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International Perspectives

It should be said that the military has and will continue to play a role in space. Since Sputnik, reconnaissance satellites have been instruments of stability by offering space-based "Open Skies," which has essentially eliminated the threat of a surprise attack. As technology becomes more advanced and space activity is rapidly increasing, the question today is what kind of role will the military assume in outer space in the coming decades?

There are two categories of military applications in space:

The first category involves taking advanced information and communication technology into orbit. Information in and from space enhances military operational capabilities and command, control, communication and information (C3I) systems, which provide more efficient war-fighting capability by using a real time global space-based information management system. The elements of this approach have already been implemented in U.S. operations in the Gulf War, Kosovo and Afghanistan, facilitating rapid deployments and lowering the casualty rate. During the Kosovo campaign, the inclusion of munitions guidance techniques based on signals from GPS satellites (the Global Positioning System commissioned by the U.S. military) has created widespread concerns around the world-in large measure because American capability in this area far outstrips the capacity of other world military powers to compete. Russia, for instance, is so threatened by this capability that their immediate reaction to events in Kosovo has been to develop technology for jamming signals from American GPS satellites in order to prevent the precision navigation of munitions in theaters of U.S. military operations. This example illustrates how unregulated advances of technology could lead to escalation and action-reaction spirals.

Even if the usage of such technologies is not in conflict with existing international law, the worry is that the U.S., by changing the very nature of war fighting, is already reaping the benefits of a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA)¹, and thus achieving a strategic asymmetrical advantage. If implemented, these proposals to accelerate the use of space could heighten the international community's already existing anxiety over U.S. technological superiority in C3I systems.

The second category is the weaponization of space. Weaponization of space could involve the use of space as a platform for interceptors that are part of a missile defense system. The current Bush Administration's proposal for a missile defense goes a long way toward opening the door for the deployment of space-based weapons². The same technology, whether it is interceptors in orbit or space-based lasers, will also have the capability to attack targets in space (e.g. satellites via Anti-Satellite Weapons, or ASATs). Both uses are consistent with the rhetoric used by the U.S. Space Command, calling for American "control of space" that seeks to "conduct defensive and offensive counter-space operations as directed to protect space and terrestrial forces." This concept, if technically elaborated, constitutes the biggest change in the way the world might view space.

Our European allies are alarmed with the Administration's assertions about future space use. There is serious concern that plans for missile defense, having already scuttled the ABM Treaty, might torpedo the whole architecture of international arms control agreements with Moscow. Russia has specifically singled out space issues as central to the bilateral relationship, virtually declaring that keeping space free from weapons is going to be their ultimate stand-their "21st Century Stalingrad." In a September 26, 2001 speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared, "Preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space forms an important part of the set of measures designed to ensure strategic stability. It is our common duty before succeeding generations to keep outer space peaceful through joint efforts...As the first practical step in this direction, a moratorium could be declared on the deployment of weapons in outer space pending a relevant international agreement."

China, an emerging space power, also is voicing its strong objection to the weaponization of space. Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's disarmament department, said that if the United States builds a missile shield, "space will become a new weapons base and battlefield...Since other big powers will not sit and look on unconcerned, this will inevitably mean the extension of the arms race into space." If the world's other space powers do act on their concerns, it could entail consequences not just for the capabilities of the U.S. military, but could also pose a threat to many of the most basic, non-military space operations.

The administration's position on weapons in space acknowledges that valuable, indeed, essential satellite technology is vulnerable to both attacks and signal jamming by hostile powers or rogue nations. There is no dispute that the United States and other space-faring nations have invaluable assets in orbit today. However, if proposals to develop a Space Force and weaponize space are advanced to address their perceived vulnerability, it would represent a dramatic departure from the international security framework currently in place, and could have grave and perhaps not fully foreseen implications for the strategic balance. Should weaponization occur, a new set of concerns and scenarios for measures and countermeasures are sure to surface. "Smoke screens" in space, space mines and the deployment of swarms of micro particles have already been advanced as hypothetical possibilities. The true irony is that instead of protecting our valuable assets in space, which also include a variety of vital commercial satellites, such developments, in effect, could make them more vulnerable.

Technical challenges notwithstanding, it may be legally easier to implement the weaponization of space than many imagine. At the moment there are only a few treaties that govern the use of space. There are international regulations that:

require launch notifications (so that they will not be mistaken by early warning systems to be a nuclear attack);
protect a country's assets against damages caused by the space activity of third parties (for example, based on this regulation, stipulated in the UN sponsored Liability Convention, the Soviet government in 1980 had to pay financial compensation to Canada for damages inflicted by falling debris from the military satellite Cosmos-954, which was carrying a nuclear reactor); and
allocate orbital slots and frequency bands (for telecommunication needs, including those of the military).

However, there are only three treaties that deal with security issues:

the Outer Space Treaty, which bans the deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space;
the Limited Test Ban Treaty that prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in space; and
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR, which is actually an export control protocol, is signed by leading space-faring nations in order to prevent proliferation of rocket technologies beyond a closed circle of countries already in possession of them.

Without the ABM Treaty, which focused on limiting the testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses, there are no rules for space that actually prohibit conventional weaponization or the use of lasers and other dual-use technologies for military ends. Even anti-satellite weapons are not legally banned. The restraint exercised in this type of activity, practiced de facto by both the U.S. and the USSR since the early 1980s, was not codified in any legally binding way.

If space, as the Pentagon's Space Command statements suggest, is the fourth frontier of warfare, many dual-use technologies could be designed anew or re-configured for non-civilian purposes, altering the current security balance not only in space, but on earth as well.

What makes the situation potentially destabilizing is that there are no ways to regulate how such technology is being used. At the crux of this problem is the dual-use dilemma: the very technology that allows us to blaze a trail to the heavens and to subsequently utilize space can also have weapons applications-e.g., a satellite's launcher could be easily converted into an intercontinental rocket, space platforms for scientific or commercial uses could be converted into orbital weapons carriers, and so on.

Fifty years ago the international community did find the right approach to tackle the problem relating to the dual-use nature of what was then new technology, and of no less danger to humanity. Following the historic "Atoms for Peace" initiative of President Dwight Eisenhower, speaking before the General Assembly of the UN in 1953, the UN designed a special set of rules, safeguards and means of verification to drastically limit the risk of the dual uses of nuclear energy. Even if imperfect, the International Atomic Energy Agency, established then as an international regulatory body, is still currently serving the goals of "Atoms for Peace," a plan that allows non-nuclear states access to the benefits of alternative sources of energy.

In the project described below, The Eisenhower Institute is working to develop recommendations and encourage international consensus to establish a set of rules for space and to recommend a potential framework for such a regime. The successful outcome of our work and its adoption by the international community could be a genuine step towards "Space for Peace."

Links to US Government Reports

HR 3616: The Space Preservation Act of 2002
A bill introduced to the House of Representatives, January23, 2002, by Representative Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH) that seeks to preserve space for "cooperative, peaceful use for the benefit of all mankind.

US Space Command's Vision for 2020
A document that details the Space Command's vision for developing the military dimension of space use.

Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization
This Commission, which was chaired by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, urges that the national security needs of the U.S. require a prominant, proactive role for the U.S. military in space. Follow this link to view the report.

Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan for FY02 and Beyond
This document outlines a long range plan for implementing the vision of US Space Command. It also takes into account technology maturation timelines and political limitations on the military uses of space. Click here to view the report.

China's Stance: Preventing an Arms Race in Space

The following documents were presented to the Conference on Disarmament. One is a statement of the Position of the People's Republic of China towards future uses of space, and the other is a preliminary outline of some of its recommendations for construction of a regime that would prevent its weaponization.

Joint Working Paper by the Delegations of China and the Russian Federation outlining the possible elements of an international agreement for space This is a draft text presented on 28th of May, 2002 by the CD Delegations of China and the Russian Federation to all other delegations seeking their support and co-sponsorship.
"China's Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament," submitted by the Chinese Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament on February 9, 2000.

"Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space," submitted to the Conference on Disarmament on June 6, 2001.

Russian Position on the Weapon-
ization of Space
This section includes an excerpt from a speech given Spetember 26, 2001 by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to the UN General Assembly and a report compiled by Sergei Rogov on an international conference entitled "Space Without Weapons: An Arena for Peacful Cooperation in the 21st Century" convened in Moscow.

Seminar at the Space Research Institute (IKI) On January 17, 2002, The Eisenhower Institute convened a meeting at the Space Research Institute (IKI) in Moscow to gain a Russian perspective on US plans for military space use. Follow this link for the report
Prevention of Arms Deployment in Space A paper presented by Lt. General Mikhail S. Vinogradov, Vice Chair, Committee of Scientists for Global Security, prepared for Eisenhower Institute Seminar, January 17, 2002

Joint Working Paper by the Delegations of China and the Russian Federation outlining the possible elements of an international agreement for spaceThis is a draft text presented on 28th of May, 2002 by the CD Delegations of China and the Russian Federation to all other delegations seeking their support and co-sponsorship.

A speech by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on September 26, 2001 to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the weaponization of space.

A Russian Report on the Moscow Space Conference
On April 11-14, 2001, an international conference entitled "Space Without Weapons: An Arena for Peaceful Cooperation in the 21st Century" convened in Moscow. Representatives from numerous nations and scientific, commercial and non-governmental organizations attended the event in order to discuss the development of peaceful cooperation in space. Follow this link for a report. Compiled by Sergei Rogov. (PDF 64k)

References

¹Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessment at the Department of Defense, defined a RMA as "...a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations". Quoted in NATO Parliamentary Assembly Committee Report of the Science and Technology Committee, "The Revolution in Military Affairs," November 1998, via world wide web: RMA Watch (http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/nato/ar299stc-e.html#1).
²Michael R. Gordon with Steven Lee Myers, "Bush Team vows to Speed Up Work on Missile Shield," The New York Times, 30 April 2001, p. A1.