Scientific Panel

December 11, 2001
Introduction

 On December 11, 2001, The Eisenhower Institute convened a small group of international space science experts at the Cosmos Club in Washington, DC to discuss the creation of a new, comprehensive legal framework for space that harmonizes its commercial and military uses. The group consisted of members of a larger international network of individuals who have joined the Eisenhower Institute in this effort, and who have direct experience in leading space agencies or in managing space launches.

Presentation by Dennis Papadopoulos
Presentation by Brett Lambert

Three participants gave presentations at this meeting: Dr. Roald Sagdeev, meeting Chairman and Distinguished University Professor and Director of the East-West Space Science Center at the University of Maryland; Dr. Dennis Papadopoulos, Professor in Physics and Astronomy at the University of Maryland; and Brett Lambert, Senior Vice President of DFI, International. Dr. Sagdeev opened with an introduction of the project and a presentation on its principles and objectives, as well as a review of the relevant technical and political issues. Mr. Lambert's presentation complemented Dr. Sagdeev's by explaining some of the current and projected trends in military space use. Finally, as part of a discussion of various means by which space assets could be interfered with or attacked, Dr. Papadopoulos addressed the potential consequences for satellites of a nuclear explosion in space.

Following these presentations, participants had the opportunity to question each other and to discuss a number of additional relevant topics, focusing mainly on space-related threat scenarios and the issue of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and its impact on the future of space.

THE PANEL LEFT TO RIGHT: Dr. Roald Sagdeev, meeting Chairman and Distinguished University Professor and Director of the East-West Space Science Center at the University of Maryland; Dr. Dennis Papadopoulos, Professor in Physics and Astronomy at the University of Maryland; and Brett Lambert, Senior Vice President of DFI, International.

The Current Debate on Space

In his presentation, Dr. Sagdeev briefly summarized the current state of affairs in space, the challenges that it poses, and the approach that the Institute is taking to meet this challenge. Mr. Lambert then highlighted some of the broad trends taking place in the area of military uses of space. When one combines the fact that space lacks a set of coherent governing principles with the various trends in the uses of space, the need for an effective and efficient regulatory regime becomes evident.

The Lay of the Land

• US commercial space use has recently surpassed use by the public sector in terms of the overall budget. However, it is inevitable that the military's dependence on the use of space will also continue to grow. The US military sees space assets as increasingly vital for day-to-day operations, and the continued exploitation of these assets and further development of the scope of its space activity has been incorporated into its long-range planning.
• The future of military space has become a principal international security issue. Early warning satellites have long been instruments of stability because they greatly reduce the threat of a surprise attack. Similarly, reconnaissance satellites are useful monitoring and verification tools in the area of nonproliferation. However, in addition to these more benign functions, some recommend the deployment of weapons in space. And the Bush administration's "broad vision for ballistic missile defense" includes space-based components like the Space-Based Laser.
• In addition to specific events, Mr. Lambert identified a number of broad trends in military space use: (Lambert Presentation [PDF .5M])
  • The Bush administration is committed to "fully fund and deploy planned communications, imagery, navigation, meteorology, and early warning satellites." Additional initiatives include deploying those systems necessary for fielding ballistic missile defense and pursuing longer-term programs such as the Military Space Plane.
  • There is a "migration of missions to space" underway, meaning a transfer of operations that traditionally have been performed by airborne systems, such as radar and surveillance, manned flights and military strikes, to outer space. The pace of this migration of missions to space does face barriers including Congressional resistance, international treaty obligations, opposition from allies as well as opposition from within the military itself, not to mention incredible technical barriers. Nevertheless, concluded Lambert, migration is not a question of "if," but a question of "when." The pace of migration will be driven primarily by technological developments-e.g., as launch costs decrease, rapid migration could overtake the fledgling policy debate.
  • There is also an increasing reliance by the military on the commercial sector even though the process is currently quite inefficient due to the abundance of national regulations that inhibit cooperation between industry and the government. Further complicating government-private sector interaction is the fact that US dominance in commercial space is in effect based on traditional government support for the industry, with funding for both government and commercial projects tending to go to the same companies. To demonstrate the complexities of the relationship between the public and private space sector in the US, Mr. Lambert raised the example of an American company that was paid $1.9 million a month by the US government for exclusive rights to overflight photos of Afghanistan during US operations there-an arrangement that would be more problematic if the number of companies taking pictures increased from a few to twenty. The military will have to become a smarter consumer. Some say it is likely that the Europeans will take the lead in forming public-private space partnerships in the near future.

   

• Just before Donald Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense, a commission he chaired concluded that conflict in space is a "virtual certainty." The commission report argued that the importance of space assets to the US military and industry makes them prime candidates for attack by states or terrorist groups. As such, these assets are in danger of falling victim to a "Space Pearl Harbor." Soon after the report was released, the Air Force Space Warfare Center staged the military's first major war game with space as the primary theater. In addition, the goals articulated in the US Space Command's Vision for 2020 and Long Range Plan demonstrate the conceptual approach of the US military:
  • Full Spectrum Dominance-the concept that the US must achieve supremacy in all space-related technologies for all potential military scenarios.
  • Space Control-the concept that the US should have the ability to "assure US access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required."

   

• On the other hand, many are concerned that that space could become the next frontier of the arms race. For example, on October 2, 2001, US Congressman Dennis Kucinich introduced a bill in the House of Representatives seeking to permanently prohibit the basing of weapons in space. Elsewhere, China submitted a proposal at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on June 6, 2001 for a framework to prevent the weaponization of outer space. In reference to the space-based components of America's missile defense plans, Russia virtually declared that keeping space free of weapons would be their "21st Century Stalingrad" and Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeded in his initiative to convene a major UN-sponsored international conference in Moscow called "Space without Weapons: An Arena for Peaceful Cooperation in the 21st Century."
• Charting a course that takes US security interests fully into account is a prerequisite for creating a viable a regulatory framework for space since the military has and will continue to play a role in space. In addition to employing reconnaissance and early warning systems that are satellite-supported, military operational capabilities and command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) systems all make use of real-time information made available through America's space-based infrastructure. The importance of this infrastructure was manifest in US operations in the Gulf War, Kosovo and now in Afghanistan. Space, in other words, is already militarized, and proposals that seek to make space into a sanctuary and outright prohibit the US from employing many of its current capabilities are not realistic. The questions are what kind of role the military will seek to assign to space beyond reconnaissance and telecommunications as technology advances and how an increased reliance on space assets for command and control infrastructure will be codified into an international framework.

Atoms for Peace and The Eisenhower Institute Approach

• As was the case when the international community first confronted the nuclear issue, today's debate on space revolves around the dual-use dilemma: the very technology that allows us to blaze a trail to the heavens and to subsequently utilize space for global benefits can also be applied to weapons development. Using a similar approach to that adopted by the international community following President Eisenhower's historic "Atoms for Peace" initiative thus provides useful guidance for our project. This led eventually to the establishment of rules of behavior to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy while safeguarding against the proliferation of its military uses.
  • Atoms for Peace proposed that the three nuclear powers of the time, Great Britain, the US and the USSR, give a portion of their stockpiles of fissionable material to an international agency where scientists would study ways to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Eisenhower intended this to reduce the amount of material that could be used to produce weapons, serve as the basis for more significant future disarmament and create mutual trust between the two superpowers. It subsequently served as a catalyst for the development of the nonproliferation process that remains a cornerstone of international security to this day. Similarly, international security would be well served today by the introduction of an international regulatory regime with a set of rules, safeguards and means of verification to limit the dual uses of space technology and help in managing the many functions that space can serve.

Threat Scenarios

After being briefed about where space stands today and where it may stand tomorrow in the spectrum of military and commercial uses, the group engaged in a technical discussion on various scenarios in which US space assets could be interfered with or threatened. Dr. Papadopoulos initiated the discussion with a brief presentation on what would happen if a nuclear weapon were detonated in space (please contact Ryan McFarland for a copy of this presentation), following which other scenarios were presented. Those present worked to determine some of the appropriate preventative measures that could be included in a regulatory framework for future space activities.

A Nuclear Detonation in Space

• If the detonation of a nuclear weapon in space took place, either from a direct attack against space assets, the firing of a high-altitude nuclear warning shot, or as a residual effect of the use of a nuclear-tipped anti-ballistic missile, the damage could be catastrophic to the world's satellite superstructure. And while most countries do not have the technology to score a direct hit on a satellite, many of them do possess missiles that can reach 600 km. If a localized detonation were to occur in low earth orbit (LEO) (320-800km), the radiation would surround the earth, forming a kind of artificial radiation belt. The result would be that all LEO satellites would be disabled within the course of a month. In 1962, for example, the Starfish high-altitude (400 km) nuclear test produced an intense, artificial radiation belt that destroyed seven satellites within seven months. This radiation belt remained in place until the early 1970s.
• One way to defend space assets against such an attack is through redundancy and the hardening of key satellite components such as the microprocessors and solar panels. But because of their size, hardening solar panels is a difficult task. Dr. V.S. Arunachalam suggested that one way to circumvent this problem is to convert satellites to internal power sources-i.e. nuclear power source. However, Dr. Sagdeev countered that this option has already been ruled out, partly because public opinion in the US is against the idea of nuclear materials in space. Other options include moving satellites to a different orbit during the life of the artificial belt.
• It was noted that many of the systems proposed by the US for defense of space assets, ASATs in particular, would be of no use in this type of situation. All agreed that the most feasible solution to this specific threat would be to maintain the nonproliferation regime and to make the close monitoring of rocket launches part of a proposed international regulatory framework.

Kinetic Energy Weapons Launched from Earth

• Dr. Sagdeev explained that the odds of an attack on space assets from ground-based kinetic energy weapons to target satellites are very small. It is not an easy task to launch a vehicle into orbit, let alone hit another target moving at a supersonic speed. Developing and operating the multistage system necessary to deliver a vehicle into geosynchronous orbit (GEO) is even more difficult than landing a craft on Mars because it requires multiple, sequential engine ignition and changing orbital planes. In the end, this process consumes an enormous amount of additional fuel and only the US, Europe, Russia and China currently possess the technology, although India is close. Finally, while it is less complicated to launch satellites into LEO, rogue states are nowhere near mastering the terminal navigation needed to take out US assets.

Jamming and Other Electromagnetic Interference

• The jamming of GPS signals represents a threat to US targeting, communications and navigation capabilities, and the technology is available on the open market. Had Osama bin Laden procured and used a network of these systems, US operations in Afghanistan would have been more complicated. If jamming is used successfully to decrease the accuracy of incoming munitions, more bombs must be used and the likelihood of collateral damage increases. Nevertheless, it was also noted that jamming has a well-defined return address that can be countered by targeting ground stations, as well as by frequency management software.
• There have been some complaints about Russia selling jamming devices on the international market but the issue has still not been addressed as a long-term problem. This is therefore a situation that will need to be addressed in the proposed framework.

Other Threat Scenarios

• Other potential threats, including Directed Energy Weapons and space-based ASATs, will be addressed in future meetings.

A "Pandora's Box": The Three-Way Dilemma of GPS

The meeting concluded with a full discussion of how GPS fits into the framework of space issues. Because it is the space application with perhaps the most far-reaching implications for both the global economy and international security, determining how to codify and manage the dual-uses of GPS technology (and similar systems like GLONASS and Galileo) presents one of the most important and challenging tasks for forming an international regulatory framework for space. In addition to its commercial applications and use by the US military, a third implication of the growth of GPS technology is its possible use by terrorists or rogue states. The following are some of the points raised by participants as they relate to GPS and its related questions:

• The US military now sees GPS technology as vital to its operations. Mr. Lambert stated that 50% of the money that the US Department of Defense spends on munitions goes towards munitions that depend on GPS.
• GPS allows Air Force targeting accuracy of eight meters. Without it, missiles must rely on their backup systems of gyroscopes and accelerometers, decreasing accuracy to thirty meters.
• Other nations are concerned that, through the use of such technology, the US is achieving a significant unilateral strategic advantage that it could misuse-e.g., China, Russia and Europe.
• Russia already possesses the GPS counterpart known as GLONASS¹. However, following the demonstration of US military capabilities in the NATO campaign in Kosovo, it has developed technology to jam American GPS signals. This technology is currently available on the open market and could be the first of many countermeasures developed in response to the use of military space assets.
• The Europeans were also surprised by American military technology in Kosovo, prompting them to propose the creation of a separate European security force. Roger Bonnet, former Scientific Director of the European Space Agency, stated that Europe must not be dependent on the US for space technology, although he acknowledged that there is no united front in Europe on this issue. The current attempt to develop the European counterpart to GPS, known as Galileo, will cost $5-6 billion, $4 billion of which has already been committed.
• The US military wants the ability to control access to GPS signals in times of crisis, which raises questions about the implications of having a GPS system managed by the military, especially since the commercial applications of GPS continue to expand². Would all commercial signals also be jammed during a crisis? If not, how will it be decided what uses are permitted? Finally, from the practical standpoint, if a terrorist utilizes commercial GPS signals, the US ability to jam transmissions would be a moot point given the inherent principle of surprise employed by terrorists. All of these unresolved issues await long-term solutions.
• Since GPS receivers are so widely available, it is quite possible that "technologically literate" terrorist groups or rogue states could use GPS-guided weapons against the US and its allies. This could be accomplished even with relatively unsophisticated technology, making it possible for the threat to become more real than a surprise ballistic missile attack.

Conclusion

Participants concluded that with the rapidly growing importance of the role of space in commercial and military activities, it will be essential to formulate a regulatory framework that can manage its future uses and maintain a stable international environment in the 21st century.

¹GLONASS has not been fully operational since 1995. Russia has been unable to replace its satellites, which have service lives of three years, faster than the rate at which they degrade. However, the Russian government has made a financial commitment to restore the system by 2006.
²Among space industry segments, GPS is second in world revenue ($44.13 billion, or 9%) to satellite communications ($431.41 billion, or 83%). Source: "Trends in Space Commerce," Office of Space Commercialization, Department of Commerce, p. [1-4].

This summary was written by Eisenhower Institute Program Manager Ryan McFarland