Intelligence

Response to the Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999

Intelligence

 

Intelligence: Recommendations 1-3
Intelligence and Information Availability

The Boards found that the US Government received no credible intelligence that provided immediate or tactical warning of the August 7 bombings.

The Boards considered that coordination and mutual understanding between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on terrorism issues and intelligence would be enhanced if the Department assigned an official to the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) Counter Terrorism Center, as other agency members of the intelligence community have done.

The Boards also noted widespread concern among policy, security and counter terrorism officials in the Department of State that information gathered by FBI investigators which could be relevant to the security of US missions and personnel abroad is often not disseminated on the grounds that leaks of such information might compromise investigations. FBI officials assured the Boards that the FBI is alert to any information it collects that might indicate or suggest threats to security of US personnel, and that it promptly makes such information available to the Department. However, the Boards pointed out that the responsibilities of analysts and security officials are very different from those of law enforcement investigators, and that each have different standards and criteria for evaluating the significance of information. The Boards noted that this problem had been cited by a previous ARB, but remains unresolved and requires further attention by the FBI and the Department.

Recommendation 1: In order to enhance the flow of intelligence that relates to terrorism and security, all such intelligence should normally be disseminated to concerned levels of the policy and analytic community; compartmentalization of such information should be limited to extraordinary situations where there is a clear national security need for limited dissemination.

The Department supports the Boards' recommendation regarding the dissemination of intelligence information, and will work closely with concerned agencies to resolve these issues.

Recommendation 2: The Department of State should assign a qualified official to the DCI's Counter Terrorism Center.

The Department of State needs to expand its working relationship with the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC). Two agents of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security are currently assigned full time to CTC. In addition, State will propose that two additional personnel be assigned to CTC, one from S/CT and one from INR. In exchange, CTC would detail an intelligence officer to S/CT.

The Foreign Service Officer from S/CT detailed to CTC would perform duties to be determined, which would reflect the needs of both the State Department and CTC and the qualifications of the individual involved. The officer would also serve as a direct liaison between CTC and the Department.

The CTC intelligence officer detailed to S/CT would serve as the primary intelligence resource for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. This officer would also serve as a direct liaison to the CTC and other members of the Intelligence Community.

Further, the Department is considering detailing an analyst to the CTC to provide analytical support, input on policy makers' needs for reporting and analysis, and assistance in better tailoring analytical products in response to those needs.

Recommendation 3: The FBI and the Department of State should consult on ways to improve information sharing on international terrorism to ensure that all relevant information that might have some bearing on threats against or security for US missions or personnel abroad is made available.

The Department agrees that information exchange with the FBI is essential when the FBI possesses information that may bear on security for our missions or personnel abroad. To ensure that such information is exchanged, there are several joint FBI/Department mechanisms already in place, including assignment of Diplomatic Security (DS) special agents to nine FBI Field Divisions to participate in the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force Program, a Department of Justice initiative to counter terrorist threats against US interests. Additionally, the Department recently intensified its discussions and exchange of information in this area by detailing a DS special agent to the International Terrorism Section at FBI Headquarters. All threats developed by the FBI that may have an impact on US diplomatic facilities and personnel abroad are discussed on a real time basis with Department personnel and a course of action, including dissemination of the information, is formulated.