Kazakh Meeting

Kazakhstan's Efforts in Threat Reduction

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the issue of security for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has moved to the forefront. Fears of future terrorist attacks and the possibility that they might involve weapons of mass destruction have come to dominate today's headlines. On September 20, 2001, just nine days after the devastating attacks on New York and Washington, DC, representatives from the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Institute of Non-Proliferation, and the Embassy of Kazakhstan visited the Eisenhower Institute to discuss the continuing efforts of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) regime. The discussion reinforced the notion that more can be accomplished to further enhance the CTR programs currently underway in Kazakhstan. In attendance were Shamil Yukhvatulin, Director General of the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dr. Olga Tyupkina, Executive Director of the Institute of Non-Proliferation, and Mr. Daulet Absatov of the Embassy of Kazakhstan. Former director of the Soviet Space Programs and Institute affiliate, Dr. Roald Sagdev, Institute President Susan Eisenhower, and Eisenhower Institute staff members, Ryan McFarland, Tyler Nottberg, and Andrew Hausman.

Status after Seven Years of Compliance

Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program introduced by Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn in 1992, the former Soviet states received financial and technical assistance to remove their weapons of mass destruction infrastructure and "to preclude proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." The Republic of Kazakhstan receives $50 million annually from the United States for implementation of the program. However, due to the change of administration in the United States, future funds are currently under review.

Dr. Tyupkina explained the progress made by Kazakhstan in implementing the three primary components of the CTR regime. One important aspect of this process is demilitarization. She further indicated that demilitarization involves the dismantling of launch sites, the return of nuclear missiles to Russia, and the dismantling of weapons storage facilities. She elaborated that there were several smaller projects ongoing but tremendous progress had been made in the elimination of strategic bombers and other delivery mechanisms. The second component is the dismantling of nuclear and biological weapons infrastructure and its conversion to civilian uses. The project on spent fuels is focused on the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, which produced nuclear pellets and beryllium. This component is strongly connected with the third component: the commercialization of the weapons and aerospace industries. There are currently several "closed" joint ventures underway between Kazakhstan and outside corporations. Dr. Tyupkina offered the example of KK Interconnect (KKI). The Defense Enterprise Fund, created by Nunn-Lugar, invested $2.5 million into KK Interconnect, a joint venture with Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Center at Semipalatinsk, to make consumer electronic devices. As of April 2001, KKI was assembling Samsung televisions for the Kazakh market. The site of Semipalatinsk was formerly used by the Soviets to test nuclear weapons.

Below are other examples of joint ventures seeking to further the industrial conversion process being undertaken in Kazakhstan.

• Approximately $4 million was slated to Kras Corporation, Fairless Hills, P.A., for a joint venture with Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Center to convert a former nuclear weapons testing facility to a printed circuit board manufacturing plant.
  
  
• Roughly $3 million was provided Byelocorp Scientific, Inc., New York City, for a joint venture with Kazakhstan partner Gidromash to convert a former missile and aircraft systems production facility to the manufacture and distribution of valves and pressure vessels for cryogenic materials and gases.
  
  
• Nearly $2.7 million was provided to Allen & Associates International, Washington, D.C., for a joint venture with Kazakhstan partner Biomedpreparat to covert a former biological warfare and production facility to a vitamins, pharmaceuticals and antibiotics manufacturing, packaging and distribution company.

The Institute of Nonproliferation is in the process of completing a report on its relationship with CTR programs covering the years 1993-2001. The report, when completed, will be available in both English and Russian.

Cooperation and Security

Dr. Tyupkina noted that the relationship between the Kazakhs and the Americans was strained because the Kazakh specialists felt that they were being underutilized. The CTR program has employed many Kazakhs, but a common complaint is that these experts are not being stimulated intellectually. She stressed that the Kazakh specialists were not looking for humanitarian aid. To the contrary, the specialists simply wanted to have fulfilling work. The Kazakh representatives stated that the possibility of a "brain drain" is not a major concern. They noted that a majority of the specialists who have left had gone to Europe, Russia and Israel. A small number of specialists have emigrated to China and Iran, but none of these people were from the weapons industry. A serious concern for the Kazakh government is that they are losing many of their mid-level specialists needed to maintain biological and nuclear weapons sites.

All of the nuclear testing sites are monitored in cooperation with Russia. The Astrakhan test site is being leased to Russia for the next three years. In addition, Mr. Yukhvatulin noted that while cooperation with Russia had been strong in previous years, recently, it has dropped off. Russia has very few nuclear test reactors and is often forced to cooperate with Kazakhstan in the testing of fuel elements, building materials, and on so-called "fast reactors," which are designed to simulate a catastrophic meltdown. Japan has also funded and participated in these tests.

According to Mr. Yukhvatulin, due to the amount of hard currency that can be gained, Kazakhstan has considered the importation of spent nuclear fuel. At present, Kazakhstan does not have the technology to import highly radiated spent fuel, but low-radiation fuel importation does seem to be something that they are considering.

The Kazakh representatives noted that protecting biological weapons material is a global problem, especially because biological weapons are relatively easy to produce and conceal these weapons. There are some leftover biological weapons production sites in Kazakhstan. These sites, however, are protected and the Kazakhs have been working with the United States Department of Defense on security systems for their facilities. Due to the lack of biological weapons specialists vis-à-vis nuclear specialists, efforts by the Kazakh authorities to develop a comprehensive database of all of the disease vectors in the country have been hampered. A major fear continues to be the roughly 1500 nuclear waste sites in Kazakhstan. Mr. Yukhvatulin noted that security is lax at these sites and weapons grade plutonium could be obtained simply by digging with a shovel.

The meeting raised some very serious questions about the security of weapons grade plutonium in Kazakhstan, as well as the relationship between the American specialists and the Kazakhs. Since the start of the "War on Terrorism," it has become even more urgent to resolve these questions before a second, more catastrophic attack occurs.