September 1997

PERSPECTIVES ON CENTRAL ASIA
Volume II, Number 6
September 1997

Published by the Eisenhower Institute's Center for Political and Strategic Studies

"Russian Troops in Abkhazia: Peacekeeping, or Keeping Both Pieces?"

By Irakli Zurab Kakabadze, Executive Director, Caucasus Without Arms

Since the late 1980s, the Southern Caucasus has seen some of the bloodiest and least tractable conflicts in Eurasia. While the conflicts in Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia clearly have multiple causes, there is a widespread view in the region itself that Moscow, center of the Russian and Soviet empires, is responsible for kindling them. While Soviet policies certainly factored into the genesis of these conflicts, this article is concerned with the role of Moscow in the post-Soviet period.

The most visible and most controversial aspect of Moscow's involvement in conflicts in the Newly Independent States (NIS) is the role of Russian soldiers and peacekeeping units. When asked about the role of Russian peacekeeping forces in ethnic conflicts throughout former Soviet space one NIS ambassador commented, "Russians like to do peacekeeping only if they are able to keep all the pieces involved in the violent confrontation under their control." Russian troops have been closely involved in the Abkhazian conflict in the Republic of Georgia from the outset. This article examines the role of Russian peacekeeping troops in that conflict.

The War in Abkhazia

There were two major divisions underlying the civil war in Georgia. One division was between ethnic Georgians and autonomy-seeking minorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The other division was between supporters and opponents of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's first democratically- elected president. Gamsakhurdia, a long-time Soviet-era dissident and staunch Georgian nationalist with the overwhelming support of the working class, was criticized by many for being anything but a democrat, if not an outright dictator. His opponents - including several parliamentarians, conservative communists, and liberals - joined with armed criminals and paramilitary forces to depose him in December 1991. Gamsakhurdia fled into exile in January 1992, at which time a military council was established to rule Georgia. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, an ethnic Georgian, returned to Georgia in March 1992 and joined the military council. He was elected head of state in October 1992 in elections in which he was the sole candidate.

Even while in exile Gamsakhurdia maintained a great deal of popular support in Georgia, particularly in the western part of the country. Despite Gamsakhurdia's debatable credentials as a democratic president, his supporters pointed out that he was democratically-elected and thus was the legitimate ruler of Georgia. Furthermore, they suspected the hand of Moscow in Gamsakhurdia's ouster and Shevardnadze's return. Shevardnadze, it seemed, would be more inclined to follow pro-Russian policies than Gamsakhurdia, who enjoyed confronting Moscow and had refused to have Georgia join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The military confrontation began in August 1992 when General Tengiz Kitovani's National Guard, a paramilitary force allied with the Shevardnadze-controlled military council, marched on western Georgia. Ostensibly, Kitovani's troops were hunting down Zviadist rebels (supporters of Gamsakhurdia) who had disrupted rail traffic and had kidnapped several high-ranking Georgian officials. However, the National Guard went on to attack the parliament of Abkhazia, an autonomous republic in western Georgia, touching off fighting that would last until Abkhaz forces took control of Sukhumi, capital of Abkhazia, in September 1993.

In August 1992, just days before Kitovani's National Guard marched on the parliament in Sukhumi, Vladislav Ardzinba, Chairman of the Abkhazian parliament, announced that he intended Abkhazia to join the CIS as a full member - in effect declaring independence from Georgia. Ardzinba was a conservative communist appointed to his post by Gamsakhurdia in 1991 and had close ties to Moscow. Due in part to the statements of some eccentric politicians in Tbilisi, Ardzinba felt threatened by Georgian independence. With ties to Moscow cut Ardzinba feared losing not only his own political power, but also the privileged status of ethnic Abkhaz in Abkhazia (ethnic Abkhaz held over 50 percent of parliamentary seats though they comprised just 17 percent of the population of Abkhazia). His declaration was a reassertion of Abkhazia's ties to Moscow rather than Tbilisi. When Kitovani ordered his troops to attack the Abkhazian parliament, he was appealing to those Georgians who resented Abkhazia's attempts to break away from Tbilisi. Thousands of Georgians and Abkhaz were killed during this war, as were many ethnic Armenians, Russians, Greeks, and others. Many atrocities were committed and the vast majority of ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia fled the region or were killed: In January 1992 there were 245,000 ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia, but by the beginning of 1997 there were only 44,000. The number of Abkhaz also decreased from 95,000 to 54,000, but due primarily to the mass exodus of Georgians, Abkhaz went from 18 percent to 37 percent of the region's population and became the single largest ethnic group in Abkhazia.1

Through the course of the conflict, the Russian army sold arms to both sides and assisted the Abkhaz with air and artillery support. Also, Russian armed units actively participated on the side of Abkhaz separatists. As a former Russian mercenary serving the Abkhaz army, Michael Demyanov, testified:

[According to] one of the commanders of the ground-attack regiment [of the regular Russian army] based in Gudauta, [Abkhazia,] Roman Semigulin, he and his battalion were directly involved in military operations from the very first day [of the war] when his battalion occupied the territory of Sysovskyi [seismic] laboratory ... in South Eshery. ... He was bragging that lieutenants [of the Abkhaz forces] were studying anti-tank defense at his military base. It should be noted that this military equipment was not sold to the Abkhazian side, but left to the Russian military with a direct objective: to use it against Georgian government forces. Russian soldiers were aiming fire at Georgian government forces and Semigulin was personally supervising these actions. Lieutenant Colonel Kudinov, also a serviceman from the same ground regiment, ... not only worked out a plan of attack, he was also directing the actions of Abkhaz paramilitaries.2

Mr. Demyanov went on to describe the involvement of Russian regular army units in the fighting. In the Eshery district, Lieutenant Colonel Kravchuk, a serviceman of the ground-attack regiment of the Russian army, directed Abkhaz paramilitary groups. All of the air-defense systems on the separatist territory were operated by subunits of the Russian Air Defense Regiment using Osa rocket launchers operated not by mercenaries or by retired paramilitaries, but by active Russian servicemen. Demyanov also identified two captains of the Russian Air Defense Regiment by first name.

Russian air units supervised by Generals Chindarov and Alekseev were actively involved in bombing Georgian towns and villages. General Alekseev's unit also participated in the storming of Sukhumi in March 1993. Pilots from his division were paid 5,000 Russian rubles for one attempt. General Alekseev was paid, too. But the main role belonged to the ground-attack aviation regiment led by General Chindarov. His pilots were instrumental in attacking Georgian positions. He was also accepting money from the Abkhaz side, but confessed, "If there is no order from Moscow I can't do anything for you, even if you cover me with gold, because I might get fired for this tomorrow!"3 The orders usually came, and Sukhumi was regularly bombed. Even when President Shevardnadze was there and TV cameras from around the world broadcast pictures of a Russian pilot, Vatslav Shipko, complete with identification number, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev denied any involvement in military operations. Grachev accused Georgians of bombing their own population with Russian airplanes.

Demyanov also mentioned two Russian generals, Sorokin and Sigutkin, who were enthusiastic in helping the Abkhaz during the military confrontation. He notes that Sigutkin would act only when official orders came from Moscow, but Sorokin sometimes volunteered and started fighting on his own.4

When Sukhumi fell to Abkhaz troops in September 1993, the Abkhaz militia joined Zviadist paramilitary units and advanced toward Kutaisi, the capital of Imereti, a western Georgian province. After suffering a devastating defeat, the government troops were disorganized. Gamsakhurdia returned from exile and the rebels advanced closer and closer to Kutaisi. When they reached the gate of Samtredia, a vital link in the Georgian railway system, Shevardnadze decided to once again enter into alliance with his long-time patrons from the Kremlin.

Without parliamentary approval, he acceded to Moscow's conditions for joining the CIS and also gave Russian troops military bases on Georgian territory. At that point, the Russian military switched sides. Russian air and artillery units attacked Abkhaz and Zviadist forces. One of the Abkhaz leaders, Ruslan Harabua, noted that during this time the Russian army inflicted great damage to the Abkhaz, as well as to the Zviadists. By the end of October 1993, Russian units managed to crush the Zviadist-Abkhaz offensive and Gamsakhurdia went back into hiding in the mountains of Samegrelo. Mysteriously, in January 1994, he was found dead, killed by a bullet to the head. Although some sources claimed that it was a suicide, neither his most loyal supporters nor his fiercest opponents believed that he had killed himself.

Keeping the Peace?

Following these events, Russian forces drew a border at the Inguri River, with Abkhaz forces on the west side and government forces on the east. Later that year, Russian troops in Abkhazia were granted official peacekeeping status by the United Nations - in exchange, some allege, for Russian acquiescence to America's intervention in Haiti. This was an apparent violation of the UN Charter, as Russia - which borders on the zone of conflict - can hardly be considered impartial.

While in Tbilisi in the summer of 1997, the author had the opportunity to interview over a dozen Georgian refugees from the Abkhazian region. Almost all of them agreed that the presence of Russian peacekeepers is not conducive to peace in Georgia. Some argued that the Russian army has a vested interest in keeping the region unstable. There is widespread belief that the seismic laboratory in Eshery is one of the main reasons for Russia's interest in the region, though others dismiss its significance. Few people know much about what is or was really taking place in this laboratory. Regardless, there are other factors perhaps even more important for Russia's national security than an aged seismic laboratory. In fact, it would be difficult to deny that the Russian military was a factor during civil war in Georgia, and clearly Russia is still trying to influence the region. While it is unclear whether Russia is interested in genuine peace in the Caucasus, most refugees agreed that Moscow has a substantial interest in keeping both warring parties under their control.

How are the Russian peacekeeping forces acting in their capacity today? Etery Astemirova, Chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, has chronicled a number of human rights violations committed by Russian peacekeeping forces. Her report includes specific accounts of peacekeepers detaining citizens and handing them over to Abkhaz authorities who then jailed, beat, and totured them; threatening and robbing citizens at gunpoint, sometimes claiming to be collecting "pay" for protecting Georgian interests; providing cover for Abkhaz paramilitaries conducting punitive combat operations; and even killing individual citizens.5

Although the Russian military backed the Abkhaz throughout the fighting, it should be noted that the Abkhaz have suffered at the hands of Russian peacekeeping and military forces, too. Russians have helped to enforce a blockade of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic after suspicions arose that Abkhaz paramilitaries were involved in supporting the Chechens in the Chechen-Russian confrontation. Because President Shevardnadze agreed to let Russia have military bases on Georgian territory, Moscow decided to act in a more balanced way. Moscow is not openly supporting either side, but rather is trying to preserve the status quo.

This is not to say that the Russians are extraordinarily bad or barbaric. Of course, they are not. Perhaps, however, the Caucasus would be better off without the Russian military, which is poorly trained and underpaid, yet vitally interested in keeping the area under its control. The peoples of the Southern Caucasus, who have a long tradition of peaceful relations, can surely find non-violent solutions to their conflicts without the assistance of the Russian military.

---

1 Dynamics of the Demographic Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, as the Result of the 1992- 1997 Conflict, Supreme Council of Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, Tbilisi, February 1997.

2 Lulu Chkenkeli, There Are No Two Truths (in Russian), Publishing House of Citizens Union of Georgia, Tbilisi, 1996, pp.26-27.

3 Ibid., p. 31.

4 Ibid., p. 29.

5 Etery Astemirova, Information About Violations Committed by Russian Peacekeepers in Abkhazia, Tbilisi, February 1997.

The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Eisenhower Institute.

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