

# SESSION IV: NATO -- NEW DIRECTIONS, NEW CHALLENGES

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## **ROBERT KENNEDY**

Kennedy has been the Director, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, since 1997. Prior to that time he was Professor of International Affairs at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs and Co-Director, Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology; Civilian Deputy Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome, 1985-88; Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of National Security Studies, U.S. Army War College, 1984-85; Senior Researcher, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1974-83; Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1974; and a command pilot on active duty with the U.S. Air Force and later with the reserve forces, 1963-86. Kennedy was founding general editor of the *Atlantic Papers*, a Fulbright Scholar and Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council. He holds a doctorate from Georgetown University.

## **ROBERT R. BOWIE**

Bowie is Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Emeritus, and former Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. During the Eisenhower administration, he was Director of Policy Planning and State Department member of the National Security Council Planning Board, 1953-57. He also served in the Truman, Johnson, and Carter administrations. He has lectured widely, including a year as Distinguished Olin Professor for National Security at the U.S. Naval Academy. His books include *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*, and *Suez 1956*.

## **KARL KAISER**

Kaiser is Otto Wolff Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Berlin and Professor of Political Science at the University of Bonn. He was Research Associate and Lecturer at Harvard University, 1963-68; and a Lecturer and Professor at the Universities of Bonn, Johns Hopkins (Bologna), Saarland, and Cologne, 1968-91. He was a member of the Council of Environmental Advisors and Commission for the Reform of the Armed Services, Germany. His latest books include: *Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, Bd. 1 Grundlagen* (Germany's New Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, Foundations), co-ed.; *Bd. 2 Herausforderungen* (Vol. 2, Challenges), co-ed.; *Bd. 3 Interessen und Strategien* (Vol. 3, Interests and Strategies), co-ed.; *Bd. 4 Institutionen und Ressourcen* (Vol. 4, Institutions and Resources), co-ed.

**SHAUD:** The task of this panel is to examine NATO and its future as a defense treaty or a collective security arrangement. Dr. Bob Kennedy, Director of Marshall European Center for Security Studies will lead off.

**KENNEDY:** Before discussing our main topic, let me as part of the team of clean-up hitters, address a couple of issues that arose yesterday. First it is important that we not confuse our terms. It is true, as Sergey Rogov suggested, that human rights violations are frequently related to the conflicts between sovereignty and national self-determination. What must be clear is that while such conflicts surely will occur in the future, it is absolutely intolerable when one or both sides deliberately and barbarically murder, rape, and pillage innocent men, women, and children. It was the magnitude of this kind of activity that troubled so many in Bosnia and in Kosovo. There is a difference between those who engaged in genocide and freedom fighters.

The second issue is that Pierre Lellouche may be right that we should not impose our own specific Western values on other peoples and other cultures -- "turning them into international values." However, we must keep in mind that in the area of humanitarian concerns, nearly all nations have subscribed to the values embodied in the International Covenant on Human Rights and, specifically in the Euro-Atlantic region, in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) Final Act.

Finally, Susan Woodward is right that

issues of humanitarian rights are most susceptible to manipulation and we must keep that in mind. However, we also must ask ourselves if we should simply do nothing when by accident of history or geography a tyrant chooses genocide as a method to deal with an internal difficulty.

Now for the panel's principal task -- NATO and its future as a defense treaty or a collective security arrangement.

It is perhaps common for all of us to get trapped by old paradigms and old approaches. Old paradigms are comfortable. They are in the realm of the known. However, if NATO is to be relevant to the treaties and challenges of the 21st century, it is necessary to move beyond the old paradigms of collective defense and collective security. To answer the question about NATO and its future, we must look to the challenges ahead. Several challenges have already been mentioned during yesterday's session. Let me briefly summarize the more prominent.

First, weapons of mass destruction: primarily nuclear and biological weapons. Chemical weapons also remain a threat, though perhaps not of the same magnitude as nuclear and biological weapons. The danger ahead is less from any great power confrontation than from rogue states and non-state actors.

Second, terrorism -- especially when combined with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

Third -- crime, corruption, and drugs.

There are no things so prejudicial to public confidence in government, no things so pernicious to economic development and prosperity, no things so damaging to the entrepreneurial spirit necessary for economic development, especially in transition economies than crime and corruption; and drugs provide the dollars that fuel crime and corruption.

Fourth -- threats to national infrastructures that in a globally interdependent world can have global consequences. The so-called cyber threat that could bring down banking and financial institutions, impair the effective functions of our armed forces and civil emergency response capabilities, threaten business and industry and the essentials of economic life -- our water, power supplies, transportation nets, oil and gas production, storage, and transmission, our telecom nets and many others.

Fifth-- the population explosion mentioned by Bob Ellsworth yesterday that might outstrip available food supplies

Sixth -- intrastate conflict and perhaps interstate conflict driven by national, ethnic, and religious tensions.

Hardly any of these threats and challenges can be met effectively by relying on the tools provided by the classical paradigms of collective defense or collective security. If these are the primary challenges of the 21st century, then NATO must move beyond collective defense to remain relevant.

While NATO should retain the capacity

for collective self-defense, we must remember that NATO has always been primarily a political alliance. It has been successful because, after centuries of conflict, it has been able to forge a new community of nations committed to working together to deal with a wide range of political and security concerns of its member states.

If NATO is to remain relevant to a changing world, it must look to a broadening of this community. In this sense the operative concept may be neither collective defense nor collective security but rather cooperative security. Many have spoken about cooperative security. Former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in Foreign Affairs offered one potentially useful description in the fall of 1994. He described cooperative security as tending "to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, interdependence rather than unilateralism."

Add to his list that cooperative security requires a vision that the age of the solitary nation-state has passed and only through broad international cooperation can we successfully address the challenges ahead. Cooperative security also requires a commitment to inclusiveness not exclusiveness -- a requirement that pertains both to the domestic and international dimensions of politics. And cooperative security requires a commitment to understanding the points of view and the concerns of others, and a determination to find win-win solutions to the problems we confront.

For NATO this suggests an intensive investment in the Partnership for Peace program -- a transforming of the program into true partnership of nations committed to each other's security, social, and economic well being.

In many ways the development of NATO over the past fifty years has been the prototype of a cooperative security regime. Let me illustrate in one small way what this means. When a junior official in Washington calls his friend Klaus in Bonn or Berlin and together they find a solution before a major problem between their governments arises, you have the essential ingredients for cooperative security -- openness, transparency, reassurance, interdependence, a commitment to understanding, and a commitment to the joint welfare of their peoples.

In conclusion, the threats and challenges we will confront in the decades ahead cannot be met simply by the collective defense system that marked NATO's first forty years. Nor can they be met by a reliance on a classic system of collective security. We as a community of NATO members must seek a broader concept of our security alliance. As a minimum we must grow a new broader community of nations from the Atlantic to Russia and Central Asia.

**BOWIE:** The conference has developed some important themes that need to be pulled together into a broader framework.

First, NATO was never meant to be an end in itself. It was an instrument to pursue the strategy of containment during the Cold War.

It should today be viewed as an instrument to be adapted to serve a new strategy for the future.

Second, that strategy should respond to the new international environment which is marked by unique and radical change with uncertain outcomes in a number of areas: a) in Russia, the entire political, economic and social order is being reversed with inevitable turmoil; b) in China, major economic reforms, under the harsh authoritarian regime, are producing rapid growth, severe unemployment, and potential political instability; c) in Europe, the European Union (EU) has established effective economic integration and seeks to create a security and political entity. It may take several decades for these processes to produce firm outcomes -- constructive or otherwise.

Third, our conference is concerned with how Russia evolves. That will be a key determinant for: a) stability in Central Europe; b) progress in arms control, particularly in the area of nuclear arms control; and c) the relationship with China, especially if its development is not positive.

Fourth, given the above considerations, a top priority for the United States and the West more broadly should be to help Russia achieve a stable democracy and a prosperous, effective economy. This will require that the West integrate Russia as a cooperative partner as it did following World War II in the case of Germany and Japan.

Fifth, this goal of assisting Russia poses

an admittedly daunting task for the United States and its allies. It is bound to take considerable time to integrate Russia. In the end, Russia itself will ultimately determine the outcome of the efforts, but the West does have the capacity to influence Russia by its policies and actions. In this regard, the expansion of NATO has had a negative impact on the desired relationship with Russia.

Sixth, a truly inclusive approach is needed to European security during this critical period when there really is no major threat. Several vehicles are available:

- Partnership for Peace (PFP) was a brilliant concept and permits the newly independent states and Russia to work with the Atlantic Alliance without NATO having to extend the Article V guarantee to them.
- The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also been useful as an inclusive organization.
- The Founding Act signed between NATO and Russia can also be helpful in the effort to integrate and include Russia in the broader security framework.

Seventh, what should we do?

- Abandon further expansion of NATO membership. The initial expansion is now water over the dam, but it is still possible to change course for the future. Expansion to include the three Baltic states would be extremely damaging with potentially dire consequences for coopera-

tive relations with Russia.

- Restore and pursue the Partnership for Peace program and the OSCE.
- Encourage European initiatives to create an effective EU security/foreign policy capacity.
- Keep NATO and its resource base intact as insurance against a resurgence of the Russian threat in a decade or so.
- Meanwhile, use NATO for other tasks outside of the traditional, e.g., for peacekeeping.
- The legitimacy of NATO intervention without UN approval arose during the Kosovo operation. The excuse was that a Russian veto would have blocked approval by the Security Council. But some UN legitimization seems desirable to avoid abuse. Perhaps the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" (used during the Suez Crisis) might be a good model here. Requiring General Assembly approval of such intervention would guard against abuse while avoiding a veto.
- In general, assist, in every feasible way, the forces within Russia striving to achieve a democratic, peaceful, and cooperative Russia.

Without the goad of the nuclear threat, the Western democracies will find it difficult to pursue such a policy toward a Russia in chaotic transition over a period of years. And even if they do, success is not assured. But it is vitally important to do so.

We should be guided by the attitude of Jean Monnet, the father of the European Union. When told that the chances for achieving a certain project were poor, he responded: "Our task is not to compute the odds, but to improve them."

**KAISER:** NATO has always been both a treaty for collective defense and collective security. Though defense had the priority, both aspects were served in three ways: first, with regard to internal relations among members of NATO, the group built up a system of cooperation which focused in particular on the military instruments of the member states. NATO succeeded in creating an achievement of historical proportions by changing the nature of interstate relations among its members in such a way that the use of force was definitively eliminated among the members of the Atlantic Alliance as a means to resolve conflicts among them. (A possible exception may be the relationship between Greece and Turkey, but here again, without NATO both members might have resorted to the use of force on several occasions in their conflict-ridden relationship.)

Second, in their relations with the outside world, NATO pursued both aims of collective defense and collective security by actively advocating democratic values and human rights, guided by the assumption that democracies are more peaceful in their outward relations and that, therefore, the advocacy of democracy serves security. The most important manifestation of this policy was the creation and promotion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Helsinki

Act, and its follow-up measures. All members of NATO took part and played a crucial role in this undertaking that substantially contributed to the promotion of democratic values and human rights. The CSCE (now OSCE) became a major force that contributed to the final collapse of communism.

Third, NATO policy explicitly turned into a double strategy of pursuing both collective defense and collective security when it adopted its new strategy after the Harmel exercise of 1967 making both defense and détente as well as cooperation with the adversary the shared purpose of the Alliance. President Richard Nixon's new policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Germany's Ostpolitik implemented the new philosophy of the Alliance. As a result, a profound change was gradually introduced in East-West relations on the European continent that increased stability and finally led to a disappearance of the old conflict.

With the end of the Cold War, conflicts have shifted from Article V crises to other challenges. In the new international system, it is not aggression by major armies, the overriding fear during the Cold War, but other types of conflict which dominate security thinking: ethnic conflict, massive violation of human rights, ethnic cleansing, genocide, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is a growing conviction among leaders of the Western world, including President Bill Clinton as well as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, that traditional sovereignty has to be reinterpreted. Under conditions of growing openness and interdependence of modern states as well as the growing importance of human rights as universally valid prin-

principles, the basic rule of the state system since the Treaty of Westphalia of non-intervention in internal affairs has to be reconsidered.

The new type of crisis is characterized by a slow emergence of critical situations rather than a feared surprise attack as under conditions of the Cold War. Moreover, these crises usually are connected with complex situations. As a result they require constant attention and analysis that in turn must be permanently connected to a process of political decision-making. Crisis management is the order of our age in order to prevent an escalation. Under these circumstances it is vital not to wait until it is too late. Bosnia is an example of states acting too late whereas Macedonia provides an example where early action (of deployment of troops) prevented an escalation.

Ambivalence is a typical characteristic of these crises. Characteristically, states observing crises tend to assess each crisis differently. Consequently, disagreements occur quite frequently. Usually there are no clear and agreed indicators that unleash action (e.g., aggression by troops crossing a border). Therefore, the question of when to intervene and under what circumstances constitutes a central and usually divisive question among states.

A clear and credible link between military and nonmilitary instruments remains an essential element of effective action in dealing with the new type of crisis. The nonmilitary means become more effective if the threat of a possible resort to military force remains credible. It was, therefore, a mistake to exclude the

use of ground troops in the Kosovo crisis. If the West had been able to demonstrate in a credible manner its willingness to intervene, if necessary, by military means early in the conflict in the Balkans, hundreds of thousands of human lives might have been saved.

In dealing with the problems of collective security in the future, the profound asymmetry in military capabilities between the United States and Europe must be reduced. For these reasons the build-up of a European capacity to act remains a prerequisite for a more effective policy of collective security. A proper mix of military and nonmilitary instruments will be necessary to deal with the new types of crisis. Economic policy, aid, diplomacy, and the building up of civil society are as important as military means. Indeed, unless they are properly used, the resort to force becomes more necessary.

Concerning the partners of collective security, the involvement of Russia in dealing with crises of collective security remains vital. This is true not only because of Russia's role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but because many of the potential crises of the future affect Russia directly, notably when they occur in the region of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, when it comes to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Russia's cooperation is vital in preventing the outflow of weapons, materials, and know-how, or in dealing with potential proliferates.

In summary it can be said that a new

balance between military and nonmilitary instruments is necessary to deal with the crises of collective security in the new era. A more intensive and effective mechanism of consultation among Western states, better adapted military instruments, a more adequate balance between Europe and the U.S. in the Alliance, a better preparation of the public for a credible insertion of military force and for the necessity of action to deal with massive violations of human rights are essential.