RUSSIA
| First Nuclear Power Plant Opened: | The first commercial-scale nuclear power plant opened in 1963. |
| Number and Types of Nuclear Power Plants: | Russia has 31 operating nuclear power plants (They are listed below). |
| Percentage of National Energy From Nuclear Power: | As of 2004, nuclear power accounted for 16% of Russia's total electricity production. By 2020, the percentage of nuclear power is expected to increase to 25%. |
| Future Nuclear Power Plans: | Russia currently has a total of six power reactors under construction and hope to increase the percentage of nuclear power in the country to 25% by 2020 from its current level of 16%. |
ANALYSIS / ISSUES
Russia hopes to use economic initiatives to expand its role as an international fuel provider in today's global energy industry. Traditionally, Russia has served an Eastern European clientele (mainly former eastern bloc states), but recently its role in the international arena has grown out of its fuel-relations with a much larger, global trade base. The prospect of new fuel clients has prompted Russia to develop nuclear power plant technology that will transport fuel to countries lacking nuclear energy via floating nuclear power plants.
Floating Nuclear Power Plants (FNPPs) -
In October 2002, the Russian Atomic Ministry approved designs for a "low-powered nuclear plant for generating heat and electricity." The first FNPPs are expected to be completed by 2008 and will cost almost six times less than the cost of a conventional, land-based nuclear power plant. The Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency has decided to start constructing an FNPP at Severodvinsk Sevmash navy plant in 2006. In March 2004, Russia offered to provide India with its own FNPP. The plant would be built in Russia and then shipped to India, where it would operate from atop a barge off of the Indian coastline. The deal between Russia and India is an attempt to bypass NSG restrictions on transfers of nuclear technology, as Russia plans to manage the floating nuclear reactor and sell the electricity to India. Other countries interested in obtaining a Russian FNPP include Thailand, Indonesia, China (negotiations to finance the plant are underway in Beijing), and South Korea (a Protocol of Cooperation was signed in October 2003). The construction of these floating plants illustrates Russia's current policy to expand its global fuel market.
Floating plants, however, have raised concern among some groups who fear that they will become an easy target for terrorists. A Russian branch of Greenpeace released a report on July 7, 2005, requesting a ban on FNPPs for fear of their poor security design. As plans now stand, each NFPP would contain 960 kilograms of enriched weapons-grade uranium as fuel. Without proper security about these floating plants, they could become the targets for terrorists seeking the means for creating dirty bombs. Security and safety have long been a concern for Russian nuclear power sites.
Chernobyl -
Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the world experienced its worst nuclear accident. The April 1986 Chernobyl disaster was the most devastating nuclear mishap in history. Experts believe that the lack of a Soviet ‘safety culture' was to blame in the faulty construction of the Chernobyl site, as faults in the design were disregarded and never fixed. The lack of safety measures in the operation and construction of the site served as a warning to all countries utilizing nuclear power. More information about the technical details and impact of the Chernobyl disaster can be found through the following websites:
During the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, western assistance programs and aid from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators allowed for a surge in safety measures surrounding the operation of Russian nuclear facilities. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also allowed many of the former eastern bloc states to break away from old Soviet technology and pursue western advancements.
Countries created from the fall of the Soviet Union are now dealing with the lasting legacies of the Soviet nuclear program. Ukraine, for instance, is home to the Chernobyl site and several other post-communist countries house nuclear power plants built during the Soviet era. Ukraine closed the last remaining operating reactor at Chernobyl on December 15, 2000, allowing for the complete decommissioning of the site to begin. The Chernobyl plant is an RBMK Soviet-style reactor. There are currently 15 of these Soviet reactors still in operation, 11 in Russia, 2 in Ukraine, and 1 in Lithuania. Following the Chernobyl disaster, safety upgrades were carried out at these plants. Today, much funding from assistance programs goes to upgrading former soviet plants as well as post-Soviet plants built from Soviet technology. Since 1992, more than 1,800 safety programs in the former Soviet states have been funded with nearly $2 billion of aid from the G-24 countries, the world's 24 most-industrialized countries. These safety programs are aimed at improving standards at the former Soviet nuclear power plants and improving independent nuclear regulators within those countries.
MOX Fuel and Reprocessing -
Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel is a way to reprocess plutonium remaining in SNF (spent nuclear fuel) to provide energy and make additional electricity. Currently, MOX fuel constitutes 2% of all new fuel. Widely used in Europe, MOX fuel is used in 30 European reactors and an additional 20 reactors are gaining licenses to do so. Plans are underway in Japan to use MOX fuel in a third of its reactors by 2010. In addition, both Russia and the United States may possibly use MOX fuel in five and six reactors, respectively. The fuel is produced in commercial quantities at four separate plants located in Belgium, the United Kingdom, and two France.
Russia currently uses MOX fuel in fast neutron reactors and today leads the ways in developing fast reactors with plans to build a new generation of fast reactors fuelled by MOX. Financing is underway for a MOX plant with the goal of reducing the amount of stored weapons-grade plutonium. The hope is to permanently destroy ex-military plutonium as it is used in MOX reactors. The Euratom Supply Agency estimates that the use of a single MOX fuel element consumes 9kg of plutonium and allows for the avoidance of a further 5kg from being produced. Opponents of MOX fuel claim that the fuel stands as a global proliferation risk because the plutonium is still "weapons-useable." This issue has created a point of contention among experts, but it has been concluded that there are serious difficulties in extracting MOX quality plutonium for the purpose of making a nuclear weapon. Of the countries currently possessing nuclear weapons, none have attempted to use MOX-quality plutonium in weapons.
Plans to jointly dispose of weapons-grade plutonium have long been discussed by Russia and the US. On June 4, 2000, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that negotiations had been completed successfully with an agreement disposal. By signing the agreement, the Plutonium Management and Disposition agreement, both countries agreed to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Russia has stated that it intends to burn all 34 tons as MOX fuel, while the US plans to burn 25.5 tons as MOX fuel and immobilize the remaining 8.5 tons. The initial disposal must begin by 2007 at a rate of 2 tons per years and the second phase of the agreement increases the disposal rate to 5 tons per year thereafter. Currently, the main roadblock for Russian disposition of plutonium is funding. An independent study completed by the US Department of Energy, and later supported by independent French and German studies, concluded the cost of disposal at $1.7-1.9 billion over 20 years. The G-8 countries have worked to generate and implement an overall investment and funding strategy to aid Russia. There is also concern over whether Russia has enough MOX production facilities and enough reactors to burn the agreed amount MOX fuel.
In addition to developing MOX fuels as a means of destroying weapons-grade plutonium, Russia has also devoted funds to develop thorium-uranium fuel. Russia's program to promote use of this fuel is based at Moscow's Kurchatov Institute and is aided in funding by the US government and the US company Thorium Power. The program, in existence since the early 1990s, focuses on designing fuel for the Russian VVER-1000 reactors. This fuel was developed from older fuel, using enriched uranium oxide, to create a core of plutonium blanketed by thorium and uranium. Proponents of this type of fuel use have cited four advantages it claims over MOX. These four advantages include: proliferation resistance, compatibility with existing reactors, the ability to use more plutonium in a single fuel assembly, and spent fuel is even less likely to allow recovery of weapons-grade material than MOX. The thorium-plutonium fuel process yields only 1% fissile plutonium. The two fuel projects, plutonium-thorium and MOX, could co-exist without each cutting into the others weapons plutonium supply. Russia houses an estimated 150 tons of weapons-grade plutonium.
The Russian Federation's Federal Agency of Atomic Energy (Rosatom) has proposed the leasing of (mixed oxide) MOX fuel to foreign countries in order to pay for the cost of plutonium programs in Russia. The MOX fuel would be the property of Russia while it is used in foreign reactors before returning home to Russia as SNF for reprocessing. This process appeals to some Western European countries as it allows them to import fuel for their reactors and export the SNF without having to worry about their own waste disposal facilities. Critics of the program argue that the leasing of MOX fuel will lead to greater instability in the nuclear power program in Russia and have negative global implications. The facilities that store SNF and plutonium in Russia have already been marked as insufficient. Increasing the amount of plutonium for MOX fuel and expanding storage for SNF at inadequate storage sites will only add to Russia's notorious reputation for poor safety standards at its nuclear facilities. The critics have targeted the MOX fuel-leasing program as a proliferation risk. The global nuclear industry, on the other hand, believe that by promoting the use of MOX fuel, the global stockpile of plutonium will decrease while producing revenue at the same time. Russia plans to spend $7 billion on environmental and social programs from the $20 billion it will receive by importing 10% of global SNF in the year 2020. The imported SNF will include both intermediate and final disposal grade SNF.
In order for Rosatom to properly carry out its plans to lease MOX fuel, it will need to upgrade its security and storage. Currently, Russia lacks adequate funding for both of these needed improvements. It also lacks public support as 90% of the Russian population is opposed to the SNF imports. Minatom plans to continue its progress, stating that MOX fuel and reprocessing will be the income maker for the Russian nuclear industry.
Nuclear Power Reactors in Operation in Russia
| Reactor | Type V=PWR | MWe net (each) | Commercial Operation |
| Balakovo 1-4 | V - 320 | 950 | 5/86-12/93 |
| Beloyarsk 3 | BN600 FBR | 560 | 11/81 |
| Bilibino 1-4 | LWGR | 11 | 4/74-1/77 |
| Kalinin 1-2 | V-338 | 950 | 6/85, 3/87 |
| Kalinin 3 | V-320 | 950 | 12/04 |
| Kola 1-2 | V-230 | 411 | 12/73, 2/75 |
| Kola 3-4 | V-213 | 411 | 12/82, 12/84 |
| Kursk 1-4 | RBMK | 925 | 10/77-2/86 |
| Leningrad 1-4 | RBMK | 925 | 11/74-8/81 |
| Novovoronezh 3-4 | V-179 | 385 | 6/72, 3/73 |
| Novovoronezh 5 | V-187 | 950 | 2/81 |
| Smolensk 1-3 | RBMK | 925 | 9/83-1/90 |
| Volgodonsk 1 | V-320 | 950 | 3/01 |
| Total : 31 | 21, 743 MWe |
Nuclear Power Reactors Under Construction in Russia
| Proposed Operation Date | Unit | Type V=PWR | MWe Net |
| 2008 | Volgodonsk 2 | V-320 | 950 |
| 2010 | Balakovo 5 | V-320 | 950 |
| 2010 | Kalinin 4 | V-320 | 950 |
| 2010 | Beloyarsk 4 | FBR (BN-800) | 750 |
| 2011 | Balakovo 6 | V-320 | 950 |
| ? | Kursk 5 | RBMK | 925 |
| Total : 6 | 4675 MWe |
Nuclear Power Reactors Planned or On Order
| Unit | Type | MWe (each) | Start-up |
| Leningrad NPP -2 1&2 | PWR | 1500 | 2012, 2015 |
| Novovoronezh 6 | PWR | 950 | 2016 |
| Kursk NPP -2 1&2 | PWR | 1500 | 2016, 2019 |
| Kursk 6 | PWR | 950 | ? |
| Bashkira 1 | PWR | 950 | 2012 |
| North-west 1 | VK | 300 | 2011 |
| Smolensk 4 | PWR | 950 | 2012 |
| North-west 2 | VK | 300 | 2013 |
| Bashkira 2 | PWR | 950 | 2014 |
| Volgodonsk 3 | PWR | 950 | 2015 |
| Volgodonsk 4 | PWR | 950 | 2017 |
| Tatar 1 | PWR | 950 | 2016 |
| Smolensk NPP-2 1&2 | PWR | 950 | 2017, 2019 |
| Tatar 2 | PWR | 950 | 2018 |
| South Ural 1, 2 | PWR | 950 | 2016, 2019 |
| Novovoronezh 7 | PWR | 950 | 2016 |
| Bashkir 3&4 | PWR | 1500 | 2018, 2020 |
| Tatar 3 | PWR | 1500 | 2020 |
| Beloyarsk 5 | BREST | 300 | 2020 |