness to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment-conceptually, organizationally, and operationally. Bosnia taught us that the military alternative to NATO is usually inaction. What NATO needs as it enters the next decade is an implementation plan (and the political will) to fulfill the obligations of a new strategic environment. That implementation plan must link the Alliance's new strategic concept to the military capabilities and force planning goals that are the foundation of the Alliance.

1 Ian O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis, "Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean," (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1996, x).
2 Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, "NATO's True Mission," New York Times, 21 October 1997, 27.
3 Michael O'Hanlon, "Paying for NATO," Washington Times, 16 October 1997, 17.
4 Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman, USA, "NATO's Military Future," Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 11, (Spring 1996): 77.
5 Interview with Ian Kemp, Jane's Defense Weekly, 28 October 1998, 32.
6 Jonathan S. Landay, "U.S. Military Outpaces Its NATO Peers," Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 1997, 1.
7 Norman Polmar, "The Republic Navies," Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 123/6/1,135, (September 1997): 119.
8 "Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries, 1975-1997," NATO Review, Vol. 46, No.1, (Spring 1998): D-14.
9 NATO Press Information Office, "The Transformation of NATO's Defense Posture," Madrid Summit, July 8-9, 1997.
10 "Table 5: Distribution of Total Defense Expenditures by Category," NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Spring 1998): D-16.
11 "NATO Called Back To Basics" London Financial Times, 4 October 1996, Pg. 3.
12 For a comprehensive analysis of the disconnect between NATO force goals and what forces the Allies actually fielded, see John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Return to top of page