Systems and Procedures

Response to the Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 1
Alarms and Drills

The Boards noted that vehicle bombs have become the weapon of choice of transnational terrorists. The Boards believed that training our personnel in steps to take in the event of a car bomb attack can reduce injuries and save lives.

Notwithstanding the long history of car bombings, the Boards pointed out that the Department of State did not include vehicular bomb scenarios in posts' Emergency Action Plans (EAPs).

The Boards stated that, given the probability of more car bombs in the future, such contingencies should be provided for in all EAPs, accompanied by the necessary training and drills. The Boards also recommended additional alarm equipment to be used by perimeter guards

Recommendation 1: Emergency Action Plans for all posts should be revised to provide a "special alarm signal" for large exterior bombs and duck-and-cover practice drills in order to reduce casualties from vehicular bombs. Special equipment should be provided to perimeter guards.

The Department agrees and is implementing this recommendation. Posts have received additional guidance on large exterior bombs, including vehicle bombs, for their Emergency Action Plans. They have also been advised that drills should involve all mission personnel and encompass all scenarios. The Selectone system installed at all embassies and consulates alerts personnel of emergencies. A specific tone notifies personnel to take cover immediately in the event of a terrorist attack to include a vehicle bomb attack. This is accompanied by verbal announcements. The Department has completed evaluation and testing of new equipment, including how it can be integrated with existing equipment to enhance its warning and communications capacity. The Department is currently working on an effective means of putting these systems in place as quickly as possible.

In addition, the Department has issued instructions both abroad and at home on personal security practices that could save lives. The widely publicized admonition not to go to windows during outside commotions may have already averted tragedy in Tashkent when mission employees, hearing gunfire at a nearby government building, took cover just before a car bomb exploded and the windows blew in.

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 2
No Low Threat Posts

The Boards commented that, in the process of establishing priorities for the allocation of resources and installation of physical security equipment, the Department of State rated posts in threat categories as low, medium, high, or critical. Given the threat of transnational terrorist attacks against our personnel and facilities anywhere in the world, especially to our most vulnerable posts -- many of which are rated "low" or "medium" threat -- the Boards argued that we can no longer accept the idea that any post falls into the lower threat categories.

Both to deter attacks and to enhance protection, the Boards stated that the goal should be to provide all posts a basic and visible level of security and to build additional security layers, treating all posts as potential terrorist targets.

Recommendation 2: Given the worldwide threat of transnational terrorism which uses a wide range of lethal weapons, including vehicle bombs, every post should be treated as a potential target and the Department of State's Physical Security Standards and policies should be revised to reflect this new reality.

The Department of State agrees. Revised standards are now in the clearance process. The Department had previously established priorities for the accomplishment of its foreign policy objectives by balancing the objectives sought against such practical considerations as funding, staffing, facility availability, and other limitations.

Security standards for all posts must be approved by the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), which is composed of all agencies represented at U.S. missions abroad and chaired by the Director of the Diplomatic Security Service. An OSPB Working Group has proposed a major revision of OSPB Physical Security Standards to provide that requirements associated with terrorism apply to all threat levels for all facilities where the USG is the sole occupant. These revised standards are now in the clearance process. The expansion of these standards to all threat levels includes, but is not limited to: anti-ram barrier and perimeter protection; hardened guard booths at perimeter vehicle entrances; establishment of minimum 100 feet setback for new office buildings (NOBs) and newly-acquired buildings (NABs), and, to the maximum extent feasible, existing office buildings (EOBs); expansion of blast protection for NOBs; and use of laminated windows for all NOBs and other buildings undergoing major renovation. In addition the Department is also currently testing a variety of types of shatter-resistant film for retrofitting windows in EOBs. The revision also includes a new standard which would require blast vulnerability studies for NABs and EOBs undergoing major renovation.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 3
Essential Physical Security Measures

The Boards pointed out that over 85 per cent of our posts abroad fall short of the security standards established in response to the Inman Commission findings in 1985. To enhance their security now, the Boards recommended that highest priority should be given to strengthening outer windows and securing window frames to building structures. Similarly, the Boards recommended that interior glass fixtures such as glass desk and table tops should be eliminated.

The Boards recommended further review of interior designs to remove and protect people from windows, poorly constructed interior walls, and blast channeling corridors.

The Boards found that the distance between the street or parking areas and US buildings abroad should be increased. They noted that this can help reduce the force of a bomb blast more than almost any other factor. The Boards advocated consideration of specially designed walls that might help reduce devastation from car bombs, especially where adequate setback cannot be obtained readily.

The Boards noted that posts' vehicle barriers require constant maintenance at a level of sophistication lacking in most countries. The Boards recommended that they be replaced by less complicated and more easily maintained blocking devices.

The Boards recommended that delivery trucks should not be allowed to approach chanceries for off-loading without being first inspected thoroughly at a pre-designated site well away from the embassy, and then accompanied by an embassy security guard to the loading area.

The Boards noted that increased technological and operational counter-surveillance of US installations either by host government forces or by US-hired local guards could serve as a significant deterrent to terrorists. They also advocated upgrades to the Department's counter-surveillance equipment.

Recommendation 3: For those US diplomatic buildings abroad not meeting Inman standards, essential physical security upgrades should be made immediately and should include inter alia, strengthening all windows with the most technologically advanced safety lamination, obtaining more setback where feasible, constructing special blast perimeter walls as necessary, installing more reliable, easily repairable vehicle barriers, and arranging for off-site delivery truck inspection and additional counter surveillance.

The Department is aggressively upgrading physical security at all of our facilities that do not meet current standards. A total of $212.9 million was appropriated in the 1999 Emergency Security Appropriation for this purpose. The Department's goal is to install all physical security improvements for which funds have been appropriated within two years. In some cases, setback requirements and compliance with all security standards cannot be obtained without new construction. In those cases, the Department is improving physical security as much as possible, until new facilities can be built as follows:

We immediately allocated funding to 132 posts for physical security improvements.

30 posts recommended acquiring additional property to increase setback. We purchased five properties and expect to complete acquisitions at the remaining posts by the end of Fiscal 1999.

American construction firms will design and install additional major perimeter security measures at 88 posts. These measures include new perimeter walls, compound access controls, security lighting and cameras, ballistic doors and windows, and other security items.

The Department, in cooperation with the Technical Support Working Group, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, and other organizations, is aggressively pursuing research and testing to identify improved methods of enhancing windows, walls, and structural elements to mitigate blast effects. The Department will utilize laminated glass to protect windows in new facility construction and also, when feasible, as part of major renovations of existing facilities. When the use of laminated glass is not feasible, shatter resistant window file (SRWF) remains the most effective means currently available that can provide an immediate, relatively inexpensive, and universally applicable deterrent against injury from flying glass shards. The Department is also exploring secondary methods of window fragment retention to be used in conjunction with SRWF, such as catcher bars and blast curtains and shades.

The Department has, to date, implemented surveillance detection programs at 120 overseas posts. We fully expect to do so at the remaining posts shortly. This program includes use of host government forces and/or local national guards. The Department believes this program will be one of the cornerstones in the protection of our overseas facilities for the foreseeable future.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 4
Close Unsafe Chanceries, Move to New Buildings

The Boards observed that there are some chanceries and official premises abroad which are threatened and are extraordinarily vulnerable because of their construction and location, and where enhanced physical security upgrades, such as those in Recommendation 3, cannot provide acceptable interim protection pending construction of new buildings. The Boards considered the risk to lives in such situations as unacceptable.

Recommendation 4: The Secretary of State should personally review the security situation of embassy chanceries and other official premises, closing those which are highly vulnerable and threatened but for which adequate security enhancements cannot be provided, and seek new secure premises for permanent use, or temporary occupancy, pending construction of new buildings.

Immediately after the bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the Secretary commenced a review of the security situation of overseas posts, requesting threat assessments and inviting recommendations on security improvements from all chiefs of mission worldwide. Soon thereafter, the Department formed and led interagency security assessment teams. Equipped with technical experts and the most up-to-date information, these teams were dispatched to a carefully selected group of our most vulnerable posts around the world to conduct in-depth security reviews and make specific recommendations. As a result, one post was closed immediately (Dushanbe) and security at others was upgraded. Physical security recommendations were provided on site to officials at all posts visited.

These reviews were used together with information from the Department's regional bureaus and other sources to establish a worldwide security project priority list from which evolved the Department's plans to upgrade or replace facilities overseas. Funding for a few of the most critical projects was included in the FY 1999 emergency security appropriation and the President's FY 2000 budget request.

In addition, on March 9, 1999, the Secretary appointed the Chair and members of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) which will look at our overseas presence in the context of our national priorities, our resource constraints, and our worldwide security concerns.

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 5
Host Government Security Compliance

The Boards stated that host governments often do not comply with their international legal responsibility of providing security support to our embassies.

Recommendation 5: Demarches to all governments with whom we have relations should be made regularly to remind them of their obligation to provide security support for our embassies. For those governments whose police forces need additional training to enable them to provide more adequate protection, the Department should provide training under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. The Department should also explore ways to provide any necessary equipment to host governments to upgrade their ability to provide adequate protection. Failure by a host government to honor its obligations should trigger an immediate review of whether a post should be closed.

We agree. Contacts with host governments on security matters occur regularly but are usually related to specific security concerns, such as the need for more patrols or the closing of a road near the embassy. We will move forcefully and regularly to remind host governments about their responsibility to protect our facilities, both through demarches and other interactions.

The ATA program is a highly successful and productive effort in which over 20,000 law enforcement officials from more than 90 countries have received training in such areas as explosive detection, VIP protection, and crisis management. Moderate amounts of equipment related to the training have been provided. The curriculum is constantly reviewed and new courses added in light of the prevailing terrorist threat. The program also conducts continual assessments for including personnel from additional countries in training. Since the August 7 bombings, we have undertaken new and substantial initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa and the Newly Independent States. To support this undertaking, the ATA program is preparing to add new training sites to accommodate the expanded number of training courses and students that will result.

Operations at missions with high physical security vulnerabilities, constant credible threats, and a host government which either refuses or is deemed incapable of protecting our facilities will be strong candidates for suspension. One such example is Dushanbe, Tajikistan where operations were suspended in September.

The almost global support our missions received after the East African bombings underscores the extent to which host governments respond to a threat. For example, in Tirana, all the streets surrounding our embassy were closed and barricaded, including the main thoroughfare across the city, until a blast wall could be constructed. In Vienna, the street in front of the embassy was also closed to all traffic.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 6
Revise Threat Assessment Criteria

The Boards believed that, prior to the bombings in East Africa, the analytic process used by the Department of State to determine the level of the threat of terrorism at posts abroad and to compile the Composite Threat List (CTL) was seriously flawed, because it did not take into account important international factors relating to terrorism nor certain host government capabilities or local cultural realities. The Boards commented that, had the threat levels for Nairobi and Dar es Salaam been calculated with these criteria, the levels would have been higher and more realistic than the respectively designated "medium" and "low" levels.

The Boards believed that physical vulnerability factors for each post, such as setbacks, security fences, and surrounding buildings, must also be factored into any threat assessment, given the practice of terrorists to seek out the softest targets. The Boards determined that the Department should create a separate category for terrorism, distinct from indigenous violence arising from domestic instability or civil war.

The Boards also felt that pre-August 7 CTL system relied too heavily on the presence or absence of warning intelligence.

The Boards were pleased to learn of the State Department's recent adoption of more comprehensive criteria in determining political threat levels.

The Boards stated that the intelligence community had paid inadequate attention to the CTL because it incorrectly saw the CTL as merely an internal Department of State bureaucratic process for allocating scarce resources.

Recommendation 6: The Department of State should radically reformulate and revise the "Composite Threat List" and, as a part of this effort, should create a category exclusively for terrorism with criteria that place more weight on transnational terrorism. Rating the vulnerability of facilities must include factors relating to the physical security environment, as well as certain host governmental and cultural realities. These criteria need to be reviewed frequently and all elements of the intelligence community should play an active role in formulating the list. The list's name should be changed to reflect its dual purpose of prioritizing resource allocation and establishing security readiness postures.

The Department of State agrees. We are radically adjusting the CTL in order to assign more weight to the threat of transnational terrorism and incorporate factors such as the physical security environment and host country realities. The name of the CTL will be changed to Security Environment Threat List (SETL) to reflect its dual purpose of prioritizing resource allocation and establishing security readiness postures.

The agencies that make up the intelligence community will be involved in the coordination of methodology and threat levels for the political violence/terrorism category of the new SETL. Additionally, these agencies are included among the members of the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), which is responsible for developing threat-based security standards for our overseas missions and has been involved in the coordination of the counter-intelligence and technical categories of the CTL.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 7
More Regional Security Officers and Marine Security Guards

The Boards believed that, at too many of our diplomatic installations, professional security oversight is inadequate. The Department of State is responsible for 161 embassies abroad, but there are Regional Security Officers (RSOs) in only about 60 per cent of these. Marine Security Guard (MSG) detachments are stationed in some, but not all diplomatic missions abroad to provide a secure environment for officially classified information and, as a concurrent duty, to provide an internal defense against outside attack.

Recommendation 7: The Department of State should increase the number of posts with full time Regional Security Officers, seeking coverage of as many chanceries as possible. The Department should also work with the Marine Corps to augment the number of Marine Security Guard Detachments to provide coverage to a larger number of US diplomatic missions.

The Department of State is establishing 37 new Regional Security Officer positions and 106 new Assistant Regional Security Officer positions to augment security at embassies worldwide. The positions were funded from the emergency security appropriation and will be filled during Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000. The addition of these positions will raise the number of posts with security professionals assigned to 172 of 252. Additional positions will be established as fiscal resources permit.

In keeping with the Marine Security Guards Detachment's (MSG Det.) primary function, the protection of classified material, the State Department and the Marine Corps were already in the process of establishing 37 new detachments prior to the bombings. Of 252 posts, this will raise the number of posts covered by MSG Det. from 122 to 159. At that time, the activation schedule through July 2001 involved eleven new detachments. Many posts require extensive renovations to accommodate a new detachment. A new schedule for activation of the remaining detachments will be established in conjunction with the completion of the required construction projects as quickly as resources permit. The Marine Corps advises that it is currently funded only for 14 of the 37 new detachments. To increase the number of new detachments to 37, the Marine Corps will require budgeting and manpower resources. The Department of Defense will assess options to address this increase.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 8
Better Training for Security Officers

The Boards found that one of the critical lessons to be learned from the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings is that security personnel need to understand the modus operandi of terrorists. Security officers need not only intelligence about terrorists, but they need to appreciate and to understand offensive operations and the many ingredients that make for a successful mission. They need to know terrorist intelligence requirements and methods of collection, local support needs, logistical problems and weapons.

The Boards commented that it is not enough for an RSO to receive two to four hours of exposure to explosives and to learn how to fire a weapon in self-defense. In the Boards' view, RSOs need to understand what the terrorist knows about explosives, explosive effects, mortars, rockets, assassination devices, and chemical/biological weapons. The Boards stressed that security officers need to look at their area of responsibility with the eyes of the attacker.

Recommendation 8: The Department of State should provide all Regional Security Officers comprehensive training on terrorism, terrorist methods of operation, explosive devices, explosive effects, and other terrorist weapons to include weapons of mass destruction such as truck bombs, nuclear devices and chemical/biological weapons. The training must also provide RSOs with the ability to examine their areas of responsibility from the offensive point of view, to look for vulnerabilities as seen through the eyes of the attacker.

The Department is conducting a comprehensive curriculum review of the Regional Security Officer (RSO) Training Program and is implementing the recommendations of the Boards during this process. Training in counter-terrorism methodology, explosive ordnance disposal, chemical/biological warfare, surveillance detection, and other related topics are being included in the syllabi for the Diplomatic Security Training Center's Basic Special Agent Course, Special Agent In-Service Course, Regional Security Officer Basic Course, and Regional Security Officer In-Service Course. The Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC) has doubled the amount of time spent training RSOs on explosive ordnance disposal from one to two days, and plans to expand this training to five days for subsequent classes. The DSTC's Mobile Security Division (MSD) has developed a comprehensive training module for surveillance detection techniques which is being incorporated into the above courses and others. The MSD has also developed a training syllabus for chemical/biological warfare that will be included in overseas training and will also be taught to appropriate domestic personnel. The DSTC is also working with the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) to incorporate elements of CTC's vulnerability and threat assessment methodology into the physical security training provided in RSO courses. Efforts to identify and develop other, appropriate course work are ongoing.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 9
Reducing US Profile Abroad

The Board for Nairobi was struck by the anomaly of the large number of personnel assigned to the US Embassy in Nairobi, a city where it had long been clear that rampant crime and political violence are rife, and where it is now clear that a high threat of terrorism exists.

The Boards believed that this illustrates the need to reexamine the role and size of US missions abroad and the resources necessary to support them.

In this context, the Boards urged a reexamination of staffing and functions at all US missions, and consideration of a return to the concept of Special Embassy Programs (SEPs).

The Boards considered that if the US Government cannot provide resources to maintain and provide security for posts virtually in all countries, including those where US interests are minimal, closing smaller posts and establishing regional posts should be considered.

Recommendation 9: The Department of State should define the role and functions of each of the US embassies abroad for the coming decade with a view toward exploiting technology more fully, improving their efficiency, ensuring their security, and reducing their overall cost. The Department should look specifically at reducing the number of diplomatic missions by establishing regional embassies located in less threatened and vulnerable countries with Ambassadors accredited to several governments.

The Department of State will use the reconstruction of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as an opportunity to apply this recommendation, and in parallel to develop principles and policies applicable to other posts. Specifically, we will review the functions performed at the two posts, and determine which functions can be regionalized; what improved communications and information processing systems will help to reduce field presence and thus the exposure of employees; and how to manage staff presence of represented agencies. Function, staffing, and technology choices will be factored into facilities design.

In addition, March 9, 1999, the Secretary also appointed the Chair and members of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) which will look at the larger question of our overseas presence in the context of our national priorities, our resource constraints, and our worldwide security concerns.

Panel members come from the highest levels of present and former government service and private enterprise. Mr. Lewis Kaden, a New York corporate lawyer, will chair the panel. He will be joined by Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.), along with a mix of former Ambassadors, former members of Congress, Chief Executive Officers from various corporations doing business overseas, representatives of various government agencies, and representatives of interest groups such as CARE, the Smithsonian, and the American Federation of Labor. PriceWaterhouseCoopers has been engaged to provide analytical support.

The panel has begun its consultations within the U.S. government, private sector, and the Congress, and is currently visiting 18 posts overseas. It expects to issue its recommendations this summer.

The OPAP's mandate is to look at the level and type of representation required abroad to carry out America's foreign policy interests given resource constraints, advances in technology, and the worldwide security situation. This will include a close look at the idea of regionalizing certain functions, or even embassies, and the trade-offs entailed in such an approach. The panel will recommend criteria for reshaping our missions overseas to maximize effectiveness and security, and outline a multi-year funding program for construction and related costs to achieve those ends.

In addition, subject to completion of Congressional reprogramming procedures, the Secretary intends to create a new Intelligence and Resources Planning Staff to enhance the Department's strategic planning with the national security community and to coordinate the long-term communications, logistics, security, and space requirements of other agencies for routine and surge operations.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 10
Revise Physical Security Standards

The Boards observed that the physical security standards mandated by the Department's Security and Policy Handbook (12 FAH-6 OSPB) were developed on the basis of our experience in the mid-1980's.

The Boards commented that the August 7 bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as other very large bombings against US installations overseas in recent years, require review of these physical security standards in order to validate their continued applicability for all kinds of future threats.

The Boards stated that this review should draw upon the valuable research conducted by the multi-agency Technical Support Working Group. The Boards urged that this review be conducted on a priority basis.

Recommendation 10: The physical security standards specified in the State Department's Security Standards and Policy Handbook should be reviewed on a priority basis and revised as necessary in light of the August 7 and other large bombings against US installations.

The priority review of the physical security standards was initiated in September 1998 by an Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) Working Group. After concluding its work in December 1998, the Working Group provided a draft of its proposed changes, for information purposes, to the OSPB on January 19, 1999. While the recommended changes are pending State and interagency clearances, they are currently being utilized by the Department for new construction and renovation projects and purchases of security materials. Formal approval of the revisions by the Department and the OSPB is anticipated. Please see the response to Systems/Procedures Recommendation 2.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 11
One Secure Compound for All Agencies

The Boards noted that the Department of State's security standards and policies cover all official US premises abroad. They observed that the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings demonstrate that terrorists seek vulnerable targets, and that we must therefore provide enhanced security, not only for embassies, but for all other US government facilities. The Boards urged that when the Department constructs new chanceries in foreign capitals, all USG agencies should either be housed in the chancery itself or in adjacent buildings within the same secure compound as the chancery, with waivers granted only in rare cases.

Recommendation 11: When building new chanceries abroad, all US government agencies, with rare exceptions, should be located in the same compound.

The Department agrees with the Boards that, in most cases, new chanceries should be designed to permit USG agencies to be co-located. The Department will pursue memoranda of understanding with the principal tenant agencies stating intent to co-locate their personnel on embassy compounds. We will confer with tenant agencies and the Office of Management and Budget on how funding will be structured. In addition, the Secretary's Overseas Presence Advisory Panel will consider this subject in the context of its recommendations on the configuration of our posts overseas.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 12
Ensuring a Long Term Capital Building and Security Program

The Boards felt the Department of State's investment in resources to protect the lives of American officials abroad has been entirely inadequate. Following the bombings of our embassy in Beirut and the subsequent Inman Report, the total funds applied to Inman projects from FY 1985 through FY 1995 was $1.46 billion. But, the Boards observed, only 19 embassy chanceries have been constructed and three others underwent extensive security upgrades to meet the prescribed security requirements. Five others, though built before the Inman standards, met the requirements on their own merits. From FY 1996 forward, with the exception of unrequested funds for a chancery in Jerusalem, no monies were appropriated for capital buildings and the program had to be funded from gifts or proceeds of sales of US properties.

The Boards observed that, during the same period, inadequate funds were made available for security upgrades of existing buildings. As a result, with some 252 missions around the world, over 85 per cent of our missions are housed in buildings that fall short of the Inman standards.

The Boards noted that, in the wake of the East African bombings, Congress passed an emergency security supplemental bill of $1.4 billion, of which about $163.5 million will be used to build new chanceries in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. An additional $150 million allocated from the supplemental will be used to build two other chanceries located in highly vulnerable countries. The supplemental also provided $629 million in funds for essential security upgrades for existing substandard embassies, for the hiring of extra security officers, and for crucial anti-terrorism training for foreign government police forces.

However, the Boards found that significant additional funding will be required to ensure the building of safe chanceries for the long term, and the resources needed to cover the recurring costs of additional security officers and upgrades. The Boards emphasized that these programs should not be funded at the expense of critical foreign affairs programs and operations. Rather, in the Boards' view, the Administration and Congress need to agree to stable and predictable increases in funding for the International Affairs budget starting in FY 2000 and continuing over the coming decade. The Boards suggested that the Department consider seeking a separate and discrete budgetary spending cap for international affairs (Function 150 funding) as a means for improving prospects for funding all critical programs, including those for security.

The Boards estimated that the State Department over the coming ten years will need a capital building program of $1 billion per year to build the necessary number of chanceries and other buildings that meet the safety requirements and an additional $400 million annually for security upgrades and security officers.

In addition the Boards believed that if the Department is unable to obtain adequate funds for this capital building program, other agencies whose personnel occupy US embassy space should pay rent or otherwise contribute their fair share.

The Boards argued that, with the US GDP amounting to $9 trillion, representing the largest single economy in the world, and with a USG budget of nearly $1.4 trillion in FY 1999, the total of $1.4 billion per year over 10 years for the security of US personnel serving abroad is a small price to pay. The Boards also encouraged the Department to find savings in the costs of US embassies around the world in connection with defining their future role and functions.

The Boards stressed that US government personnel abroad are serving on the forefront of defending and promoting US national security and commercial interests. In the Boards' view, keeping them safe in a reduced, lean profile is a reasonable but necessary cost. The Boards noted that the Administration will need to work with Congress, as it did for the multilateral development banks and UN arrears, to find ways so that these funds fall outside the statutory caps for discretionary funding in the Balanced Budget Act.

The Boards observed that Americans and their colleagues in embassies and posts abroad have died because successive Administrations and Congresses failed to heed the lessons drawn by the Inman report over 14 years ago. The security of Americans overseas was not given priority and the funds were not provided for critical security improvements. This must not happen again.

Recommendation 12: The Department of State should work within the Administration and with Congress to obtain sufficient funding for capital building programs and for security operations and personnel over the coming decade, while ensuring that this funding should not come at the expense of other critical foreign affairs programs and operations. A failure to do so will jeopardize the security of US personnel abroad and inhibit America's ability to protect and promote its interests around the world.

The Secretary has been fighting for increased resources for the Department of State since she assumed office. As of mid-1998 her efforts had succeeded to the point of reversing the downward trend of our funding levels, permitting a resumption of hiring in critical State Department areas. After the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the Administration requested and Congress approved a $1.4 billion emergency security appropriation to rebuild the two bombed embassies and to make quick security enhancements worldwide.

The Secretary continues to advocate a multi-year funding program to improve the security of our personnel and facilities overseas, engaging the Office of Management and Budget, the President, and Congressional leaders at every opportunity. The recommendations of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, due during the summer of 1999, will be used to analyze the specific requirements for funding for capital construction and overseas security enhancements. The Department will coordinate closely with other USG agencies operating overseas to ensure that national security, resources, and general security are adequately considered in the funding debate. Strategic planning and coordination with our "mission partners" will help identify long-term requirements.

The Secretary continually underscores her belief that additional funds for security must be obtained without diverting funds from major foreign affairs programs.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 13
Firm Chain of Accountability

The Boards noted that the Inman Report in 1985 stated that security activities were hindered by "the lack of a firm and recognized chain of accountability for security matters." The Boards, in examining the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, concluded that this problem remains. They observed that none of those interviewed by the Boards could point to a single person having the responsibility and resources necessary for ensuring the security of Americans overseas.

The Boards saw responsibility as dispersed throughout the government, and accountability as unclear. In their view, agencies, bureaus, and offices with programmatic and operational responsibilities are not coordinated with the key policy-making entities to ensure the security of US personnel abroad. The Boards observed that the intelligence community focuses on threats and warnings, while the law enforcement community concentrates on gathering information, collecting and preserving evidence, and pursuing terrorists and other criminals in order to detain, extradite, and try them. The Boards noted that within the Department of State, responsibility for security and counterterrorism issues is dispersed, and in the field the Ambassador is held responsible for the security of all USG personnel at the mission but is handicapped by a lack of resources.

The Boards found that the crux of the problem is accountability. The Boards noted that prior to the Khobar Towers explosion the Pentagon had a similar problem of no one single person being charged with the security of US military units stationed abroad. This was resolved when the Secretary of Defense designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the responsible officer.

Recommendation 13: First and foremost, the Secretary of State should take a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of US diplomatic personnel abroad. It is essential to convey to the entire Department that security is one of the highest priorities. In the process, the Secretary should reexamine the present organizational structure with the objective of clarifying responsibilities, encouraging better coordination, and assuring that a single high-ranking officer is accountable for all protective security matters and has the authority necessary to coordinate on the Secretary's behalf such activities within the Department of State and with all foreign affairs USG agencies.

The Secretary of State continues to take a personal and active role in ensuring the security of our people and facilities overseas. She has personally led the fight for increased funding for chancery replacement and security enhancements. The Secretary continuously briefs Administration and Congressional leadership on terrorist and other security threats and the implications for US Government employees and their families. She begins her own senior staff meetings with a security update from the Under Secretary for Management. The Secretary has initiated frequent meetings on security with the Under Secretaries of State. She regularly discusses security issues with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. She receives a daily security situation briefing from the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.

The Secretary is interested in finding ways in which the organization of the Department's security operations might be improved. Accordingly, the Department is undertaking a thorough reexamination of the Department's security structure as suggested by the Boards in this recommendation. The study will develop options for improving the organizational structure of the security function within the Department, particularly with respect to the sharing of management responsibilities among headquarters and field elements and enhancing the Secretary of State's ability to ensure the security of U.S. personnel abroad. The study will also develop recommendations for enhancing intelligence support to the offices responsible for security within the Department of State. In the meantime, the Department is reviewing coordination procedures and preparing guidance for strengthening and expediting them.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 14
Informing the Public on the Critical Need to Protect US Interests and Personnel Abroad

The Boards noted that the Secretary of State and her senior deputies have launched a vigorous public affairs effort with the Congress, the press and the public to restore adequate levels of funding for foreign affairs over the last two years. The Boards believed that this effort must be expanded, and that new emphasis should be given to funds for security and combating terrorism. To amplify this message, the Boards suggested that the Foreign Service, including former Ambassadors -- both career and non-career -- should be mobilized to help explain to the public that the United States needs to invest more to protect its civilian representatives abroad from terrorism without sacrificing other important foreign policy missions, and that more resources will be needed for this purpose. The Boards urged that other foreign affairs agencies be enlisted to join this effort.

Recommendation 14: The Department of State should expand its effort to build public support for increased resources for foreign affairs, and to add emphasis on the need to protect US representatives abroad from terrorism, without sacrificing other important foreign policy programs.

Public outreach has been a top priority for the Secretary throughout her tenure. She and her top officials -- through meetings, Congressional testimony, media appearances, and public events -- have worked energetically to explain the link between the Department's diplomatic activities and programs overseas and the well being, security, and prosperity of the American people.

State is redoubling these efforts. We have developed an aggressive public communications plan informing the public of the need to protect our representatives and citizens abroad in the face of expanding terrorist threats without sacrificing funding for other foreign policy priorities.

Under this plan, we are:

promoting media coverage by having Department officials speak to local print and electronic outlets;
developing feature stories for placement in print and on television that illustrate the comprehensive web of issues;
encouraging newspapers across the country to print op-eds and other articles by the Secretary and other senior Department officials;
expanding information on international security and budget issues available to the public on the Department's Web site at www.state.gov, including releasing all published material described herein on the Web site;
developing speaker programs and town meetings throughout the United States with attendant media coverage;
providing Department briefings on budget and security issues; and
disseminating a fact sheet on US diplomatic activities overseas, terrorist threats, and the requirements for enhancing embassy security.
The Secretary is deeply committed to increasing the public's awareness of the importance of the Department's conduct of foreign policy. The Department is bound by several statutes that prohibit it from specifically attempting to enlist the public's support in an effort to sway Congress on a particular issue, such as additional funding. Nevertheless, the Department will do all it can to engage the public on the need to protect our employees overseas within applicable legal restrictions.

 

Systems/Procedures: Recommendation 15
Prepare for Chemical, Biological, Nuclear Terror

In the Boards' review of security and counter-terrorism guidance provided to Embassies Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as the Department's terrorism threat analysis system and Emergency Action Plan (EAP) guidelines applicable to all posts, they found no reference to the potential threat of terrorism using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons or materials. The Boards observed that the Administration and Congress have focused considerable attention and resources on defending against and preparing for terrorist attacks in the United States by both domestic and international terrorists using such weapons of mass destruction. The Boards noted, however, that the recent emergency security supplemental appropriation passed in the wake of the East African bombings made no provision for addressing this problem abroad.

While the attacks on Nairobi and Dar es Salaam offered no direct insights for dealing with such emergencies, the Boards concluded that, if Americans are threatened by such attacks at home, our missions abroad would appear to be equally or even more exposed. The Boards recommended that the Department's threat analysis, protective security systems, EAP guidelines, training and contingency planning systems should be broadened to address the threat of terrorists using materials of mass destruction.

Recommendation 15: The Department of State, in coordination with the intelligence community, should advise all posts concerning potential threats of terrorist attacks from the use of chemical, biological or nuclear materials, should establish means of defending against and minimizing the effect of such attacks through security measures and the revision of EAP procedures and exercises, and should provide appropriate equipment, medical supplies, and first responder training.

We agree. The task of devising effective responses to these threats presents major technical and financial challenges. Although we must begin to respond immediately -- and have done so -- we must also recognize that this will remain a difficult work in progress, reflecting changing threat information and the best and most recent scientific and technical knowledge.

The Department of State has been seriously concerned with the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear warfare (CBRN) since the Iran and Iraq war. The expressed interest in chemical and biological weapons by several foreign groups and the changing nature of terrorism increase concerns that such weapons may be used for terrorist purposes.

Looking to the future, State has worked aggressively to improve its posture world-wide vis a vis potential CBRN terrorist attacks. All Department elements working together have established an expanded CBRN protection program, which has components including detection, prevention, training, protection, and consequence management. We will also revise the Emergency Planning Handbook to incorporate CBRN incident response, protection, and evacuation. This is a resource intensive program. The Department will identify the resources needed and request additional funds for its implementation, based on the best current threat information and the best and most recent scientific and technical knowledge.

In addition, the Department is bolstering the "front line" of defense by developing training courses in its Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program for first responders and crisis management officials in host countries.

The Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT) is the only interagency response team that provides the coordination and connectivity for planning and execution of a combined USG-Host Nation response to the consequences of incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear contaminates. The CMRT members are the on-the-ground USG coordinators and work directly with the country team, the host nation's crisis managers, and the incident site response team. CMRT members are also represented on the State Department's Task Force in Washington, D.C. From these various locations, CMRT members are able to coordinate response requirements at or near real time, using state-of-the-art, secure communications. The CMRT is designed to provide timely status reports and identify essential requirements for the interagency's response.