Introduction

Response to the Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombs exploded near the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These vile attacks killed over 220 people, and wounded more than 4,000. Among the dead were twelve American, and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian U.S. Embassy employees and family members.

Pursuant to the Diplomatic Security Act on October 5, 1998, I convened Accountability Review Boards (ARBs) to review the circumstances of each of the bombings, to assess the adequacy of our security systems and procedures, and to recommend improvements to them. Because of the links between these near-simultaneous bombings, a single Chairman -- retired Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. -- headed both Boards. The Boards delivered their combined report to me on January 8, 1999 containing their findings and program recommendations.

As required by the Diplomatic Security Act, I now present this report on the actions the Department of State has taken or intends to take in response to the Boards' findings and recommendations.

The Boards' report is tough-minded. It should be. The Boards were fair in recognizing the constraints (particularly financial) that have hampered our ability to provide for the security of our employees abroad -- but their unambiguous message is that this cannot be an answer or an excuse.

I agree. We are dealing here with the lives of those we send out to represent America to the world, and who face risks every day they do so. Some of those risks are unavoidable. But as the world's most powerful nation, and one of its richest, we simply cannot fail to take whatever measures are within our reach to protect our people.

The Department of State agrees with all of the Boards' recommendations, and I intend to implement them aggressively with only slight differences in tactics on a few. In some instances, this may require legislation to clarify my authority, and that of Chiefs of Mission, to enable us better to carry out the responsibilities placed on us for the security of all U.S. employees and their families at our missions abroad. It will certainly require determined and long-term support from the Congress to provide the funds necessary for the security enhancements we must have. As the Boards have hammered home, this is a dangerous world for our people abroad, and we cannot protect them for free.

I am particularly grateful that the Boards' findings recognized the diligence and professionalism of our Ambassador in Nairobi, Prudence Bushnell, and our then-Chargé in Dar es Salaam, John Lange, and the courage and resourcefulness of their Embassy teams in responding to the bombings. I also wish to underscore that the Boards did not find any U.S. employee or member of the uniformed services derelict in their duties in connection with these incidents.

The Boards noted that the security systems and procedures at both posts were in accord with Department policy and were for the most part properly implemented. Indeed, in both cases, the terrorists failed in their attempts to breach the posts' perimeters.

Nonetheless, the Boards also pointed out that these systems and procedures did not adequately anticipate truck bombs or other attacks by weapons of mass destruction. I accept that finding. As detailed in our responses to the Boards' individual recommendations, we have already substantially revised our systems and procedures, and are continuing to do so to take account of these realities of transnational terrorism.

Similarly, the Boards noted that the Department has not fully implemented its physical security standards, in the case of older facilities where the cost of upgrades to newer standards has been seen as prohibitive or where their locations have precluded compliance with setback or similar requirements. The Boards argued that the practice of granting exemptions for such facilities cannot be maintained in the face of the exposure the two bombings highlighted. I agree. The Department has already taken interim steps to improve physical security at these sites, and we are engaged in a vigorous program either to bring them into compliance or to replace them. This will be an expensive process and, regrettably, a long-term one. The sustained support of the Congress over many years will be required.

The Boards found that we received no credible intelligence that gave warning of the August 7th bombings. However, the Boards concluded that we have relied excessively on tactical intelligence when determining the level of potential terrorist threats to our posts worldwide. The Boards noted that past experience indicates that terrorist attacks are often not preceded by any intelligence warning. Accordingly, the Boards believed that greater attention should be paid to other risk factors that facilitate the operations of transnational terrorists in particular countries. I agree, and as detailed more fully in the body of this report, these recommendations are being implemented.

The Boards recognized that the U.S. response to the bombings, both by the Embassy staffs and by the multiple agencies responding from all over the world, was both resourceful and often heroic. However, the Boards noted planning, coordination, and logistical failures that slowed and impeded our response. The Boards made several recommendations for better coordination, in particular concerning transportation arrangements, improved dedicated air transportation for our Foreign Emergency Support Teams, and better planning and advanced placement of medical and emergency equipment. We agree with these findings and recommendations, and respond to them in detail in the body of this report.

The Boards were disturbed by the collective failure of the Executive and Legislative Branches over the past decade to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of our missions abroad. They underscored that our recent supplemental appropriation of over $1 billion for security is only a first installment in a long-term strategy for protecting American officials abroad. The Boards also underscored that our investments in security cannot be made at the expense of our substantive foreign policy activities.

I accept the Boards' assessment of responsibility, and I cannot agree more strongly with their caution that substantial, long-term investment in security must take place, but not at the expense of the foreign policy that is the very reason for sending our officials into harm's way in the first place. As the President eloquently summed up in his State of the Union Message:

"The bombing of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania reminds us of the risks faced every day by those who represent America to the world. Let's give them our support, the safest possible workplaces, and the resources they need so that America can lead."

I cannot improve on that statement.

I invite your close scrutiny of the recommendations and responses that follow, and look forward to working intensely with the Congress in the coming years to carry out the critical program outlined here.

NOTE ON FORMAT: This report is organized to follow the order and presentation of the Boards' recommendations. In each section, a summary of the Boards' background discussion is followed by the Boards' recommendation, followed by the Department of State's response.