Chapter 16

Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments and Prospects for Peace

by Sergei Gretsky

Introduction

Throughout the years of its Soviet history Tajikistan was known as a forlorn outpost having the highest birth rate and infant mortality in the USSR, the last hearth of anti-Soviet resistance and the Basmachi movement which went on into the late 1930s. In fact, Soviet history is the only history Tajikistan, as a nation, has ever had. It appeared on the map of the world in the mid-1920s, with the other countries of Central Asia, when the Soviets nationally and territorially delimitated Turkestan, which they inherited from the tsars and the Emirates of Bukhara and Khiva. Tajikistan first appeared as an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan in 1924 and was elevated to the status of Union Republic in 1929.

Independence, which followed the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, was accompanied by a fierce power struggle leading to the outbreak of the civil war in December 1992. In violation of the civic truce proclaimed at the November 1992 session of the Tajik Republican Parliament, a coalition of Soviet-era political elites and criminal elements known as the Popular Front of Tajikistan, attempted to annihilate the Tajik opposition, a coalition of Islamic and secular pro-democracy groups. Although they had the backing of the Russian military and Uzbekistan's government, the attempt failed. Opposition forces were pushed across the Panj river into Afghanistan and soon resumed the armed struggle along the Tajik-Afghan border and inside Tajikistan. Tens of thousands of refugees were pushed into Afghanistan, and hundreds of thousands fled the country for Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union. The war claimed a heavy toll: about 100,000 dead; a devastated economy; and a society deeply fragmented both regionally and politically. Internal peace and stability have never been restored. Moreover, the Tajik civil war destabilized the Central Asian region and has acquired an international dimension: As a result of short-sighted Russian and Uzbek policy, Afghanistan, with its own civil war, has been drawn into the conflict in Tajikistan.

This analysis will examine the causes of the Tajik civil war, the domestic political developments after the war's onset, the current status of the opposition, and prospects for peace at the ongoing UN-mediated intra-Tajik peace talks. A closer look at the volatile situation in Tajikistan is particularly timely because there are new signs of a basic shift, one with potentially far-reaching implications. There is an apparent shift in the internal and external correlation of forces in the conflict: Uzbekistan, the regional primus inter pares, as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are hedging their bets by wooing the Tajik Islamic-democratic opposition, instead of placing all their bets on the beleaguered regime of Imomali Rahmonov in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe.

Causes of the Civil War

There were a number of antecedents that led to the on-set of the Tajik civil war, now in its third year: some rooted in history; some generated by perestroika; some influenced by outside interference in domestic political developments. More specifically, the elements were localism, ideological antagonism and power struggles between Soviet-era political elites and incipient proto-democratic, nationalistic and Islamic parties and movements, as well as Uzbekistan and Russia's meddling into Tajik politics.

Localism

The 1920s division was not fair to Tajiks. Out of a total population of 1,100,000 only 300,000 found themselves in the confines of the newly established state, the others being isolated within the confines of other national borders. Worse still, ninety-three percent of the country's territory was mountainous. What turned out to be gerrymandering was explained by the desire of the Uzbeks to have the historically important cities of Bukhara and Samarqand as part of Uzbekistan, despite the fact that for centuries the majority of the cities' population was Tajik. This was a matter of prestige rather than a political necessity, for when the Russians conquered Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century, they made Tashkent the political, administrative and cultural center of Russian Turkestan, replacing cities of Bukhara and Samarqand, which had been regional centers for centuries.

As a result, Tajiks were left without two centers around which the process of nation-building was unfolding. Consequently, without these cities' intellectual elite and professionals, Tajiks were denied critical resources for state-building. Despite the fact that both processes were soon completely suppressed by the Soviet regime, this loss contributed to the preservation of mahalgaroi (localism), when self-identification with a particular region was more important than awareness of being an ethnic Tajik. Tajiks were virtually thrown back to the state of "natural" isolation caused by geographic factors, because there was no other city in newly established Tajikistan that could play a central role for them.

The settlement of Tajiks has been such that mountains have secluded them into four regions loosely connected with each other, which after the republic's creation came to constitute its provinces the Fergana valley (Leninobod province), the Karategin and Hissor valleys (Gharm, Hissor, Faizobod, Regar, and other districts under the direct rule of the central government), Khatlon (Kulob province), and the Pamir mountains (Gorno- Badahshon autonomous province). Over centuries, this seclusion contributed to the formation and preservation of strong local identities that were gradually melded at the court, madrassahs (Islamic religious schools) and bazaars of Bukhara and Samarqand. The integration process was accelerated in the 19th century with the emergence of the Tajik Enlightenment and the Jadid movement, the Russian conquest of the greater part of Central Asia and the transition of Emirates of Bukhara and Khiva under the Russian protectorship.

With the establishment of Soviet Tajikistan, neither Dushanbe, a village-turned-capital, nor Khujand and Uroteppa (Istarawshon), other ancient cities of Central Asia now located in Leninobod province, could replace Bukhara and Samarqand as the Tajiks' cultural center. On the contrary, when the Khujandis ascended to top party and government positions in Tajikistan in 1940s they endorsed localism as the corner stone of their policy, and kept regional rivalries boiling, while reserving for themselves the role of arbiter. Under the Khujandis, localism assumed such proportions that it began to somewhat resemble the Indian caste pyramid with its division of labor. In Tajikistan, the popular wisdom put it in the following way: "Leninobod governs, Gharm does business, Kulob guards, Pamir dances, Qurghonteppa ploughs." The skillful maneuvering permitted the Khujandis to exercise an undivided rule in the republic until the end of perestroika.

In addition, throughout Tajikistan's years within the Soviet Union, little was done to eradicate natural localism. For example, Leninobod province is connected with the rest of the country by a road which goes through Uzbekistan and by a railroad crossing to both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Thus, the only domestic highway is closed to traffic because of snow almost half a year. For the same reason Gorno-Badahshon is cut off from the rest of the country for the most part of the year. There is no rail link between neighboring Kulob (now Khatlon) province and Gorno-Badahshon, as there was none between Qurghonteppa and Kulob provinces, now both part of Khatlon province. To a great degree, these gaps in transportation infrastructure are explained by the fact that, in their pursuit of localism manifested by the Leninobod-first policy, Tajik leaders channeled allocations from the central budget almost exclusively to the development, primarily industrial, of their native province. This left the rest of the republic as an agricultural and raw materials appendage, with high hidden unemployment rates and lower living standards.

Historically and geographically the economy of Leninobod province was more integrated with the economy of neighboring Uzbekistan. After the emergence of Tajikistan, the Leninobodis preserved their economic orientation with the Uzbeks, a link which has impeded the formation of Tajikistan's integrated national economy and added to regional and social tension.

Perestroika and then independence, produced an opportunity to step up nation-building and put forward another difficult task that of state-building. It changed nothing for the Khujandi political elite: It was preoccupied exclusively with preservation of its supremacy against the backdrop of popular strife and demands for putting an end to localism espoused by forces across the country. In 1991, these forces, which included the Islamic Renaissance Party, the "Rastokhez" Popular Movement, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the "La'li Badahshon" and "Nosiri Khusraw" societies, as well as forces loyal to Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda (chiefIslamic cleric of the republic), formed what became known as the Islamic-democratic opposition, or "the opposition" for short. In May 1992, as a result of the opposition's limited success in curtailing Khujandis' authority manifested by the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) , the latter resorted to playing the card of localism to stymie further encroachment on their power. Precipitating a flare up of regional rivalries, the Khujandis succeeded in breaking the emerging unity of the country's other regions and lured political and criminal leaders of Kulob province into fighting the opposition forces, some of whom were natives of Karategin and Pamir. In December 1992, this fighting turned into the civil war.

Ideological Antagonism and Power Struggle

To the Khujandis, quelling the opposition was devoid of any ideological overtones because they had no intentions of defending Marxism-Leninism. The Khujandi elite never professed Marxism-Leninism, rather they employed Communist Party infrastructure as a vehicle to perpetuate their grip over the republic. This explains their abandonment of the party after the August 1991 failed coup and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union. For diehards who stayed in the Communist Party, challenging the opposition was a matter of principle. Meanwhile, the opposition was striving to root out localism, unite the nation, and build an independent democratic nation.

With the exception of La'li Badahshon and Nosiri Khusraw, which were regionally-based non-political Pamiri associations, all other constituent forces of the opposition were founded and operated as national parties. The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) channeled its efforts into reviving Islam and its traditionally important role in the everyday life of Tajiks, and advocated a greater role for Islam in the political life of the country. First established as a branch of the All-Union IRP, it became independent early in 1991, and was legalized in October that year.

The Rastokhez Popular Movement, which appeared in 1988, and was officially registered in 1989, was the first anti-establishment opposition organization. The Movement's agenda was patterned after agendas of similar popular front movements in other Soviet republics, and was built on issues of national revival such as: republican sovereignty; promotion of national culture; and recognition of the national language as the state language. What was characteristic of Rastokhez at the beginning was its pursuit of pan-Iranian and Zoroastrian, rather than Islamic roots, and its attempts to revive them as "truly" Tajik. In sum, Rastokhez was conceived and operated as a national (in Soviet terminology "nationalistic") movement.

The Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), founded in 1990, had a more diverse ethnic representation. Its platform was broader than of any other political party or group and reflected the common ground that made possible the unification of other parties into the Islamic-democratic opposition. This included abrogation of the totalitarian system of government, denunciation of Marxist ideology, introduction of democracy and a market economy eradication of localism and a more equitable distribution of power.

Since independence, the opposition has articulated its desire to work together with President Rahmon Nabiev and his government in building a truly independent Tajikistan. Yet the Khujandis have been more interested in preserving their own power than in addressing challenges of post-Soviet existence. It is in this light that the Khujandi elites' power struggle with the opposition had ideological overtones. Political and economic reforms advocated by the opposition threatened to undermine the very structure, totalitarian in its essence, which has been the basis of Khujandi rule. Reforms would have demolished that structure and eventually replaced it with some democratic form of government.

In their struggle to stay in power by exacerbating localism, the Khujandis dragged the country backward, invalidating opposition attempts to bring politics and public consciousness to a level higher than the local "loyalty- above-all" level. In turn, the opposition gave in to the Byzantine politicking of the Khujandis. In May 1992, some leaders of the opposition indulged in the vice of localism by stirring anti-Kulob emotions that deeply offended Kulob sensibilities and made them more prone to fight the opposition to the end.

Entangled in a power struggle with the Khujandis, the opposition also resorted to the means it had vowed to abandon in its activities: intimidation and the use of force (Nabiev's resignation, hostage taking of Supreme Soviet deputies and of Russian school children and their teachers), and lack of respect for the principles of democratic government (formation of the GNR, pressure on the Supreme Soviet to adopt certain laws, and so forth).

However, primary responsibility for the outbreak of the civil war belonged to the Khujandis who, unable to defeat the opposition with Kulobis alone, resorted to outside intervention by appealing to President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan and the Russian military. The Khujandi elite did not live up to its self-assumed role of the leader of Tajiks.

Outside Interference

It was outside interference that turned civic strife in Tajikistan into civil war. Uzbekistan and Russia came to the rescue of the Soviet-era Tajik nomenklatura, each for reasons of its own. The threat of Khujandis loosing power in Tajikistan was also felt by ethnic Uzbeks, both those living in Tajikistan, where they constituted a powerful community of 23 percent of the population, and those in the Uzbek government. After the Bolshevik revolution, Moscow continued its policy of favoritism toward Uzbekistan, and Tashkent remained the center of Soviet Central Asia. It was after the emergence of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic in 1929 that the Khujandis' alliance which the Uzbeks paid off. With Tashkent's backing, the Khujandis rose to a leading role in Tajikistan during the 1940s. It has been no secret that since that time, all nominees for top party and government jobs in Tajikistan were first approved by Tashkent and only then by Moscow. In return, the Khujandis recognized Uzbekistan's leading role in the region, and made Tajikistan faithfully follow Uzbekistan's policies. The Khujandis followed the lead of the Uzbek's policies for a long time, and their defeat in Tajikistan would have impeded the implementation of President Islam Karimov's plan for an Uzbek-dominated Turkestan, which he had been advocating since independence.

In addition, developments in Tajikistan were fraught with two other threats of a domestic nature. First, perestroika brought a revival of historical rivalries between Tajiks and Uzbeks. Since the introduction of glasnost Tajiks, both inside Tajikistan and in Bukhara and Samarqand, demanded that minority rights of the Tajik population in Uzbekistan be restored. Some even called for the "return" of Bukhara and Samarqand to Tajikistan. Second, Islam Karimov feared that the success of the Islamic-democratic opposition in Tajikistan would strengthen anti-Karimov opposition in Uzbekistan, thereby jeopardizing his rule. In May 1992 these threats motivated him to intervene actively in Tajik politics on the side of the Khujandi elite and to procure their alliance with the Kulobis. Also, skillfully playing the card of "the threat of Islamic fundamentalism," he convinced Russian President Boris Yeltsin that the Islamic tide was a threat to Russia as well, and obtained Russian military assistance for intervention in Tajikistan.

Russians and Russian-speakers living in Tajikistan, as well as Russian military units stationed in the republic, contributed to Moscow's decision to throw its support behind the Khujandi-Kulob alliance. They felt threatened by the advent of Tajikistan's independence and by the political developments that followed because they were not psychologically ready to give up their privileged status of "big brother" and submit to the rule of those whom they considered to be beneath them. This propelled emigration of Russians, Germans, Jews and others to Russia, the western NIS, Germany and Israel. Emigration had already assumed a mass character in Tajikistan after the adoption of a "Law on Language." The law, which made Tajik the state language, has always been considered by Russians a critical turning point and the main source of all their misfortune in Tajikistan since 1989, because it put their jobs and future at risk by necessitating the use of Tajik in the state apparatus and in sectors of national economy where the Russians primarily worked. Emigration did not appeal to many because, upon their arrival to Russia, Tajikistani and Central Asian Russians and Russian-speakers discovered that they were not that welcome there, and that it was very difficult to adjust behaviorally to a new life among their co-ethnics. Furthermore, many simply could not afford to move out of Tajikistan. These factors persuaded many Europeans in Tajikistan to stay where they were and fight for there survival.

What crystallized this development was the presence of the nominally Russian military unit, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. An overwhelming majority of the division's Russian or Russian-speaking officers were born and had lived practically all their lives in Tajikistan or other Central Asian republics. They had no chance to continue their service in Russia, which had plans to cut its armed forces and was already struggling to accommodate tens of thousands of officers brought home from Eastern Europe. Unlike other Russians in Tajikistan, they had weapons at their disposal. After a period of neglect on the part of Russia the officers succeeded in drawing Moscow's attention to their sorrowful plight. Once they did, like Karimov, they convinced the Kremlin that military intervention in support of the Khujandi-PFT alliance was the only option to hold off the spread of Islamic fundamentalism throughout Central Asia and in Russia, and prevent a mass exodus of Russians and Russian-speakers from Tajikistan.

The possible loss of CIS territory, in the context of the emerging Near Abroad policy, was the other factor that influenced Kremlin's decision to intervene. The Near Abroad policy, as officially proclaimed, aims at accomplishing the following: (1) protect the interests of Russians (and Russian speakers) living outside Russia in the NIS; (2) stop migration to Russia from those areas; and (3) maintain stability in those regions, especially on Russia's southern borders. In reality, after almost one-year of neglecting the developments in newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union, by late 1992, Moscow regained interest in this post-Soviet space and sought to reassert its control over it.

These factors have been instrumental in varying degrees to the onset of civic strife in Tajikistan. But the major factor that triggered the war was the outside interference initiated by the Khujandi political elite and the latter's ambition to save their nearly forty-year-old rule over the country at any cost. If it were not for Uzbek and Russian intervention, the confrontation of the Khujandi-PFT alliance with the opposition would never have ended with a civil war because, by early fall 1992, neither side could prevail militarily or otherwise. A political equilibrium forced them to negotiate a truce at the November 1992 Supreme Soviet session. It was only after Tashkent and Moscow committed themselves to military support of Khujand and intervened that a low-intensity civic conflict developed into a civil war.

Evolution of the Political Situation in Tajikistan Since December 1992

Since the outbreak of the civil war three processes have been defining life and politics in Tajikistan:

• A continuing surge of localism and disintegration of power.
  
• The criminalization of political and everyday life.
  
• A gradual loss of the republic's sovereignty and independence, which threatens the state's very existence.

Disintegration of Power

Since the beginning of 1993, the disparate regional and political forces that formed the pro-communist bloc (and the current government) have been divided over their conflicting interests. This has produced a new surge of localism in a republic already divided regionally by the civil war a division which the temporary cease-fire announced in late September 1994 has so far merely papered over.

In the central government, forces from the regions of Kulob and Khujand clashed, producing a paralysis that has prevented the central authorities from exercising control over the republic and governing effectively. There was also rivalry between Kulobis and their former partners in the Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT) the Laqais and the Hissori faction.

The governing coalition had been forged in 1992 when the Khujandis invited regional leaders from the economically depressed Kulob province, crime bosses included, to join them in an alliance against the Islamic- democratic opposition. The Khujandis needed the fighting manpower offered by the Kulobis so it was clear that the Khujandis would later have to share power with the Kulobis, who had never been in power before, or enjoyed any outside support. The Kulobis' dominant role in the fighting allowed the Khujandis to pose as neutrals in the civic strife. The reward Kulobs received was that for the first time in Soviet Tajikistan's history a Kulob, Imomali Rahmonov, was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Additionally, 14 ministers, a majority in the new government, were appointees from Kulob. Still, the Khujandis kept the most important political and economic strings in their own hands, ensuring that they would be able to maintain a firm grip on the country. They counted on having Kulobi forces do away with the opposition, after which the Khujandis would reinstate a Khujandi as head of state. These plans turned out to be illusory.

The civil war is still going on, and Rahmonov is still presiding in Dushanbe. This is a new development in the internal politics of the republic and can be explained by a shift in Russia's policy of relying exclusively on Uzbekistan and thus Khujand as its principal ally in the region. By supporting the Kulobis, who never had political power in Tajikistan nor received outside support, Russians have created a whole new balance of power in Tajikistan.

By 1993 political maneuvering that brought about this shift was fierce. Abdujalil Khamidov, governor of Leninobod province and a relative of then- Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullojonov, attempted to found a pro- Leninobodi People's Democratic Party in response to the establishment of a pro-Kulob People's Party of Tajikistan by Abdumajid Dostiev, Rahmonov's First Deputy. At the December Supreme Soviet session, Khamidov intended to oust Rahmonov and re-introduce the post of President, obviously seeing himself in the presidential chair. He and the pro-Khujandi people's deputies from Leninobod, though, failed to achieve this aim since Rahmonov delivered a pre-preemptive blow. Rahmonov forced the dismissal of Abdumalik Abdullojonov, who had been behind the attempt to unseat him. Khamidov and Abdullojonov's brother, who had been the mayor of Khujand, also were dismissed. The heads of the provincial KGB and Interior departments, as well as the provincial prosecutor were sacked, the latter replaced by a Kulob.

After his defeat, Abdumalik Abdullojonov left for Moscow, indicating that he would not feel safe in Tajikistan not even in his native Khujand. Khamidov found refuge in Tashkent, but shortly before the presidential election in November 1994 he switched sides and was reinstated by Rahmonov as governor of Leninobod province. Khamidov's defection showed a split in the once coherent Khujandi elite, making prospects for its return to power even more ambiguous.

The presidential election was another blow to the Khujandis and aggravated further regional tensions in the country. The election itself, as one U.S. diplomat noted privately, took place in an atmosphere of wide scale threats and deception. Had it been monitored and the outcome fair, Abdullojonov would likely have won with about two-thirds of the vote. As it was, the "victory" of Rahmonov by a two-thirds majority was the result of massive fraud. Immediately after the election, Rahmonov systematically removed all Abdullojonov supporters from local government, replacing them with his own people. In Leninobod province, for example, 13 out of the 16 district governors that were seen as sympathetic to Abdullojonov were unceremoniously replaced by Rahmonov's appointees. All this appears to have been done illegally, even unconstitutionally.

Despite the hopes of the international community, the run up to the Tajik Parliamentary election in February 1995 was beset by fraud and intimidation, and was in many ways a replay of last November's presidential election charade. New election laws had the effect of restricting access to the nomination process, leaving Rahmonov with almost total de facto control of who could run. Threats and strong-arm tactics completed the task of discouraging "undesirable" candidates and prompted Abdullojonov to announce his party's boycott of the elections.

The election was also hastily conducted; there was simply no time for proper party or voter registration, equitable and informative campaigning, independent electoral commissions or monitoring, or adequate provisions addressing the substantial number of political prisoners and exiles. International observers would have preferred to postpone this election, as one remarked in a background briefing.

Russian backing for Rahmonov once again prevailed. Rahmonov's partisans were elected en masse, and his regime promptly pronounced the vote "free and fair." Now Rahmonov's regime stands on an even narrower social base than ever before, having systematically begun excluding ethnic Uzbeks as well as political opponents from any significant political roles. Rahmonov cannot even boast support of all the Kulobis. Since 1993 various Kulobi groups have renounced Rahmonov's control. Rahmonov inflamed divisions within Kulob when he appointed the majority of ministers in the current Cabinet from just one district, Baljuvon, which signaled the germ of localism even within the Kulobi's faction.

The best hope for avoiding a major explosion, paradoxically, may be that escalating problems within the Rahmonov regime and Tajikistan's desperate economic plight will force the Russian military to find an alternative to Rahmonov. An indication of this happening came in August 1995 when Yokub Salimov, a convicted racketeer who in 1992 became Minister of Interior, was finally dismissed. He had become a thorn in Moscow's side since 1994 when President Boris Yeltsin himself reportedly "advised" Rahmonov to sack the minister.

The first sign of the split within the Kulobi faction came when Dostiev, the second man in the Kulobi hierarchy and Rahmonov's successor as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet after the presidential election, was not re-elected as Speaker of the Parliament after the parliamentary election. He was also removed as head of the Government delegation at the UN-mediated intra- Tajik peace talks. Dostiev and Salimov, known to be long-time allies, reportedly planned a coup to overthrow Rahmonov in May-June 1995, a situation which may have precipitated Salimov's dismissal and appointment as ambassador to Turkey. Still, Salimov wields enormous power through his cronies at the ministry.

As for the Khujandis led by Abdullojonov, he and other leaders of the Khujandi grouping, as well as some Hissoris all backed by President Karimov of Uzbekistan are currently trying to form a coalition with the opposition to topple Rahmonov and his Kulobi grouping. In August 1995, Akbar Turajonzoda and a number of other opposition leaders met in Tashkent with Abdullojonov and other powerful figures from Khujand to discuss coordination of activities and a possible alliance. Perhaps being mindful of the Khujandis' political ambivalence, the opposition has so far been cautious about entering into a coalition with them.

The Kulob-Khujandi rift is not the only split. The same process has taken place among former comrades-in-arms of the PFT. Various Kulobis are now at odds with nearly all their erstwhile partners: Hissoris, Laqais and even Rahmonov himself. Militarily the Popular Front of Tajikistan consisted of two main factions: Kulobi and Hissori. The Hissori grouping included units from Tursunzoda, Hissor and Shahrinou districts which together with Gharm (Karategin) are known as districts of republican subordination. Unlike Gharm, these three districts with a substantial Uzbek population supported the Communists. They received direct support from Uzbekistan in October and again in December 1992, when they made assaults on Dushanbe their trucks had Uzbek license plates. But after the pro- communist forces took power, Hissoris were virtually excluded from sharing power. Only in April 1993 was one of their field commanders, Jamoliddin Mansurov, appointed mayor of Dushanbe. But their desires including the creation of a Hissor province out of the districts of the republican subordination have not been met.

The situation deteriorated in 1993 when the authorities decided to form the armed forces of Tajikistan exclusively out of Kulobi units. This turned relations between Kulobis and Hissoris into a sort of "cold war." Hissoris demanded that all Kulobis who were not residents of Dushanbe as of 1991 should leave the city. In turn, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ordered the disarmament of all Hissori units. Ibod Boimatov, Hissori governor of Tursunzoda district and a former field commander, replied to the Supreme Soviet's orders: "We did not receive arms from the Tajik government, so we are not going to turn them in." Furthermore, inhabitants of Tursunzoda district refused to take part in guarding the Tajik-Afghan border. In November of last year, Boimatov recalled all those serving at border posts. In May 1994, fighting between Hissoris and Kulobis was reported to have taken place not far from Dushanbe. In the beginning of July Russian tanks moved into Tursunzoda to guard the Tajik aluminum works, and Boimatov fled with his comrades-in-arms to Uzbekistan.

Perhaps the most notorious examples of these PFT disagreements out were the deaths of Sangak Safarov, a Popular Front leader (see next section), and Faizali Saidov, one of the most ruthless field commanders, who killed each other in a dispute over portfolio sharing. That created a rift between the Laqais, Faizali's group, and Kulobis. Laqai tribesmen form one of numerous Turkic ethnic groups that inhabit the region; 100,000 of them live in Tajikistan, united in the Association of Laqais of Tajikistan. The Association has been demanding recognition as a distinct ethnic group (separate from the Uzbeks) and autonomy within Tajikistan. In April-May 1992 the Laqais supported the pro-Communist rally in expectation that their demands would be satisfied. This never happened. Moreover, they were left out when the distribution of ministerial and other lucrative posts occurred.

We are observing a classical situation in which former partners turn into enemies once their common aim is more or less reached. Significantly, this surge of localism has taken place not only at the level of provinces, which more or less reflected the strife between Islamic-democratic and pro- communist forces, but also at the district level. Regional disintegration has been intense. There is a growing possibility of further disintegration at the level of individual communities or collective farms. Clashes of this nature happened in 1992 in districts within Khatlon province and the Hissor valley, which are populated jointly by Gharmis, Kulobis, Uzbeks and Badahshonis, who were supporting different sides at the onset of the civil war.

All this indicates that disintegration and paralysis of the power structure in Tajikistan are at a critical point and threaten the existence of Tajikistan as a country. Rahmonov's government is controlling only a small portion of Tajikistan's territory Dushanbe and part of Khatlon province. Leninobod province, Gorno-Badahshon autonomous province, districts of the republican subordination and some districts of Khatlon province de facto do not recognize Rahmonov's rule. The almost complete criminalization of life in Tajikistan exacerbates the situation. In fact, these two processes go hand in hand.

Criminalization of Life

After the Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT) came to power, Tajikistan became politically and economically controlled by the Front's leaders, many of whom had criminal pasts. These leaders were appointed to central and local governments, a move that led to a sharp increase in crime rates. What began with the criminalization of politics could not fail to affect all other aspects of life. The first move in that direction was indisputably the selection of Sangak Safarov as a leader of the Popular Front of Tajikistan. Safarov spent 23 of his 65 years in prison for violent crimes.

Many of those who came to power in the republic in November-December 1992 and were not affiliated with the PFT, also had criminal pasts. Former Tajik ambassador to the CIS and now Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Mirzoev was twice convicted of gang rape. Ilhom Shakirov, Tajikistan's trade representative in Moscow, served time for financial machinations. Two Prosecutor Generals of Tajikistan indicted Abdumalik Abdullojonov, while he was still Prime Minister, on charges of corruption and embezzlement. The latter's criminal background has been the talk of Tajikistan for years. Many field commanders with criminal backgrounds became governors or mayors of districts, towns and settlements in areas where they had previously operated.

Leaders of the PFT did nothing to restrain their fighters from committing various crimes and mass killings in Dushanbe and during military operations in Gharm and Qurghonteppa. With the fragmentation of the PFT, the authorities lost control of its various groups and were unable to control crime and violence in the republic. Salomiddin Sharopov, prosecutor of Dushanbe, acknowledged that in 1993 the number of felonies went up by 19 percent and robberies by 32 percent, and the number of murders increased 2.2 times over 1992 figures. Shootings can be heard in Dushanbe every night. Various gangs have adopted the tactic of killing plant and factory managers in order to place their own appointees in the positions. For example, in the course of 1993 Dushanbe's cotton factory changed managers six times, all of them were killed by rival groups.

It is virtually impossible to occupy any significant post without the backing of PFT gangs. Such gangs reportedly maintain unofficial prisons where they hold kidnaped people for ransom. Their primary targets are businessmen, Gharmis, and Badahshonis. As a rule, judges refuse to deal with cases in which PFT members are involved. In Dushanbe, a deputy prime minister was killed in March 1994. That was followed by the murder of the executive editor of the leading newspaper. There were assassination attempts on the lives of the former prosecutor general of Tajikistan and vice-president of the republic.

Tajikistani Russians (including 201st Division officers) have also been affected by the crime wave. Interviews with Russian refugees published in the Russian press suggest that they are subject to duress, and worse, because of their nationality. There has been a sharp increase in the number of murders of Russian officers in Dushanbe and other towns of Tajikistan. Significantly, these murders are not attributed to the opposition, which denounces such acts. On the contrary, a special brigade of the Ministry of Interior, which consists of Kulobis with criminal pasts, has committed attacks on and insults to Russian officers.

Drug-related crimes are also on the rise. The drug business has developed into a major source of income for all sides the Government, the opposition, and the Russian military. (It should be emphasized that wild cannabis and the opium poppy have been cultivated in the region and used by Central Asian peoples in various ways for centuries and were an item exported along the Silk road from the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent to Turkey and Europe.) Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the subsequent civil war dramatically increased the drug business in that country. Now the civil war in Tajikistan echoes the Afghan pattern. The absence of a strong central government, the criminal past of many in the current Tajik leadership (and of warlords on both sides), the breakdown of the economy, uncontrolled borders, and the expansion of commercial ties and transportation links to other parts of the world have all contributed to the expansion of the drug business in Tajikistan. Tajik authorities claim that private opium buyers from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and elsewhere are prompting a dramatic increase in the production of Tajikistan-grown opium, destined primarily for foreign markets. Drug abuse in Tajikistan itself is on the rise, with heroin surfacing for the first time. The greatest impact is in Gorno-Badakhshon Autonomous Province, in the almost impassable Pamir Mountains. Badakhshonis, who have been supporting the Opposition, found themselves economically and otherwise blockaded by the current regime. This prompted them to produce opium as a cash crop and engage in drug trade to survive. Drug dealers, who have been in business for years, are emerging as the most powerful figures in Pamir. Last year neighboring Badahshon province in Afghanistan roughly doubled its opium poppy acreage and potential opium production.

As one might expect, crime, drugs and arms trafficking are spreading beyond Tajik borders into the CIS. Several cases have been reported in which Kulobis carrying Kalashnikov submachine guns, Makarov guns, and ammunition destined for sale were detained in Moscow and other Russian cities. Some of the increased crime and violence, moreover, is committed by the Russian military and CIS peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan. The crime wave, the ongoing civil war and the grave economic situation have all contributed to the accelerated departure of Russian and Russian- speakers from Tajikistan, rather than stopping it as the government hoped would occur with the crackdown on the opposition forces. The official figures suggest that those groups have been leaving Tajikistan in 1993 and 1994 at a much higher rate than in 1992 7,000 a month. The most recent figures (cited in May 1995 by an official of the Russian embassy in Tajikistan) suggest that 80,000 Russians and Russian-speakers remain in the republic, 80 percent of whom live in Leninobod province. High prices of air tickets and containers and low prices of real estate in Tajikistan have restrained the flow of refugees. The Russian government and Andrei Kozyrev personally are doing nothing to create acceptable conditions for Russians and Russian-speakers to keep on living in the republic despite numerous strongly worded statements on protection of the rights of Russians in the near abroad. The Kremlin, with all its power to influence Tajik politics, did nothing to have the "Law on Languages" revoked or have dual citizenship granted to Russians, both of which were conditions of the Tajikistani Russians' support for the PFT and the Khujandis in 1992. Contract officers and soldiers of fortune have made their way to Tajikistan.

In the true spirit of glasnost', some of these soldiers, interviewed for the Russian press, did not hide the reasons behind their decision to go to Tajikistan: money, the desire to do some shooting, or the deep-seated wish to seek retribution for the lost Afghan war. After the Russian Defense Ministry realized that many of the contractors had criminal pasts originally many of the contractors were hired without screening it had to abandon the idea of contract recruitment.

In sum, the Government and the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan should be accorded primary responsibility for the republic's collapse into a state of lawlessness and crime. In May 1992 they distributed about 1,800 Kalashnikov submachine guns to Kulob criminal elements gathered in Ozodi Square. When those elements formed the PFT and later came to power, they made crime and violence the law of life. What neo-communist rule holds for Tajikistan is best expressed in a phrase attributed to President Rahmonov, to Dostiev or to former Minister of Interior Salimov: "We came with blood, and we shall leave with blood."

Gradual loss of the republic's sovereignty and independence

The inability of the republican leadership to cope with the political situation, exercise control over the whole territory, and provide the civil tranquility necessary for stable social and economic development combine to make Tajikistan politically and economically dependent on Russia. Initially, after the ascent to power of the Khujandi- PFT alliance in 1992, Tajikistan fell into the same kind of dependency on Uzbekistan.

Those two countries provided crucial support for the restoration of the old regime. This explains the heavy Russian military presence and the initial Uzbek "advisory" role in the republic. Russia apparently admitted Tajikistan to a new ruble zone, thus taking over the devastated Tajik economy. Tajikistan transferred the entirety of its gold and currency reserves to Russia as a deposit for the admittance. Since republican reserves were not that large, the government also transferred some plants and factories to meet Russia's terms. Once it was done, in May 1995, Moscow made Dushanbe introduce its own currency, which sent Tajik economy further down the drain and deeper into debt with Russia.

On the eve of his country's third Independence day, Rahmonov, in a rare moment of candor, acknowledged that little was left of Tajikistan's independence. Yet, Rahmonov and his Kulobi coterie now bear primary responsibility for Tajikistan's survival as an independent country. By consistently narrowing their base of support, they set a vicious cycle in motion: their dependence on Russia makes them increasingly autocratic, isolated, and unpopular, which makes Rahmonov more dependent on Russian protection. It was evident that by inviting Uzbekistan and Russia to intervene in Tajikistan in 1992, the Khujandis and their Kulobi allies were giving away Tajikistan's sovereignty and independence. What nobody knew at the time was that former strategic allies would turn into strategic rivals over domination in Central Asia, that control over Tajikistan would become the ultimate bone of contention, and that peace and national reconciliation in Tajikistan would become hostage to Russo-Uzbek competition.

Tajikistan's independence and Russo-Uzbek rivalry in Central Asia

By masterminding the Khujandi-Kulob alliance and intervening in Tajikistan with the help of the Russians, President Karimov of Uzbekistan counted on reinstating the old Khujandi-dominated regime, i.e., his own influence in the republic. Apart from the domestic reasons that were indicated earlier, he wanted to put pressure on other regional leaders to make them more compliant to his idea of a united Turkestan and his vision of the region's future. The developments that followed indicate that he succeeded only partially.

Karimov did not re-gain control over Tajikistan for two reasons. First, Karimov underestimated the aspirations of the Kulobis who, having acquired a taste for power, resisted all efforts to strip them of it. More importantly, though, Karimov's failure is explained by the launch of Russia's Near Abroad policy. After a brief period, Russia re-emerged as a key player in Central Asia as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union attempting to restore its authority in the region. Uzbekistan's desire for regional domination did not escape Moscow's attention. The Kremlin understood that it had been a tool of Karimov's policy by intervening in Tajikistan in December 1992. Thus, the Russian political leadership abandoned its initial unquestioned acceptance of the notion of the "threat of Islamic fundamentalism," used by Karimov to seek Russian support and justify Russian and Uzbek military intervention in Tajikistan. Karimov tried to secure Russian economic and military support for the ethnic Uzbek faction leader in Afghanistan, Abdurashid Dostam (who at Karimov's request assisted militarily the Khujandi-PFT alliance in 1992), under the pretext that Dostam was fighting Islamic fundamentalists and safeguarding the CIS, i.e. Russia's border with Afghanistan. However, Karimov was put off by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Since Moscow could no longer rely on the Uzbeks, or their once-loyal Khujandis, it needed another channel through which it could reassert its influence in Tajikistan and challenge Uzbekistan for regional domination. Russia chose the Kulobis. Russia backed Rahmonov when the pro-Uzbek Khujandi grouping tried to oust him at the December 1993 session of the Supreme. By backing the Kulobi Rahmonov, Russia counters the Khujandis and, through them, the influence of Uzbekistan. As previously noted, this marks a new development not only in Russian policy toward the region, but also in internal Tajik politics, where traditionally the Khujandis had been backed by Russia and the Kulobis had no external support. To consolidate their power, Kulobis, with Russia's backing, staged parliamentary and presidential elections and held a referendum to endorse the new constitution. After the November 1994 presidential elections, the Kulobis, apparently with Russian consent, began to gradually drive the Khujandis and Tajikistani Uzbeks out of the central government and local administrations throughout Tajikistan, including the stronghold, Leninobod province.

Obviously, this turn of events does not suit Karimov and jeopardizes the implementation of his plans, but he will not try to oppose Russia's presence in Tajikistan openly. He understands that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Tajikistan would mean the fall of Rahmonov and the return of the Tajik opposition, which would undoubtedly influence the situation in Uzbekistan. The return of the Tajik opposition, which has Uzbeks in its ranks, could provide the Uzbek opposition groups with the possibility of operating from Tajikistan, facilitating their work in overthrowing Karimov. This prompts the latter to declare that stability in Central Asia can be assured only by the presence of Russia as a guarantor and that Uzbekistan's future is inconceivable without Russia, which must remain Uzbekistan's strategic partner.

In mid-March 1994 the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik foreign ministers gathered in Dushanbe and issued a unanimous appeal to the UN to grant Russian troops the status of a UN peacekeeping force. In the same month, moreover, Karimov signed a Military Cooperation Treaty with Russia which, among other things, provides for the establishment of military bases for joint use. These moves show that Karimov wants to persuade the Russian leadership that Uzbekistan and no other Central Asian state is and will be Russia's principal ally in the region.

On the other hand, in light of the war in Chechnya and the prospect of a more nationalistic, pro-empire regime in Russia, the 30,000 Russian troops in Tajikistan make Karimov very apprehensive about Moscow. Karimov is trying to ease Russia out of the region in different ways. In interviews and statements destined for foreign consumption he accuses Russia of neo- imperialism in the region. By strongly opposing the idea of dual citizenship, seen by Central Asian Russians as a saving remedy, he psychologically encourages them to leave, obviously anticipating that with their departure Russia's influence would diminish. In this connection, he openly reprimanded President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan for admitting the possibility of introducing dual citizenship in that republic. His relations with President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan deteriorated when the latter advanced the idea of a closer Eurasian Union. The Uzbek president is one of the most vocal opponents of creation of any supranational bodies within the CIS, fearing that such structures would lead to restoration of a Russian-dominated unified state.

At the same time Karimov is pushing for such formal structures within the Central Asian Union, signed on his initiative between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan in July 1994. Karimov yielded some success because Presidents Nazarbaev and Akaev are no less worried than their Uzbek colleague about the fate of their countries should there be a change of regime in Moscow.

These fears prompted all three presidents to change their policy toward Tajikistan. Since his Khujandi allies lost the November 1994 presidential election, Karimov has been speaking out about finding a political solution to the Tajik civil war. He has talked about promoting free and open parliamentary and presidential elections in Tajikistan and about the necessity of forming a coalition government made up of the current regime and the opposition. As a sign of his dramatic change in tactics, as earlier mentioned, Karimov invited Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda, first deputy chairman of the Movement for the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan and head of the Tajik opposition delegation at the UN-mediated intra-Tajik peace talks, for consultations. Their meeting took place on April 3, 1995 in Tashkent. Karimov also proposed holding the fourth round of the intra-Tajik peace talks in Tashkent. The opposition welcomed it, but the current Russian-backed Dushanbe regime immediately rejected the offer.

By making these overtures toward the Tajik opposition, Karimov is evidently trying to forge an alliance between the Tajik opposition and the Khujandis in order to play them against the Kulobis and the Russians. When the Uzbek leader invited Turajonzoda and other Opposition leaders to meet in August 1995, Abdullojonov and a number of prominent Khujandis came as well. When the two delegations met however, their negotiations did not produce any tangible results. Karimov has secured regional support for his new Tajik policy. After the escalation of fighting between the opposition fighters and the Russian border guards in the first weeks of April 1995, Karimov organized a meeting with President Nazarbaev and President Akaev in Shymkent to discuss these countries' common approach to resolving the Tajik civil war. As a result of the summit, the three leaders called on the Tajik government to enact a political reconciliation as quickly as possible. They also proposed to hold the next round of intra-Tajik peace talks in Almaty. The Russians reacted negatively to the latter proposal; they insisted on holding the talks in Moscow. However, the entire process showed that Karimov had been successful in winning over two other Central Asian countries in his drive to undermine Russian influence in the region. The next step in this Russian-Uzbek tug-of-war was the threat made at the CIS summit in Minsk in May 1995 on the withdrawal of Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz units from CIS "peace-keeping" forces in Tajikistan, unless Rahmonov opted for political reconciliation with the opposition.

In addition to the political rivalry, there is economic rivalry between Russia and Uzbekistan. It is illustrated by a remark attributed to a leading Uzbek businessman close to Karimov. He said that, by providing Tajikistan with new Russian currency, Russia wanted to drain Uzbek natural resources and with the help of Tajikistan bring the Central Asian states to their knees. This allegation came despite the fact that the bulk of the new Russian currency ended up in Uzbekistan after Uzbeks rushed to sell cheap food in the bordering districts of Tajikistan where they were experiencing starvation. To stop this drainage, Tajik authorities had to introduce their own coupons coequal with rubles. Furthermore, in a plain show of force, Uzbekistan has repeatedly blocked the only railroad that connects Tajikistan with the outside world in order to prevent the delivery of goods and fuel from Russia.

In sum, Russia's growing awareness that its own interests in the region do not always coincide with those of the Uzbek government calls into question a strategic partnership with Uzbekistan and makes the future progress of Karimov's regional aspirations more uncertain. Despite the latter's periodic overtures toward Moscow it is unlikely that Russia will welcome, let alone assist, the appearance of a regional "superpower" in Central Asia. Thus, the Russo-Uzbek competition for influence over the region, on the battlefield of Tajikistan, will continue to fuel the Tajik civil war. As the political games played between the Kremlin and Tashkent continue, the people of Tajikistan will remain the long-suffering pawns.

The Tajik Opposition: Fundamentally Moderate

The Tajik opposition has survived the crackdown and purges by the current regime. The opposition managed to reorganize itself and reemerge as a force which eventually made governments of Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan sit down at the negotiating table with it. The opposition has advanced its proposals for ending the civil war and continuously speaks about finding a political solution to the conflict. The Islamic wing of the opposition has repeatedly stated that it has no plans to build an Islamic state in Tajikistan. Notably, it has not found much support in the Muslim world.

Since December 1992, the opposition has been concentrated in three places: Afghanistan, Moscow and Gorno-Badahshon. Small groups of fighters operate in central Tajikistan (Karategin). The Islamic part of the opposition, which was shoved into Afghanistan together with more than 100,000 refugees, consisted of various groups, notably the Islamic Renaissance Party and forces loyal to Akbar Turajonzoda, who as Qadi was Chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tajikistan, the country's clerical hierarchy. These forces, plus nonaffiliated civilian refugees, organized the Movement of the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan (MIRT). The Movement is headed by Said Abdullohi Nuri, who has been spiritual guide of the IRP and close to Turajonzoda, who is now his first deputy. Another deputy is Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, Chairman of the former IRP, now disbanded. Opposition fighters are concentrated in military camps in Tahor and Qunduz provinces of Afghanistan. The headquarters of MIRT are in the town of Taliqon in Tahor province.

The secular part of the opposition is based in Moscow. Now called the Coordinating Center of Tajik Democratic Forces in CIS, it unites members of the Democratic Party, "Rastokhez" Popular Movement, various Pamiri groups and formerly non-affiliated activists and intellectuals. The Center is headed by Otakhon Latifi, former Deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan. The "Umed" (Hope) Fund deals with the Tajik refugees scattered in CIS. It is headed by Colonel Habib Sanginov, former people's deputy of the republican parliament and former head of the republic's Traffic Inspection. The opposition has managed to preserve the close cooperation and unity of its Islamic and secular elements, though the leader of the small Democratic Party and a number of his followers abruptly defected from the opposition to embrace Rahmonov and his Russian allies. As was the case in 1991-92, the opposition groups are working together on articulating a joint approach to ending the civil war. During the third round of intra-Tajik peace talks in Islamabad in October 1994, representatives of various groups forming the opposition drafted a joint declaration to announce formally the creation of the United Tajik Opposition and its underlying principles. After the discussion within each of the constituent groups the declaration was signed by MIRT, the DPT and the Coordinating Center on July 23, 1995. Said Abdullohi Nuri was re-elected the opposition's leader. The declaration is open for signature to other parties, groups or individuals in opposition to Rahmonov's regime.

All the attempts of the Russian military and the Tajik government to persuade the Moscow-based secular part of the opposition to enter into separate talks have failed. The Tajik opposition represents a rare example in the Muslim world in which Islamic and democratic forces are committed to and are acting together to build a democratic and secular state. Many a lance was broken over the alleged threat of "Islamic fundamentalism" in Tajikistan and the supposed desire of the Islamic Renaissance Party and Muslim Spiritual Board of Tajikistan to build a theocratic state. The embellishment of this threat was necessary to justify Uzbek and Russian intervention and the resuscitation of the old totalitarian regime. To be sure, when the IRP was officially established in 1989, it proclaimed as one of its goals the establishment of an Islamic state in Tajikistan. It perceived that this goal would be the result of winning parliamentary elections and having the change approved by a referendum. But after coming face to face with Tajik political reality, and under pressure from Akbar Turajonzoda, the IRP dropped this goal from its charter. It became evident that a long period of "de-Sovietization" and education in the Islamic spirit was necessary to produce a constituency that would be prepared to discuss seriously the idea of introducing an Islamic state.

Since 1991, the IRP has been advocating the establishment of a secular, democratic state with a market economy, in which State and Church would be separated. In addition, the Islamic part of the opposition has pledged its support for preservation of the multinational character of Tajikistan and has committed itself to the respect of ethnic minority rights. Most recently they advanced a proposal to include in the creation of a theocratic state in Tajikistan. Contrary to widespread rumors implying that Iran has supported the IRP and the MIRT, Iran did not and could not have played any active part in supporting the Islamic-democratic alliance in Tajikistan for two reasons. First, it was as clear to Iranians, as to the leaders of the Tajik Muslims, that there were no immediate prospects for founding an Islamic state in Tajikistan, if only because there were few Tajiks who knew what being a Muslim really meant: what line of conduct, outlook and, generally speaking, mentality they would henceforth be expected to follow. It would be necessary first to have large numbers of educated clergy who, in turn, would be able to deliver Islamic teachings to the masses.

Second, good and stable relations with Russia are more important for the pragmatic Iranian leadership than the desire to have Tajikistan or any other Central Asian state Islamicized as soon as possible. That is why, on the official level, Teheran does not go beyond the expression of concern for the plight of Muslims in Tajikistan. In addition to having Russia as its economic partner and arms supplier, Iran is apparently trying to win Moscow's support for its confrontation with the West, specifically the United States over its deal for the purchase of nuclear reactors from Russia. The fact that Russo- American relations have soured shows that Teheran might have made progress in this direction.

The Islamic Conference Organization, an international Islamic organization, did not even respond to the Tajik opposition's appeal to act as an intermediary in peace talks nor did it pay heed to the opposition's peace proposals. All this brought public lamentations from Davlat Usmon, one of the leaders of the opposition and former Deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan. He disclosed that financial support, arms and ammunition came from various Islamic nongovernmental organizations and from sympathetic Tajik Afghan mujaheddin commanders. However, it was reported that Javid Nasir, head of the Pakistani army's Interservices Intelligence Directorate, was fired for helping Islamic forces in Tajikistan, India, Sri Lanka, and the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Turajonzoda indicated that several countries were ready to assist the opposition in waging the war, not because of their love for the opposition but in order to weaken Russia.

After scoring some military success in fighting the Russian border guards, "peace-keepers," and the Government troops, the opposition advanced its plan for a political solution of the war. The way to a peace settlement in Tajikistan, as seen by the opposition, was outlined in two documents "Proposals for the Peaceful Settlement of Military-Political Conflict in the Republic of Tajikistan" (December 7, 1993) and "Proposals of the Tajik Opposition Delegation and Umed Fund" (April 14, 1994). The opposition`s peace plan is summarized as follows:

• The opposition, the government and ethnic minorities should form a State Council; Academics, technocrats and other neutral persons should form a Provisional Government for a transitional period;
  
• UN peace-keeping forces should be brought into the republic. They should include military observers from Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and France, among other countries;
  
• A conciliation committee should be established which, together with UN peace-keeping forces, would undertake the disarmament of all armed groups, including the "special brigades" of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Security comprised of the PFT fighters;
  
• The conciliation committee and UN peace-keeping forces should establish "safe havens" and monitor the return of refugees;
  
• As the process of stabilization takes place, a new constitution, which would specifically declare the inadmissibility of the establishment of a theocratic state, should be drawn up and adopted by a referendum;
  
• After the constitution is adopted, parliamentary elections should be held;
  
• The winning party should form a government and start to build Tajikistan`s armed forces, which would take over from UN peace-keeping forces and Russian troops stationed in the republic.

These proposals found complete support from Presidents Akaev, Karimov, and Nazarbaev, and from the OSCE and other international organizations and leaders. Though the Tajik opposition is prepared to negotiate and compromise, Said Abdullohi Nuri has warned that, if peace talks fail and the parties to the conflict fail to find a political solution, the opposition and refugees would not allow themselves to be driven permanently into Afghanistan, as their predecessors were by Soviet troops in the 1920s. Nuri emphasized that the opposition would continue the armed struggle against the current regime if a settlement is not reached.

A Chechen Parallel?

While the continuing Russian military intervention in Tajikistan actually predates Moscow's recent campaign in Chechnya, it was the latter that drew more notice, at least temporarily no doubt due to its abrupt escalation into outright urban warfare. The origins of these two conflicts have certain common features. They both had a Russian-supported internal political putsch, but one that failed to stabilize the situation to Moscow's liking. In both cases, the Russians resorted to military intervention rather than genuine negotiation in order to "guarantee" the desired outcome. There is another common feature of Russia's policy in Tajikistan and Chechnya: In neither instance does Russian military intervention have much to do with protecting the lives or interests of ethnic Russian populations in those areas, many thousands of whom have ironically been forced to flee their homes in the wake of Moscow's military maneuvers.

There are also differences between the two cases. A major legal distinction, of course, is that Chechnya is officially part of the Russian Federation while Tajikistan is supposed to be a sovereign state, independent of Russia altogether. Legalities aside, some observers believe that both the Russians and the Tajik opposition may have hardened their views in response to events in Chechnya. "Tajik rebels take heart from Russia's struggles in Chechnya," headlined London's Financial Times on February 3, 1995. The article quotes Akbar Turajonzoda to the effect that the Sinn Fein party offers "the lesson for us and probably the Chechens, too." "They fought for 30 years," the Qadi added, "and then forced the British government to compromise. We hope it will take us a lot less time."

This sentiment was echoed by Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, the Qadi's colleague in opposition. While the Tajik opposition would respect a cease-fire, he told a private gathering, it would not forswear a military option; that was what had compelled the regimes in Dushanbe and Moscow to deal with the opposition in the first place, and that was its only hope of obtaining political satisfaction from now on. As for the Russian military contingent in Tajikistan, it has become both bigger and more belligerent since the fall of the Chechen capital of Grozny, some 2,000 miles west. Lt. Gen. Chechulin, then commander of the Russian border guards on the Tajik-Afghan frontier, has taken to saying that negotiated agreements are not necessarily binding on his troops. Apart from their obviously dire impact on the Tajik peace talks, remarks like these raise the even more unsettling possibility that some key Russian units in Tajikistan may not be fully under anyone's political control not even Moscow's.

Meanwhile, Russian propagandists have lost no time in trying to connect their local adversaries in both Chechnya and Tajikistan with the specter of "Islamic fundamentalism." In mid-January 1995, articles in Nezavisimaya gazeta and Krasnaya zvezda charged that, in the wake of their operations in Chechnya, Russian forces in Tajikistan now faced "an attempt to create a united Islamic front against Russia" or even "the first hints of a possible jihad." The truth, however, is that the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan is not fundamentalist and indigenous rather than imported. And it is the "secular" ruling clique in Dushanbe that, as its actions continually demonstrate, is both intolerant and undemocratic not the Islamists and democrats who oppose it.

The Peace Process in Tajikistan

A trilateral attempt by Russia, Uzbekistan and the Khujandi-PFT alliance to annihilate the opposition in 1992-93 failed. Their hoped-for blitzkrieg never materialized. With continuous fighting between Russian border guards (assisted by the 201st Division) and Tajik opposition guerrillas operating both within Tajikistan and from Afghanistan, Russia was left with no other option but to increase its military presence in Tajikistan throughout 1993 and 1994. The Russian leadership attempted to raise joint CIS forces with little success. Kazakhstan sent its promised battalion only in 1994. Kyrgyzstan initially sent but failed to keep its battalion in Gorno-Badahshon. Only after President Akaev announced incentives for volunteers was Kyrgyzstan able to send two units to Badahshon again in 1994. Uzbekistan, pursuing its own policy, has sent troops to Tajikistan, but they are stationed mostly in Leninobod province. Thus Russia found itself bearing the major burden of a military adventure in Tajikistan.

After Tajik opposition guerrillas razed border post No. 12 in July 1993, and with the growing awareness in Russia that it is being drawn into a "second Afghanistan," Russia's political and military leadership could no longer ignore the evidence that a peace settlement was the only solution. Colonel-General Bessmertnyi, chief of staff of CIS peace-keeping troops in Tajikistan, acknowledged that support for the opposition inside Tajikistan was growing. A USIA opinion poll conducted in Russia in September 1993 showed that almost 60 percent of Russians were opposed to the deployment of Russian troops in Tajikistan. Against that backdrop, in November 1993 the Russian government, in the person of Evgeni Primakov, director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, established direct contacts with the Tajik opposition. In March 1994, Anatoli Adamishin, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and President Yeltsin's envoy to Tajikistan, traveled to Teheran and met with Akbar Turajonzoda. Those direct contacts eventually led to peace talks under the United Nations aegis between the current Tajik regime and the opposition, the first round of which was held in Moscow in April 1994, the second that June in Teheran, the third in October 1994 in Islamabad, and the fourth in May 1995 in Almaty. Ambassador Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, U.N. Secretary-General Special Envoy to Tajikistan, has been moderating the talks, with Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan serving as observers. The OSCE and OIC are also present at the talks.

In the first round the Government refused to accept the opposition's proposal for a cease-fire. At the time of the first round of Tajik peace talks, the Russians, mindful of the Tajik opposition, invited Akbar Turajonzoda and Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda to visit Moscow in April 1994. There they met a number of officials, including Albert Chernyshov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Gromov, First Deputy Minister of Defense. Gromov repeatedly stated that Tajiks themselves should find a political resolution to the civil war.

In the second round the sides worked out an agreement for a cease-fire and for termination of all hostile actions. It was not signed because the opposition demanded that at the same time all political prisoners should be freed, all politically motivated prosecutions should be dropped, and the official ban on opposition parties and movements as well as on newspapers and journals should be revoked. The government rejected all of these demands. The Tajik government delegation was headed by a low-level official the Minister of Labor and Employment who had no real power to negotiate a peace settlement. This has prompted the opposition to reciprocate in the composition of their delegation.

The subsequent phase of regional diplomatic maneuvering over Tajikistan's fate began in July 1994, when the Supreme Soviet in Dushanbe passed a resolution to hold a presidential election combined with a referendum on a new constitution on September 25, 1994. This decision arguably violated accepted democratic norms in several distinct ways. The existing constitution of Tajikistan did not provide for the post of president of the republic at all, so a new constitution should at a minimum have been adopted in advance of, not alongside, a vote for the presidency. In addition, an election of this sort should have been preceded by the repeal of the state of emergency and the ban on political parties. Finally, and most importantly, the new election plan breached the Dushanbe regime's agreement with the Tajik opposition that all issues pertaining to either an election or a new constitution would be discussed only at the final stage of the UN-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks. That agreement, in the form of an agenda for the talks, had been signed by the Tajik government and the opposition delegations in April 1994, during their first round of talks in Moscow.

Against this background, Dushanbe's abrupt electoral ultimatum made Boutros-Ghali threaten to cancel the next round of Tajik peace talks. Similarly, the head of the OSCE mission to Tajikistan announced that the departure of his mission was a possibility. And the Tajik opposition responded by intensifying military action across the Afghan border, as well as inside Tajikistan.

All these developments apparently raised concern in Moscow. As a result, the planned election was postponed and Moscow dispatched to Tehran in September Albert Chernyshov, deputy to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and Abdulmajid Dostiev, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, for further talks with the Tajik opposition. Akbar Turajonzoda was the opposition's chief negotiator. In the meantime, in twelve days of negotiations in Tehran, the two Tajik sides signed the "Agreement on a temporary cease-fire and cessation of other hostilities along the Tajik-Afghan border and inside Tajikistan." They formally extended that agreement in the third round of Tajik peace talks held in Islamabad the following month. The U.N. established a mission of military observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), the primary function of which is to observe the implementation of the agreement. The UN mission also gives a much needed international exposure to the Tajik tragedy. The cease-fire, the course of the fourth round negotiations, and their follow-up (or lack thereof), highlighted some hard truths about the Tajik situation.

The Tajik opposition delegation in Islamabad initially insisted on the fulfillment of earlier promises as conditions for a cease-fire: release of political prisoners (above and beyond a "prisoner of war" exchange); safe havens for the opposition supporter in the Karategin Valley; and humanitarian supply for besieged opposition forces in Gorno-Badahshon. As the talks progressed, however, the opposition gradually reduced its demands, and settled instead for token concessions on these issues. When even those promises were not fulfilled afterward by Dushanbe, there was hardly a protest from any of the international sponsors of these talks. This author, who participated in these sessions, observed that at every stage the Russians in attendance encouraged their clients in Dushanbe to adopt an intransigent line. More dramatically, the Dushanbe regime went ahead with the previously postponed presidential election. To no one's surprise, Moscow's favorite, Imomali Rahmonov, won a comfortable if not crushing majority, amidst widespread accusations of irregularities.

To consolidate their victory, the Russians proposed another round of Tajik talks in Moscow in January, followed quickly by a parliamentary election in Tajikistan itself. Rahmonov's purges proceeded, and a parliamentary election of sorts was eventually held. However, the peace talks had to be postponed. Outside attention, never very attuned to Tajikistan, was suddenly riveted by an abrupt escalation of a rather similar Russian role in another formerly obscure Muslim corner of the former Soviet Union Chechnya.

The fourth round of the talks did not take place until May. It was preceded by the first meeting of Tajikistan's President Imomali Rahmonov and Said Abdullohi Nuri, the opposition's leader and Chairman of the Movement for the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan (MIRT). The two met in Kabul from May 17 to May 19, 1995. They extended the temporary cease-fire agreement for another three months; they also pledged that the two sides would continue the peace process in order to resolve the conflict by political means. Rahmonov and Nuri reiterated that matters of political and institutional change would be the topic of the fourth round's discussion in accordance with the agenda agreed upon at the first round in Moscow in April, 1994. Yet, from the onset of the fourth round it was evident that the government was not going to stick to the agenda. In his opening speech, Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloev, first deputy premier and head of the governmental delegation, alleged that fundamental political and economic reform had already been introduced in the country, implying by that there was no need for any further reforms. Instead, the government side suggested discussing items related to a permanent cease-fire, repatriation of refugees, and other minor issues unrelated to the round's agenda.

The opposition delegation advanced its package of proposals, enumerated above. The new element in the opposition's package was the formation of a Council of National Unity from representatives of the current government and the opposition. Each would have 40 percent of the seats and representatives from ethnic minorities the remaining 20 percent. To avoid speculation that MIRT wanted to turn the country into an Islamic state by force, the Islamic wing of the opposition tabled a proposal to include in the constitution an article that would prohibit the construction in Tajikistan of an Islamic or socialist state for 40-50 years.

The government dismissed the opposition's proposals altogether. To save the round, Piriz-Ballon suggested a number of compromises that were also rejected by the government and not find full support in the opposition. At that time, President Nazarbaev intervened to mediate the talks personally. In the course of one day, May 31, which was to be the last day of negotiations, he met with Piriz-Ballon, the governmental delegation, the opposition delegation. He drafted a list containing a number of mutually acceptable points for the government and the opposition, called President Rahmonov, received his approval, met with Mr. Ubaidulloev and Mr. Turajonzoda seeking their approval, and by the end of the day it seemed that a joint statement with these and other points would be signed. However, after the arrival and intervention of Russian deputy foreign minister Chernyshov, the Tajik government disavowed its agreement with the points negotiated by Nazarbaev and refused to sign the statement.

Items in Nazarbaev's proposal included the following: the establishment of a joint social-political commission based on the principles of parity, which would work out proposals to amend the Tajik constitution and other legislative acts; the convening of a Congress of the peoples of Tajikistan to discuss issues of national reconciliation and ways to achieve it; the suspension of the execution of opposition supporters for the period of the intra-Tajik peace talks; and, fourth, the opposition's agreement to extend the cease-fire arrangement until November 26, 1995 in exchange for a government contingent reassignment (in the end of 1994 the government deployed 350 troops in Gorno-Badahshon province in violation of the cease-fire agreement) exclusively for the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border.

Out of all these proposals only the third was incorporated into the joint communique, along with a pledge by the government and the opposition to step up their efforts to ensure the voluntary, safe and dignified return of all refugees and internally displaced persons to their places of permanent residence. Both sides adopted concrete measures to this end. They also agreed to exchange an equal number of prisoners and POWs by July 20, 1995, which was not done.

The fourth round of the Tajik peace talks failed to produce any tangible results in matters of political, constitutional and institutional transformation. First and foremost, the Russians were unhappy with the emerging unified regional approach to the problem of Tajikistan. Presidents Akaev, Karimov and Nazarbaev state unequivocally that Rahmonov should share power with the opposition, otherwise they will withdraw their troops from the Tajik-Afghan border. They reiterated their position at the CIS summit in Minsk, May 26-27, 1995, where Nazarbaev was represented by his vice-president. Second, the Russians were apparently annoyed by Akaev, Karimov and Nazarbaev's initiative to hold the talks in Almaty in lieu of Moscow (as originally scheduled) and by Nazarbaev's decision not to sign the extension of the CIS "peace-keeping" in Tajikistan. These factors persuaded the Russians to use the round to show that neither Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan nor Uzbekistan can manage their internal affairs without Russia's involvement.

Conclusion: Is Change in the Air?

Behind the facade of Russia's tough line vis-...-vis its interests in Tajikistan, however, the real tide may be shifting in a different direction. Against the background of Russia's debacle in its own Muslim borderlands (Chechnya), the real question remaining is the degree to which the Russian public will encourage, or even acquiesce to, continued Russian expeditionary adventures. In fact, reliable USIA polls suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Russian public opinion does not support the expenditure of blood and treasure to restore the Soviet empire or to preserve a Russian sphere of influence in the Near Abroad.

The question will become all the more pertinent if, as may well prove to be the case, the cease-fire in Tajikistan falls apart because little has actually been achieved through the peace talks. The inability to reach agreement through the peace talks could be attributed to Moscow's inability to find blueprint for the settlement of the Tajik civil war that would be to Moscow's advantage and best guarantee its strategic interests in the region. More precisely, the end result of these complex, ongoing negotiations over Tajikistan will depend in large measure upon the stand of the Russian military, especially those officers stationed in Tajikistan. Their influence can be best illustrated by the proposal Colonel General Pyankov, former commander of CIS peace-keeping troops in Tajikistan, made to Akbar Turajonzoda. The general invited Turajonzoda to hold talks in Berlin or Prague in March 1994, a proposal Turajonzoda rejected, saying that he would only deal via official channels, with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Meanwhile, comments by uniformed commanders most involved with Tajik issues also indicated a possible shift toward political and away from purely military options in that arena. During a recent upsurge in inter-Tajik skirmishing in the Pamir area in the spring of 1995, the Russian commander of the CIS expeditionary forces in Tajikistan, General Patrikeyev, publicly blamed the Tajik government rather than the opposition for violating the cease-fire between the two sides. Immediately thereafter, perhaps because of this indiscretion, it was announced the Patrikeyev's tour as commander would not be renewed. But his superior, Russian Defense Minister Grachev, offered a similar slight to Dushanbe when he declared that the CIS forces in Tajikistan, at Rahmonov's invitation, would not be increased. These ambiguous signals suggest that Moscow, like Tashkent, may be rethinking it political-military posture in Tajikistan as the opposition there demonstrates its continued viability.

Indeed, the Tajik opposition is not too weak to mount still damaging military offensives. It did so quite successfully in Tavildara in August/September 1994, as a kind of "protest vote" against the presidential elections and constitutional referendum. In sum, it is still unclear whether the Russian bear has really tamed the Tajik tiger. And the solution to that riddle lies no less in the internal dynamics of Tajik society than in diplomatic maneuvers of Russia and Uzbekistan described above.

Looking ahead, a new round of more formal negotiations between the contending Tajik sides is scheduled to begin sometime in November 1995. The talks promise to provide an acid test of whether this newly apparent interest in the Tajik opposition, on the part of both Moscow and Tashkent, will also be reflected in a more flexible position on the part of the current Tajik regime itself or whether the two sides will go back to the battlefield again. Either way, the next few months could represent a turning point for Tajikistan, and quite possibly for its neighbors as well.

Go to Chapter 17

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