NATO After the Attacks

NATO After the Attacks

By Sean Kay
September 25, 2001

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an alliance united, representing the core of America's international political and security partnerships. And yet NATO is not likely to play a direct role in the US-led international response to global terrorism sparked by the September attacks on American territory. In what is envisioned in the US to be a closely coordinated political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence and military strategy bringing together close allies, partners, and even previously hostile countries, NATO is only one component; perhaps it is not even the most important.

That said, the Allies have signaled a strong statement of political solidarity with the United States. It is in the political sphere that the historic NATO decision to declare the attacks on New York and Washington, DC, as an assault on all nineteen allies is best understood. If political unity were not essential to the success of any strategy, or judging on military contributions alone, NATO involvement would hardly be necessary.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has engaged in a difficult process of adapting its Cold War structures to meet the security challenges of a new era. Some policies have worked well. Although the alliance dithered for over four years as the casualty toll in Bosnia rose to some 250,000 dead or missing by 1995, NATO did eventually play a pivotal role in bringing peace to this tragic region. In embarking on limited enlargement, NATO was able to help foster regional stability by helping to mediate the rising power of Germany against the declining power of Russia. In NATO's most controversial role, its campaign against Serbia had mixed results. Lacking even rudimentary coordinating mechanisms to articulate common operational concepts for intervention-let alone diplomatic priorities-serious divisions emerged in the trans-Atlantic relationship. NATO did not function well as an organization during this war, but, it should be noted, did ultimately meet its objectives.

These accomplishments aside, NATO also has tended to be reactive, responding to crises in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner. As such, the alliance seems ill prepared to respond effectively to the threat that brought about the first invocation of its collective defense mission. The question now is: what is to become of NATO and its core agenda?

In the immediate future, NATO's role in facilitating an international response against terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, will be a supportive and largely informal one. Any idea of a "global NATO" has already been ruled out by the allies, reflecting the long-standing European reluctance to being drawn into American-led operations outside its immediate spheres of interest. NATO's planning procedures, consultative forums, and intelligence sharing, however, may be able to help coordinate a coalition of like-minded states as long as this involves non-European operations.

For example, NATO has already contributed to the counterterrorism effort by facilitating diplomatic and military cooperation among key Eurasian states, promoting dialogue through the instrument of the Partnership for Peace (PFP). Through PFP, the United States and its European allies have worked closely with non-NATO members, including Uzbekistan, for example. Some of these countries may become key staging grounds for anti-terrorist operations. NATO's institutional partnership with Russia, in particular, is now showing its true potential and can be expected to expand in areas such as intelligence and information sharing in the coming months.

NATO's recent willingness to work in support of a European Union security identity also will be crucial to Europe's effectiveness in supporting the coming operations. The creation of a functional working relationship between NATO and the EU is now being forced to move beyond theory and into practice. As the United States shifts its geopolitical focus, it may soon become essential for European forces to be prepared to take the lead in peacekeeping in the Balkans, for example. America already had been contemplating a reallocation of resources from Europe to other regions well before the terrorist attacks. Aside from retaining a strong American presence in Turkey, whose bases may be used to support counterterrorist air strikes, the shift away from Europe is almost a certainty.

The longer-term picture for NATO is murkier. The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 disasters has left the entire international community in a state of flux. Suddenly, the United States has found itself, while welcoming the support of its NATO allies, giving higher priority to Russia and other states of Eurasia which might assist it in military and intelligence operations. Reactions have been mixed. From the perspective of some European allies, the quest for new partners denotes a sudden willingness of US President George Bush and his advisers to assert a long-term commitment to international cooperation. This is a welcome change for those who feared that the alliance could collapse under the weight of American unilateralism.

If the advice and perspective of allies is ignored in the coming conflict, however, then the United States may exacerbate resistance to America's "go it alone" policies. Divisiveness over the wisdom of military tactics or the overall strategy could have profoundly adverse effects on the alliance. The United States might proceed unilaterally in these complex operations, but should realize that it does so only at its peril.

America's NATO allies know about terrorism. They have been its targets and have suffered from its consequences for decades. The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey have all suffered from sustained terrorist campaigns, in one form or another. Russia is currently involved in what it sees to be a terrorist campaign waged by Chechen separatists who are targeting civilian populations throughout the country. Experienced voices in these governments will support American efforts to root out terrorists and to deliver justice. Unlike some Americans, however, many have learned, after much bloodshed, that conventional uses of the military may not always be the best tool for defeating terrorist networks.

European leaders already have cautioned Washington against certain military actions, which, should they result in widespread civilian casualties or seem disproportionate in their lethality, could play into the hands of those who committed the original atrocities. For many European leaders, even the concept of "war" is not the appropriate response to the recent attacks on the United States. French President Jacques Chirac refused to characterize the coming campaign in such terms when he met with President Bush one week after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.

It is safe to say that the Europeans will be prepared to support a sustained campaign against terrorism and they will work through NATO whenever this is appropriate. But to succeed, any strategy will have to carefully calibrate European views about the choice of instruments-diplomacy, economic leverage, intelligence sharing, and, when deemed effective, military power-if an enduring allied commitment is to survive. To date, the Bush team appears to have had an open ear to the allies. The reckless rhetoric labeling America's response a "crusade" was quickly reined in, and American officials moderated their words-it is now a "campaign."

In a recent speech in Boston, former president George Bush, the incumbent's father, perhaps put it best when he said that we needed to "erase the concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism, or in anything else for that matter." But the Bush II administration still seems divided. There are those who would work closely with allies and partners (Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example, and his principal deputy, Richard Armitage) and those who seem to prefer a more unilateral approach (such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his principal deputy, Paul Wolfowitz.)

Key American advisers have argued that ending Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq is essential to the credibility of a war against terrorism, for example. The allies might be expected to join the United States in such an effort if the evidence were provided that Iraq was involved in the recent attack. But short of that, any veiled excuse to attack Iraq would likely create significant divisiveness in the transatlantic relationship-to say nothing of the Arab-Muslim community whose support the United States is avidly courting.

Two other issues on NATO's agenda will continue to complicate US-European security cooperation. First is the US insistence on pursuing national missile defenses, over the strong opposition of Russia, China, as well as the European allies. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said recently in Moscow that the attacks on the United States show that missile defense is now more important than ever. Such statements demonstrate America's tin ear to allied concerns, and its inability to reassess new global security dynamics from which it cannot be immune. If anything, the recent terrorist attacks have undermined the near-term case for missile defense. Both the European allies and Russia will eventually push the point that Washington has given priority to technologies that do not work for a threat that does not yet exist.

Second is NATO enlargement, which remains on the Alliance's agenda for its 2002 summit in Prague. Of all of the items on NATO's pre-existing agenda, enlargement is most likely to be affected by recent events. Simply put, America needs Russia. This is not to say that the US is about to undertake radical revisions in policy, such as conceding the Baltic states to a Russian sphere of influence. That will not happen. But other mechanisms will have to be found to assuage Baltic aspirations for NATO membership. It will be necessary for the US to devise creative alternatives, and it is in its interest to do so.

NATO's and Europe's security challenges now lie to the south and southeast. Consequently, NATO enlargement will have to take on a new meaning. The alliance will have to prioritize membership criteria and reorient these to take better account of threat-based and geopolitical factors. NATO likely will still enlarge in 2002. But suddenly it may be Romania and Bulgaria, which look attractive, more so than the three Baltic States, simply by nature of where they sit on the geostrategic map. While the Baltic countries might eventually join NATO, their membership prospects for 2002 are increasingly dim.

For all of the limitations, NATO can be a very useful tool for the United States as it leads the world's anti-terrorist campaign. Over time, Washington and its European allies should look carefully at their shared history. NATO was formed as part of a broad strategy to deal with the security challenges in the aftermath of World War II. NATO succeeded because it was established, along with the Marshall Plan, as a formal recognition that fascism and communism found their roots in the desperation of economic and political misery. Past experience will likely lead America's European allies to advance a long-term approach to terrorism, which recognizes that new manifestations of bellicose ideology have similar foundations.

NATO has spent much of the post-Cold War in a quest for a new mission. That new mission has now found the Alliance. Maintaining allied unity and creating functional, multifaceted responses to terrorism will require a high degree of creative diplomacy and new thinking about security. By working together to address the political, economic, and social seeds that lead people into the dark world of terrorism, the allies can prevail together. The key question in the months and years to come is whether the Bush Administration will be able to learn from the wisdom of its friends and lead the alliance into this uncertain future.

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Sean Kay is a professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan University. His extensive writing about NATO includes NATO and the Future of European Security and NATO After Fifty Years. Professor Kay was also a contributor to the Institute's book, NATO at Fifty: Perspectives on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance.

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