Nuclear Fact Sheet

What is the Nuclear Fact Sheet? The Eisenhower Institute's Nuclear Fact Sheet is a collection of important data relating to the fields of nuclear weaponry and nuclear energy. The purpose of the Nuclear Fact Sheet is to increase the level of public awareness of the major security issues surrounding nuclear weapons and of the government programs instituted to deal with the associated threats. It also provides a basic account of the state of nuclear energy in the world today. It is our hope that the publication of this fact sheet will foster increased discourse and debate on these critical subjects.

Nuclear Fact Sheet Table of Contents

I. THE WORLDWIDE THREAT - CONVERGING DANGERS IN A POST 9/11 WORLD

Approximately 14,300 strategic nuclear weapons exist worldwide, more than 95% of which are in the arsenals of the US and Russia. (source: http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/factsataglance.cfm)

More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia maintain approximately 4,600 warheads on hair-trigger alert, or "launch-on-warning" status, for immediate launch in the case of a nuclear attack.

It takes only a few pounds of plutonium (or several times that amount of Highly Enriched Uranium [HEU]) to make a nuclear weapon. Plutonium is created by the fissioning of uranium. Prior to 1942, there was no plutonium in the world. Today there is more than 1,000 tons of plutonium.

Plutonium has a half-life of 24,400 years. This means that existing stocks of plutonium will be dangerous to humans and other forms of life for nearly 250,000 years.

While a number of countries in the world possess significant stocks of these materials, the largest inventory in the world is held in the Newly Independent States (NIS): an estimated 1,350 metric tons of plutonium and HEU, enough to produce approximately 40,000 nuclear weapons. More than 99% of this material is located in Russia, with smaller stocks held in other NIS, including Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

"Russian entities continue to provide other countries with technology and expertise applicable to CW, BW, nuclear, and ballistic and cruise missile projects. Russia appears to be the first choice of proliferant states seeking the most advanced technology and training. These sales are a major source of funds for Russian commercial and defense industries and military R&D."

 

Testimony of DCI George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2/6/02. (Source: http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/factsataglance.cfm)

 

The 21st century marks a turning point when more atom-bomb material enters civilian commerce than exists in all of the world's nuclear weapons. The nuclear power industry is about to introduce civilian plutonium on a massive scale on the world market as a commercial fuel. The uranium now used in power reactors is low-grade uranium that cannot be used in weapons. But the plutonium can be used either for fuel or for bombs.

Plutonium becomes a concentrated nuclear-explosive material once it is separated from the highly radioactive spent fuel of a reactor. This processing of reactor wastes to recover plutonium is called "reprocessing." If plutonium is then mixed with uranium, the so-called "mixed-oxide" (MOX) fuel can be used to run reactors. This is the industry's plan. It has begun producing by the ton a material that can be used by the pound to make nuclear weapons. The design of atomic bombs is now within the reach of nations as well as terrorist groups. All they need to complete the job is plutonium. (Source: http://www.nci.org/nuketerror.htm)

II. ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF SELECTED THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS IN RUSSIA, BY AGENCY
 

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Cooperative Threat Reduction) PROGRAMS

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program of the US, which began in 1991, assists the states of the former Soviet Union in controlling and protecting their nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, and delivery systems. To aid in the implementation of arms control agreements, CTR also contributes to the dismantling and destruction of a number of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems.

Probably the most significant achievement of this program is the successful removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. At the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus respectively possessed the third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear arsenals in the world."

 

 Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (Russia and NIS):

	Total Soviet Stockpile, 1991	April, 2002	2004 (proj.)	2007 (proj.)
Nuclear warheads deactivated	13,300	5,829	8,266	9,882
ICBMs destroyed	1,473	449	659	1,025
ICBM silos eliminated	831	429	430	565
ICBM mobile launchers destroyed	442	1	100	208
Ballistic missile submarines destroyed	48	21	32	41
Sub-launched ballistic missiles eliminated	728	291	573	677
SLBM launchers eliminated	936	368	480	612
Strategic bombers eliminated	167	94	125	131
Long-range nuclear ALCMs destroyed	487	483	713	713
Nuclear test holes/tunnels sealed	194	194	194	194

(Source: http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/whatsnew/prog_accomp_0502.html)

B. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (MPC&A) PROGRAMS

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation

The MPC&A program has reported that as of July 2001, it had already installed rapid or comprehensive security upgrades covering 37% of the estimated 603 metric tons of weapons-useable nuclear material in the NIS.

The program has identified 252 buildings at 40 sites in Russia that require upgrades. As of February 2001, the MPC&A Program had finished or was in the process of installing security systems in 115 buildings, thus protecting about 223 tons, or 37%, of the 603 tons of fissile material identified as being at risk of theft or diversion from Russia."

As of February 2001, the MPC&A Program has yet to install security systems in 104 buildings containing hundreds of metric tons of fissile material because the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) had restricted access for national security reasons. These include 11 buildings at civilian sites and 93 buildings at nuclear weapons laboratories

Access issues in particular continue to hamper progress at many sites. The U.S. requires access and/or assurances to confirm that material is being protected, and access issues continue to delay projects and undermine confidence. Cold War attitudes are persistent on both sides, and the high proportion of funds spent in the U.S. also raises concerns.

Russian Transitions Initiative

Russian officials have identified a need to create 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the 10 closed nuclear cities over the next several years and that DOE's funding for the program has been insufficient to meet this goal.

Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)
This program facilitates reduction of the Russian nuclear weapons complex by removing functions and equipment from the weapons facilities within the closed nuclear cities and helping to create sustainable, alternative non-weapons work for scientists who will be displaced by downsizing. Accomplishments to date include:

• Assisted 370 nuclear cities workers in finding employment.
  
  
• Created two nonproliferation centers in the closed nuclear cities of Snezhinsk and Sarov. The establishment of the centers is part of a strategy for developing nonproliferation analysis and research as a form of alternative, non-weapons employment for Russian nuclear weapons scientists, while also promoting a nonproliferation culture within Russia

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)
This program engages former Soviet weapons of mass destruction scientists and experts in cooperative, non-weapons-related projects involving the ten major DOE National Laboratories and U.S. industry. Accomplishments to date include:

• Engaged over 10,000 NIS scientists, engineers, and technicians since program inception; approximately 5,400 are currently engaged in active projects
  
  
• Currently 400 projects are underway at 170 institutes in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Over 100 of these projects are underway in Russia's closed nuclear cities, particularly Sarov, Snezhinsk, Zheleznogorsk, and Zelenogorsk
  
  
• Successfully commercialized 8 projects, representing over $17 million in sales and 294 long-term jobs created
  (Source: Correspondence with U.S. Government Official, March 2001, NCI Program Web Site, IPP webpage, Department of Energy FY03 Budget Justification)
  
  (Source: Correspondence with U.S. Government Official, March 2001, NCI Program Web Site, IPP webpage, Department of Energy FY03 Budget Justification)
  

III. COSTS/BUDGET NUMBERS
 

General (Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-16.html)

$3.5 trillion: Amount the United States spent between 1940 and 1995 to prepare to fight a nuclear war.

$27 billion: Amount the United States spends annually to prepare to fight a nuclear war.

$2.2 billion: Cost for one B-2 bomber (21 were authorized by Congress).

$2.5 billion: The lifecycle cost of each B-2 (RDTE, procurement, operations, maintenance, and support).

From 1992-2002, the Department of State, Defense and Energy have funded over $4.9 billion in nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia.

For FY 2002, United States Government security-related assistance for Russia totals over $870 million.

FY03 request for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in former Soviet states is over $1 billion.

Department of Defense

FY02 funding for DOD's CTR Program is estimated at $400 million, with $307 million in Russian programs.

Department of Energy (Source: http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/mpca.htm)

Congress increased DOE funding with an FY02 Supplemental in addition to FY02 appropriations. Assistance increased for MPC&A to $291 million; Plutonium Disposition to $61 million; and Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and Nuclear Cities Initiative to $57 million.

At current funding levels, all NIS facilities will not receive fully upgraded security and accounting systems until end of fiscal year (FY) 2007.

According to a 2001 revision of its MPC&A timeline and budget, DOE estimated that it would complete the installation of MPC&A systems in 2011 and would continue to provide assistance through 2020, at a total cost of $2.2 billion.

IV. SECURITY BREACHES - ILLICIT TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS
 

The largest stock of fissile materials in the world is held in the NIS: an estimated 1,350 metric tons of plutonium and HEU, enough to produce approximately 40,000 nuclear weapons. More than 99% of this material is located in Russia, with smaller stocks held in other NIS, including Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Much of this material is contained in Russian nuclear weapons, but roughly 600 metric tons, is stored in other various non-weapon forms at more than 50 sites. (Source: http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_8b.html)

The IAEA reports 181 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. Many of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a "dirty bomb" that could spread radioactive contamination over a wide area. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six agencies spent $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of nuclear materials. (Source: GAO-02-426)

A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive salted with radioactive isotopes in order to spew out that radioactive material and contaminate a wide area. It is not a nuclear weapon in the conventional sense, because nuclear weapons involve a complex nuclear-fission reaction and are thousands of times more devastating. After the bomb is detonated, the explosive acts as a dispersal agent, propelling dangerous nuclear material through the air. Many variables control the potency of the dirty bomb, including the amount of explosives and nuclear material used. Such a bomb does not create an actual nuclear blast, but it could kill 1,000 people in a densely populated city, render the immediate are unlivable for months and pose cancer risks for decades.

Many types of radioactive materials with military, industrial, or medical applications could be used in a dirty bomb. Weapons-grade plutonium or uranium, as well as freshly spent nuclear fuel, would be the most deadly but are also the hardest to obtain and handle. Medical supplies such as radium or certain cesium isotopes, used in cancer treatments and X-ray machines, could be used, although they generally would be less dangerous. As little as a measuring cup's worth of radioactive material would be needed, but experts say that such small amounts would be unlikely to cause severe harm, especially if scattered over a wide area.
(Source: http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/dirtybombfaq020610.html)

V. ENGAGING EMERGING NUCLEAR POWERS
 

Current State of Nuclear Proliferation (Source: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/statefct.asp)

Current Arsenals of the Recognized Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS):

•  
  • China: About 300 strategic warheads
    
    
  • France: Less than 500 strategic warheads
    
    
  • Russia: 6,094 deployed strategic warheads
    
    
  • United Kingdom: Less than 200 strategic warheads
    
    
  • United States: 7,295 deployed strategic warheads

1,700-2,200: Number of strategic nuclear weapons Presidents Bush and Putin pledged to reduce their stockpiles by December 31, 2012 according to the Moscow Treaty. However, there is no decommissioning schedule.

Unrecognized Nuclear-Weapon States

Estimates of the current arsenals of the de facto nuclear powers based on the known amount of fissile material are: India (45 to 95 warheads), Israel (75 to 125 warheads), and Pakistan (30 to 50 warheads). India and Israel are assumed to use plutonium in their weapons; Pakistan is believed to use enriched uranium.

States of Immediate Proliferation Concern (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Iraq)

Iran has sought nuclear-related equipment, material and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia. Russia is continuing its work on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to IAEA safeguards.

Iran, and North Korea have produced or flight-tested missiles with ranges over 1,000 kilometers. China and Russia are the only two potential US adversaries that currently deploy missiles that can target and reach U.S. cities. (http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.asp)

Shortly after the first Gulf War, the IAEA discovered a multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons development program - a program in stark violation of Iraq's NPT commitments. IAEA inspection teams later determined that under the nose of the agency, Baghdad had assembled a program that involved over 10,000 scientists and nearly 50 kilograms of uranium that could be used to assemble weapons.

Miscellaneous

All but four countries in the world have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which they promise not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. The four countries that have not signed this treaty are India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba. All but Cuba have nuclear weapons capabilities. The nuclear weapons states promised not to help other nations develop or acquire nuclear weapons and, most important, they promise to engage in good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Many countries have the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons, but have chosen not to do so. Examples include Sweden, Norway, Japan, Brazil and Argentina. South Africa developed nuclear weapons and then dismantled them.

VI. NUCLEAR POWER 
 

There are currently 440 commercial nuclear reactors in 31 countries with a total capacity of about 351 gigawatts, and 30 new nuclear power plants are currently under construction. In addition, 56 countries operate civil research reactors. (Source: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf01print.htm)

A typical plant generates 20 metric tons per year; 2,000 metric tons is generated by the nuclear industry per year. The entire industry has produced about 40,000 metric tons of used nuclear fuel over the past four decades. If used fuel assemblies were stacked end-to-end and side-by-side, this would cover a football field about four yards deep. (Source: http://www.nei.org/doc.asp?catnum=3&catid=23)

Nuclear power currently supplies more than one-sixth (16%) of the global electricity needs, and its efficiency is increasing. In considering the fact that globally energy demands will grow about two times in next five decades, a large number states value nuclear power as a competitive, potentially unlimited, energy source with favorable environmental characteristics that can enhance energy security in sustainable manner.

 

(Source: IAEA PRIS Database; http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/safeguarding/www.iaea.org/cgi-bin/db.page/pl/pris.nucshare.htm)

VII. ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Bilateral

• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
  Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)
  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)
  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)
  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III)
  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START IV)
  START Provisions - Comparisons
  Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
  Fissile Material Disposition
  Wyoming MOU
  Bilateral Destruction Agreement [BDA]

Multilateral - Nuclear

• Non-Proliferation Treaty
  U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
  Limited Test Ban Treaty
  Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
  Threshold Test Ban Treaty
  Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
  Nuclear Material Convention
  Fissionable Material Convention
  Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
  Nuclear Weapons Convention [Abolition]
  Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism
  Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
  ICJ - Legality of Nuclear Weapons
  The Antarctic Treaty
  African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
  Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty
  South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
  Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
  Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
  Central European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
  Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 

 Multilateral - Conventional

• Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
  Open Skies Treaty
  Confidence- and Security-Building Measures [OSCE]
  Charter of Paris for a New Europe
  Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)
  United Nations Transparency in Armaments (UNTIA)
  Program for Coordination and Assistance for
  Security and Development in Africa (PCASED)
  Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas

Bilateral - Risk Reduction

• Hot Line Agreements
  Incidents at Sea Agreements
  Accidents Measures Agreement
  Ballistic Missile Launch Notification
  Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC).
  Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
  Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
  Cooperative Threat Reduction
  Mutual Detargeting

Multilateral - Other WMD

• Biological Weapons Convention
  Geneva Protocol
  Chemical Weapons Convention
  Seabed Arms Control Treaty
  Outer Space Treaty
  Environmental Modification Convention
  PAROS Prevention of Arms Race
  in Outer Space

Multilateral - Export Control
·  COCOM
·  Wassenaar Arrangement
·  Australia Group (AG)
·  Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
·  Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
·  Zangger Committee

(Source: Federation of American Scientists; http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/)