Countdown to IAEA Report

Countdown to the IAEA Report on Bushehr

By Tyler Nottberg and Olga Prygoda
The Eisenhower Institute

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WASHINGTON, June 11, 2003 - Fifty years ago, President Dwight Eisenhower suggested that nuclear technology should be used to help others develop peaceful uses for atomic energy, provided that the recipients of this technology agree not to use it for military purposes. His vision led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and IAEA safeguards later gave rise to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, enshrined in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in March of 1970.

Even if the NPT did not provide a definitive solution for nuclear nonproliferation, it served its purpose during the Cold War. Both superpowers stood firmly behind the regime; it created a framework for US-Soviet cooperation; and it provided transparency and access to countries that might otherwise have tried to develop covert nuclear programs on their own.

In the post-Cold War era, Iran's nuclear program emerged as a major source of contention in US-Russian relations. Russia is helping build the first large-scale nuclear reactor in a country that US President George W. Bush last year included with North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq as part of an "axis of evil."

Russian Minister of Atomic Industry (Minatom) Alexander Rumyantsev has said on numerous occasions that cooperation with Iran has not prevented Russia from fulfilling all of its international obligations to the NPT. In addition, the IAEA has been monitoring construction on the Bushehr nuclear power station closely since Russian-Iranian collaboration began in 1995. The object of this monitoring has been to ensure that all nonproliferation commitments are being kept.

Washington rejects the idea that Iran should be developing its nuclear program in the first place and has been pressing Moscow to stop providing assistance. The official US view is that Iran-a country rich in oil and gas reserves-should not be worrying about nuclear power. A desire to do so only proves Iranian intentions to develop nuclear arms.

If Russia pulls out of the Bushehr reactor project and breaches its contract with Iran, the financial impact on Russia would be severe. Not only would Russia lose considerable revenues from the current project, but such steps could very well trigger a chain reaction of cancellations by Iran of other deals in a range of economic sectors, causing the loss of billions of additional dollars.

To offset such potential losses, US representatives have hinted that they would be willing to offer Russia various incentives. However, as a top Russian official in the Ministry of Atomic Energy described it, "It's better to have a bird in hand than two in the bush."

Trying hard to protect its own interests, last year Russia introduced an additional constraint on the Iranian side for cooperation on Bushehr. Russia demanded that all of the spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr reactor must be returned before the delivery of any new fuel. Still the US side objected.

In December of 2002, the National Council for the Resistance of Iran-an umbrella organization for Iranian opposition-disclosed its own intelligence on the atomic ambitions of the ayatollahs. The Council provided evidence of the existence of nuclear sites in central Iran, such as the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, which were not part of Russia's cooperation with Iran and which were beyond the oversight of the IAEA. Adding to Russia's embarrassment, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami confirmed that Iran is mining its own uranium in order to develop an indigenous capability to supply nuclear fuel. Critics raised alarms that any processing of uranium in centrifuges theoretically would give Iran the ability to produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel as well.

On June 2, in Evian, France at the G-8 summit of the world's richest countries, Russia signed the Statement on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Securing Radioactive Sources. Part of the Statement was aimed directly at Iran and North Korea, calling for, "encouraging all countries to strengthen controls on radioactive sources." Russian President Vladimir Putin then made comments on Iran in his final press conference that led analysts to believe Russia was giving way to US political pressure and would reexamine its position on nuclear collaboration with Iran.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair probed Putin further during a friendly dinner conversation with him, then hurried to disclose an interpretation of the new Russian position based on his own intelligence gathering. According to Blair, Putin "made it clear that in the meantime, Russia would suspend its exports of nuclear fuel to Iran." A statement by Blair's press service then confirmed that Russia had agreed to suspend the planned shipment until Tehran accepted the Additional Protocol to the NPT.

The Additional Protocol was drafted under US leadership in 1995 in order to complement the NPT. Its objective is to introduce measures that would facilitate increased access to information and facilities, including the disclosure of all nuclear sites ranging from uranium mines to nuclear waste storage facilities, and the simplification of procedures for short-notice inspections. In the case of Iran, it would mean more intrusive inspections by the IAEA. However, until now the protocol has only been signed by a handful of countries, including the United States and Russia.

Soon after the summit, it became clear that the news of the death of Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation had been somewhat exaggerated. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that turned Russia's threat to "freeze" collaboration into a suspension of fuel shipments, which were not even scheduled to take place until 2004. And further clarification was made to the Additional Protocol issue by calling it, "a document that is signed on voluntary basis." The only firm demand that Russia made was for Iran to agree to return the spent nuclear fuel.

Negotiations for the Russian-Iranian agreement on spent fuel have been taking place between Minatom and the Iranian Atomic Agency since December 2002. On June 5, the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow, Gholamreza Shafei, said in a press conference that Iran is ready to sign the accord immediately and is only waiting for the Russian side to sort out "technicalities" concerning environmental protection during the transport and storage of the spent nuclear fuel. At the same time, the ambassador insisted that Iran has no plans to sign the Additional Protocol, saying that, "The meat and the bones must come together-we can't get only the bones when someone else gets the meat."

Presently, the international community is awaiting a full report from the IAEA on Iran, which will be released on June 16. The report will describe the findings of IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei and his chief aides, who traveled to Iran on February 21 and 22.

With a week to go before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, there are signs of impatience. Alleged leaks from the draft IAEA report are controversial, ranging from statements on Iran's "failure to meet its obligations" to assertions that it is "showing a newly cooperative attitude with these recent revelations."

In the meantime, the head of the Iranian atomic energy program, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, announced that Iran would agree to additional international monitoring of its nuclear facilities if it is allowed to acquire more advanced technology, calling on the IAEA to, "end discrimination against us and allow all member states equal access to nuclear technology."

Russia will certainly find it difficult to dismiss whatever findings are presented, especially if they disclose that Iran has been non-compliant with the NPT and the IAEA Code of Conduct. President Putin stated at the G-8 summit that, "The IAEA should be a leader in the nonproliferation effort."

With nonproliferation as a key issue in the post-Iraq War period, and with concern about the nature of Russian-Iranian cooperation now a fundamental driver for US policy towards both countries, the impending report will mark a crucial moment for policymakers. Next week, all eyes will once again be on Mohamed El-Baradei and the IAEA.