Meeting the Nuclear Challenge

Meeting the Nuclear Challenge: A Personal Perspective

By Robert McNamara

April 25, 2003
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In October 1999, shortly before the fateful vote of the United States Senate rejecting the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, United Kingdom Prime Minister Blair, French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder published a joint op-ed article in The New York Times in support of ratification of the Treaty. In that article, the three authors clearly labeled nuclear proliferation as the "principle threat to world safety" in the 21st century. The events of September 11, 2001 only underscore the growing danger of major catastrophe that we all face, and cause us to consider how much more horrible they would have been had terrorists acquired fissile materials or nuclear weapons.

The Russian and US SORT Treaty and the US Nuclear Policy Review, published in 2002, make clear that Russia and the US plan to retain thousands of nuclear warheads for decades ahead, if not in perpetuity. The US and Russian actions are a clear violation of Article 6 of the Nonproliferation Treaty which requires the five Declared Nuclear Powers-Russia, the US, Britain, France and China-to move to negotiate elimination of all nuclear weapons.

By its future nuclear weapons program, the US is saying, in effect, "While we have the most powerful conventional military force in the world, and will not allow any other nation to challenge our conventional power, we will not permit non-nuclear nations, with smaller conventional forces, to acquire nuclear weapons, but will retain them ourselves."

Such a position is not tenable. It has already led to a breakdown of the nonproliferation regime with North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. And other nations-Iran, for example-appear to be violating the treaty as well. If they continue to move in that direction, one or more of Syria, Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are likely to follow their lead. The Atomic Energy Agency estimates that 60 to 70 countries are now capable of building nuclear weapons.

The US recognizes the danger and to meet it has adopted a policy of preemptive military action and regime change. While this US military program in Iraq, in military terms, was enormously successful, its cost in Iraqi civilian lives lost (more than the 3000 lost in the attacks on the US on 9-11) and in financial and political terms to the US was huge. Given this cost, it is more unlikely that we would threaten such action to deter or respond to nuclear threats from the states referred to above each time we have a new crisis with the NPT.

The Iraqi war by its cost has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the US program to counter nuclear proliferation and the World Community, as represented by the Security Council, lacks an alternative.

What to do?

The G-8 plan for reducing the fissile material stockpile is a promising step, but more is required.

I suggest that one, or preferably more, of the five Declared Nuclear Powers petition the Security Council to develop a full response to the breakdown of the NPT. I can think of several steps worthy of consideration, but I urge that extensive debate be focused, in particular, on the following six actions:

• All nations now possessing nuclear weapons will state the number and type of weapons they possess in a formal submission to the Security Council;
  
  
• No nation not now possessing nuclear weapons will be allowed to acquire them;
  
  
• Nations now possessing nuclear weapons will present to the Council a program to drastically reduce their number over a period of years, leading eventually to their elimination;
  
  
• When necessary to assure the security of nations giving up nuclear weapons-e.g., Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, or India-legally binding security guarantees will be provided by the nuclear weapon states;
  
  
• Evidence of failure of any nation to adhere to Security Council regulations implementing the Security Council Resolution will lead to the introduction of inspectors for such periods of time-indefinitely if necessary-as are required to enforce transparency and compliance; and
  
  
• Violation of the Security Council regulations will result in the Council authorizing the use of conventional military force to compel compliance.

Robert McNamara served as Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.