Crisis Management

Response to the Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999

Crisis Management

Crisis Management: Recommendation 1
Crisis Management Training in Washington

The Boards found that, following the August 7 bombings, a round-the-clock Task Force was quickly established to coordinate the Department's responses. Overall, the Task Force performed its role satisfactorily, although there was confusion, a discontinuity of leadership, and difficulties in communication and coordination with other agencies. The Boards, after interviewing a number of persons involved with the Task Force, found that many were unaware who precisely had overall command of the effort.

The Boards observed that such Task Forces must provide focus and control in responding to crises of various natures. They noted that attacks against official US facilities abroad involving mass casualties and destruction present unique challenges, requiring special contingency plans. They recommended that crisis management training and contingency planning be required at the Department in order to ensure the readiness of a trained core of crisis management personnel. The Boards further recommended that this training reach across bureau and functional lines within the Department, and across departmental and agency lines, to encompass the full range of problems and potential solutions that are raised by mass casualty incidents.

Recommendation 1: Crisis management training for mass casualty and mass destruction incidents should be provided to Department of State personnel in Washington to improve Task Force operations to assure a cadre of crisis managers.

The Department agrees that its personnel would benefit from more specialized Task Force (TF) training focusing on mass casualty and mass destruction incidents. The Executive Secretary of the Department and the Foreign Service Institute have designed and will be conducting the first such training exercise for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in April. It will be aimed at regional and functional bureau personnel who do not traditionally participate in Task Force work. The Department is also developing additional crisis management exercise scenarios as well as a syllabus for TF training courses for others who do not regularly serve on TFs but who could be called upon to participate in a task force.

Crisis Management: Recommendation 2
Crisis Management Training for Posts Abroad

The Boards observed that the August 7 bombings demonstrate that international terrorists today target our diplomatic missions even in countries that were regarded as low-threat environments with no history of anti-US attacks. They pointed out that the bombings also demonstrate the need for crisis management training for US Government personnel at our embassies and consulates abroad and greater readiness to deal with mass casualties and destruction which result from terrorist attacks. In the Boards' view, such training would also improve management of other kinds of crises.

The Boards observed that, since 1988, the State Department has ordered drawdowns or evacuations of diplomatic mission personnel in 134 instances - for an average of once every four weeks over a ten-year period. Two-thirds of these posts were assessed as low or medium threat just prior to drawdown or evacuation.

The Boards noted that during the same period, budget cuts resulted in virtual elimination of the State Department's program to send teams to posts for on-site crisis management training. While regional teams once were capable of scheduling periodic visits to many posts over several years, such training schedules were totally eliminated until last year, when they were resumed on a minimal scale.

Recommendation 2: A revitalized program for on-site crisis management training at posts abroad should be funded, developed, expanded, and maintained.

The Department has sufficiently funded its Crisis Management Training (CMT) program, offered through the Foreign Service Institute, to conduct 100 Crisis Management Exercises (CMEs) at overseas posts in FY 1999 (compared to nine in FY 1997 and 13 in FY 1998). In addition, we are expanding crisis management training throughout the training curriculum we offer for USG employees assigned overseas. CMEs use scenarios written for each post and tailored to each post's situation and its Emergency Action Plan. All instruction domestically and all CMEs abroad are based on guidance provided in the Department's Emergency Planning Handbook. Crisis Management Training operates under the aegis of the Crisis Management Training Oversight Committee, which is chaired by the Director of the Operations Center and has broad Department representation, including representatives from the regional bureaus, Diplomatic Security, and the Office of Counter Terrorism. The Department's FY 2000 Budget request includes funding to conduct 100 exercises in FY 2000, which will complete an initial CME at each post. We are also developing a maintenance level of training for FY 2001 and beyond to reinforce the initial CMEs and to involve recently assigned post personnel.

Crisis Management: Recommendation 3
Reconfiguration of Emergency Support Teams

The Boards commented that the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), which brings together specialists in crisis response, intelligence, and law enforcement provided extraordinarily valuable support to Embassies Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. However, each team arrived at the scene almost 40 hours after the bombings, having experienced delays of up to 24 hours. The Nairobi team was delayed because of the breakdown of the original FEST aircraft. The Dar es Salaam team was delayed because a second aircraft was not immediately available. The Boards observed that the FEST process is aimed at addressing an ongoing, evolving hostage or other terrorist related event, not deployment in a post-bomb crisis where the mission is to assist in restoring administration of embassies and dealing with dead and wounded victims. In the Boards' view, the deployments to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were ad hoc and would have been more effective had there been advanced planning on consequence management. For example, a public affairs expert experienced in disaster and crisis situations, a hazardous materials expert, and a building safety engineer would have been invaluable on the FEST team to Nairobi. The Boards believed that priority should be given in the composition of FEST teams to rescue and care of personnel, followed by protection of classified material and of the crime scene for forensic purposes.

Recommendation 3: The FEST should create and exercise a team and equipment package configured to assist in post blast crises involving major casualties and physical damage (while maintaining the package now deployed for differing counter terrorism missions). Such a new configuration should include personnel to assist in medical relief, public affairs, engineering and building safety.

We agree with the recommendations and have taken corrective action. Since the East African bombings, we have developed a concept for staffing and equipping the FEST to respond to post-incident terrorist events, including deploying two FESTs (first within four hours, second within 18 hours). This new FEST concept will include initial medical assessment capabilities (which are being coordinated with the interagency medical working group described in the response to Crisis Management Recommendation 5), and initial search and rescue, public affairs, and engineering and building safety experts. Additional personnel may also be required to support this enhanced FEST capability. The FEST remains an initial assessment team, tasked with arriving first and identifying immediate follow-on requirements. In many locations, the arrival of too large a team too soon could exacerbate the existing crisis. We are striving to strike a balance between assessment of the crisis and initial rescue and care of personnel.

In addition to the above steps, the Department has initiated a program aimed at quickly providing experienced administrative and other personnel to augment staff at a post that has been debilitated by terrorist attack or natural disaster. The Regional Embassy Support Team (REST) program employs a roster of experienced, pre-selected individuals with the wide range of skills necessary to help maintain day-to-day operations at a post while survivors deal with the crisis and casualties. REST participants, posted at embassies all over the world, would be dispatched immediately to the disaster scenes, arriving before teams assembled in the United States. The program is managed by a board of directors composed of representatives of the State Department bureaus that are responsible for posts overseas.

Crisis Management: Recommendation 4
A New Aircraft for Foreign Emergency Support Teams

The Boards noted that the FEST flight to assist Embassy Nairobi on August 7 was delayed by over 13 hours when the 36-year old aircraft dedicated to the FEST broke down in Rota, Spain during a refueling stop. (Another aircraft was ultimately brought in from Germany.)

The Boards also noted that the FEST aircraft lacked space to carry supplies and sufficient personnel urgently needed by the post. The Boards stated that the unreliability of the current FEST aircraft and its small size have been recognized as problems in the counter-terrorism and crisis response community for some time, but that no action has been taken.

Recommendation 4: A modern, reliable, air-refuelable FEST aircraft with enhanced seating and cargo capacity to respond to a variety of counter terrorism and emergency missions should be acquired urgently for the Department of State. Clearly defined arrangements for a backup aircraft are also needed.

For the last two to three years, the Department has led a concerted interagency effort to upgrade the aircraft that supports the FEST. In May 1998, the President directed that a plan or options for an improved system of aviation support to counter-terrorism operations be developed. The report was to include any required changes in funding and be coordinated with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The East African bombings occurred while the report was being coordinated and that tragic event further reinforced the need for new and improved airlift.

The interagency working group forwarded the results of its study to the National Security Council (NSC) in September 1998. The interagency group (State, Defense, CIA, and FBI) recommended the purchase of two specially modified Boeing 757s (B-757) for this purpose. This option was deemed by the interagency group to be the most cost effective and operationally suitable choice for the FEST mission. B-757s can land and operate virtually anywhere in the world, unlike various wide-body aircraft in other options that were also considered. Moreover, since DOD is upgrading its fleet by purchasing B-757s, DOD's offer to fund the annual operating and maintenance cost for these two aircraft as part of the DOD budget was particularly attractive. The NSC, however, wanted further study of the issue.

The Department has revived the issue. The National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget are still discussing aircraft options, their cost (either through purchase or lease), and an appropriate funding mechanism to meet the requirements identified by the counter-terrorism community.

Presently, there is a clearly defined arrangement for a back-up aircraft for the FEST if the primary aircraft is not fully mission capable. The alternatives for new FEST aircraft also consider appropriate back-up arrangements.

Crisis Management: Recommendation 5
Better Coordination of Emergency Airlift

The Boards pointed out that the US Air Force provided an unprecedented number of aircraft, but that delivery of emergency teams and relief personnel to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam following the bomb blasts was problematic. Aircraft breakdowns, crew rest restrictions (without back-up crews), and lack of ready back-up aircraft delayed arrivals of personnel and equipment. Problems also occurred with turn-around time and protocol and procedure for military medevac aircraft from Germany.

The Boards noted concerns about State Department officers who were unfamiliar with the airlift and medical evacuation system, disjointed liaison, lack of clearly defined requirements or pre-planned loads, and excessive "load creep." Further, the Boards noted Medevac delays due to required checks of the injured by Air Force medical personnel, and problems with their interactions with Kenyan hospital officials. The Boards pointed out the need for prior agreement on procedures between the Departments of State and Defense to handle emergency airlift more effectively in the future and recommended some cross training of crisis management officers, including medical personnel. Finally, the Boards observed that commercial aircraft might have been used to supplement Department of Defense airlift.

Recommendation 5: The Department of State should work closely with the Department of Defense to improve procedures in mobilizing aircraft and adequate crews to provide more rapid, effective assistance in times of emergency, especially in medical evacuations resulting from mass casualty situations. The Department of State should explore as well, chartering commercial aircraft to transport personnel and equipment to emergency sites, if necessary to supplement Department of Defense aircraft.

The Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have created two Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) to analyze and improve interagency airlift and medical support processes.

The Movements IWG has focused on the partnership between the Departments of State and Defense, and other non-DOD agencies that are tasked to respond to international emergencies. Significant progress has already been made in improving the deployment process.

The Medical IWG has been formed to create a rapid and coordinated medical response system for reacting to a variety of overseas disasters. Our aim is to mobilize immediately an emergency medical team on the ground to assess the needs of survivors and oversee their care. Our readiness will be enhanced by analyzing in advance the types of disasters and responses, and defining circumstances in which a response may be automatically activated without awaiting a formal request or medical information from the scene of the disaster. The working group will draw upon the best assets of responsible federal agencies (e.g., the National Disaster Medical System, the US Public Health Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, and others).

Together these two IWGs will address each of the Board's recommendations.

The IWGs will also address identification of skilled personnel, equipment and supplies, and transportation requirements. Contingency planning for transportation needs will include identification of assets from the Department of Defense, the National Disaster Medical System, and other federal or commercial assets.

In addition, the Department of Defense is in the process of developing a multi-pronged training program to educate State Department personnel about the capabilities and limitations of DOD transportation support. This program will be directed to Task Force Coordinators, Deputy Coordinators, and other pertinent Department personnel. This program will improve State-DOD transportation coordination in all emergencies, whether in evacuation, medical, or other emergency situations. Finally, the Departments of State and Defense will consider every alternative to enhance rapid transportation of its personnel and equipment, including commercial charter aircraft when feasible.

Our medical readiness would be enhanced in several other ways for which funding is required.

The Department's Continuing Medical Education Program -- Training for Foreign Service medical professionals this spring will focus on Advanced Trauma Life Support. This training will be provided by the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences.

Telemedicine Capability -- State and DOD are currently testing telemedicine technology in Nairobi. This technology would transmit medical information, including visual and voice data, concerning the Nairobi bomb victims to U.S. medical personnel in Landstuhl, Walter Reed Hospital, and the Department of State. Successful application could be deployed in a future mass casualty scenario.

Worldwide Health Resources, Risks, and Recommendations (R3) -- Creating a database of local medical resources throughout the world would enable Department medical officials to contact and communicate directly with local and regional medical personnel, brief rescue support teams, coordinate with US medical personnel, and develop alternative medical support options on short notice. This is especially important where Foreign Service medical personnel are not resident, are incapacitated, or overwhelmed during a crisis situation.

DNA Sampling -- The Office of Medical Services is exploring the option of obtaining blood samples from employees and eligible family members at posts abroad. These samples would not be analyzed until there was a need for identification of human remains. The availability of samples would permit more rapid verification of human remains and thus earlier communication with victims' families. At present there is no authoritative, scientific data base available for this purpose overseas.

Crisis Management: Recommendation 6
Off-Site Communications and Safety Equipment for Post Disasters

The Boards pointed out that no scenario existed in the Emergency Action Plan (EAP) or elsewhere anticipating complete destruction of communications systems, offices, and records, or heavy embassy casualties.

The Boards also noted that notifying the next of kin of those killed and injured proved extremely difficult since records at post were destroyed and the Department had to rely on uncertain lists.

Finally, the Boards noted a strong consensus that essential equipment and documents should be stored at a secure off-site location in the event of an embassy's being heavily damaged in a bomb blast.

Recommendation 6: The Department of State should ensure that all posts have emergency communications equipment, basic excavation tools, medical supplies, emergency documents, next of kin records, and other safety equipment stored at secure off-site locations in anticipation of mass destruction of embassy facilities and heavy US casualties.

The Department strongly agrees with this recommendation, and has established a working group to address the requirement. The working group has developed a standard inventory for each emergency stockpile. Regional bureaus and individual posts are being directed to identify locations for such stockpiles, and to tailor their contents where appropriate in view of local infrastructures. Funding will be provided to the greatest extent possible from the emergency security appropriation, with the remainder from post operating budgets. Detailed instructions for implementing this recommendation are being sent to posts worldwide.

The Department recognizes the devastating impact that disasters of this type can have on surviving family members. It has gone beyond the recommendations of the Boards, to create a task force to provide the Director General with recommendations on the establishment of a special office to provide expedited help to surviving family members in obtaining benefits and other assistance.