Ballistic Missile Defense

BMD In Context: Diplomacy, Deterrence and Defense
The Report of the Working Group on Ballistic Missile Defense

For PDF text version of the report, click here
Arguments Against NMD
In Defense of NMD

With his speech at the National Defense University on May 1, 2001, President Bush confirmed his intention to proceed with a Missile Defense program in order to "counter the different threats of today's world." Missile Defense, however, remains a controversial topic domestically, and a great deal of disagreement still exists over the likelihood of a ballistic missile attack on the United States, the appropriate response to so-called rogue states and the feasibility of the technology.

If U.S. security interests are to be properly served, a much greater measure of public and congressional understanding, consensus and support are needed than have yet been achieved. In response to this fact, The Eisenhower Institute has convened a working group that is outlining a framework for consideration of the issues of Missile Defense that can contribute to decision and action. It will comment on the political and diplomatic process involved with the Administration's campaign to implement its Missile Defense policy and seek to increase domestic understanding of the issue.

The study is composed of thirteen nationally recognized political and technical experts who have had long careers in the fields of national security, arms control and foreign policy. In addition to contributing to a group report that outlines the various issues of the debate, individual members will offer their own take on these issues. Given the diversity of opinion in the group, these viewpoints promise to cover the entire spectrum of the national security debate and thereby provide a comprehensive look at an issue that will play a key role in defining the international security environment of the coming decades.

The President's Decision to Withdraw from the ABM Treaty
by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, March 2002

Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky argues that President Bush's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty was a political act motivated neither by "extraordinary events" that have led the treaty to be an impediment to safeguarding US national security, nor by the technical necessities of developing an operational missile defense system. Similarly, the implications of the decision will ultimately be defined by its political consequences rather than by its technical significance. Follow this link for the full analysis.

Working Group Members