FOS Framework
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE
THE CHALLENGE
The medium of space has been transformed dramatically over the past half century. From Sputnik to the International Space Station to GPS and Galileo, the unique character of space has enabled nations and individuals to learn, see, and connect in ways never before imagined. However, as this environment offers opportunities, it brings with it certain limitations. Satellite orbits are controlled by the laws of orbital mechanics and, as a result, there are a limited number of orbital slots and frequencies. At the same time, though space assets orbit the earth as a whole, they do not recognize national borders and are, by nature, more vulnerable to attack than ground-based systems and much more difficult to defend. They follow a predetermined and predictable course, and they are left exposed and unprotected by either personnel or material. This is why it becomes vitally important for nations and commercial entities to cooperate on space security while inhabiting ever closer quarters in space.
The current international space security framework, which can trace its birth to the Eisenhower administration, acknowledges the importance of non-aggressive military applications in space, a recognition which has served to enhance national and international security for many years. Few, after all, can deny that reconnaissance from space and early warning satellites strengthened the stability of deterrence during the Cold War. Over the past decade, many nations have invested in creating military space systems that have greatly augmented their reconnaissance, communications, and targeting capabilities. These assets' increasing value have made them integral to military planning by most space-faring nations, both to defend and to target. These nations are now at a crossroads. They must decide if security will be increased by weaponizing space or by maintaining the status quo, where space is utilized for military purposes, but not yet as a base for destructive weapons.
For a medium that is inherently international in nature, space is predominantly unregulated. The International Telecommunication Union is responsible for the allocation of communication frequencies and orbital slots, but it has no authority over what is deployed on orbit. The Outer Space Treaty forbids only the presence of nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, in orbit or on heavenly bodies and military installations on heavenly bodies. The former ABM Treaty, by prohibiting a space-based missile defense system, had simultaneously banned the testing of space-based ASATs in an anti-missile capacity. However, despite some effort to create a new treaty at the Conference on Disarmament, the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has lifted any limitations on the deployment of non-nuclear weapons in orbit. In addition, the recently released United States National Space Policy specifically states that the United States will "oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space." The new directive pledges the United States to preserve the unregulated nature of space. These developments have led to a potentially unstable situation.
The first nation to deploy weapons in space, even if only out of concern for the security of its own assets, will likely trigger a chain reaction of reciprocal moves, opening a space arms race. Major space powers such as Russia and China have made clear that that they oppose the weaponization of space, yet are prepared to respond in kind to any U.S. attempt to deploy weapons there. Consequently, unregulated and unilateral action by any nation to weaponize space may be quickly transformed into a new area of confrontation. At the same time, the space security that all nations and commercial entities are seeking for their space assets could be irrevocably lost.
A space arms race always brings with it the possibility of the purposeful, or even accidental, use of destructive space weapons. Aside from the grave military damage an attack on space assets could cause, including the possible debilitation of critical national defense infrastructure, offensive weapons in space could be extremely disruptive to every day life in the public sphere. Satellites in orbit around the Earth are now used for communications, banking operations, television broadcasting, airplane navigation, the internet, weather and climate research, remote medicine and education, and numerous other important services. All of these assets, and in many respects our quality of life, would be at risk either from direct attack or by the resulting barrage of high speed space debris created from the destruction of other co-orbital assets. A war in space would clearly have global repercussions.
This is why a joint effort on behalf of all major and emerging space-faring nations to eliminate the threat of space-based warfare, such as The Eisenhower Institute's proposal below, would be a significant and worthy first step toward a comprehensive response to space security threats.
In summary, it is our belief that the deployment of weapons in space by any nation would increase the vulnerability of its own space assets and almost certainly produce a number of other negative consequences, including:
1. The possible initiation of an expensive arms race by the major space powers;
2. A resultant increase in the number of nations with space-based weapons;
3. Damaged prospects for international cooperation on a new vision for space exploration;
4. Disintegration of space objects, which would create dangerous, high-speed space debris fields in heavily used orbits.
THE PROPOSAL
We believe that this fragile situation calls for a multi-layered strategy which would bring together both existing and threshold space powers into a mutually beneficial and security-enhancing framework. There are three distinct categories of countries with different levels of space capabilities: established space powers that are capable of designing, developing, and launching space assets independently; emerging space powers that are on the threshold of achieving a space launch capability or are capable of designing and developing space assets independently; and "countries of concern" that possess basic rocket/satellite technology but do not have the technical means or geographic capacity to launch satellites. Each of these categories of nations are capable of posing, in their own way, a threat to the security of space objects.
The challenge in dealing with the first group - established space powers - is to maintain the security of their space assets while avoiding the creation of a hostile and unsafe space environment. An arms race, once sparked, would be extraordinarily expensive and counterproductive to global security interests.
The second group - threshold space powers - may possess rocket technology capable of sending an object to Low Earth Orbit or have the capability to become significant "players" in the future. The international community must find ways to encourage these nations' developing access to space to the extent that the MTCR allows, while ensuring that security in space for all nations is not decreased.
The third group - "countries of concern" - are important to engage, but the complexity involved in drawing nations such as North Korea into the regime could very well put its creation at risk. Should the regime's members believe it useful, they may engage these countries at a later date.
The most pragmatic approach for achieving a consensus among space-faring nations is to maintain and "lock-in" the status quo, thus preventing the full weaponization of space, but not attempting to scale back on systems which have already being deployed. Our strategy, applicable to both established and emerging space powers, would reward responsible countries that choose to join the framework voluntarily while isolating those who do not abide by its principles. At the same time the plan would not prohibit complementary measures undertaken by the signatories in order to make their space assets more secure and redundant.
Key to this proposal is the establishment of a multilateral regime based on an international agreement banning on-orbit offensive weapons and the testing of any destructive anti-satellite weapon based on land, sea, air, or space. We recommend a regime similar in structure to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
STRUCTURE
Create a Multilateral Regime similar to the MTCR.
The Space Security Framework (SSF) would be a voluntary agreement rather than a treaty and would create an organization of like-minded nations that commit themselves to abiding by certain principles in order to enhance their mutual security in space. The creation of this new regime would have the advantage of providing a forum outside the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament for discussing and acting on civil, commercial, and military space issues with only existing or threshold space powers. It would eliminate the need to negotiate with nations who may have opinions, but no power or potential role to play in space.
Aside from those nations that are currently in space or likely to be soon, the regime could also include countries with a favorable geographic location, which is critical for launch purposes; satellite manufacturing capability; ground stations; or any other critical function. Observer status could be accorded to those nations that are consumers of space technology and want to be associated with the pact.
Each member of the regime would commit itself to the principles discussed below. Each would also undertake to pass domestic legislation that demonstrates a minimal commitment to these principles as confidence-building measures. Because membership in the regime is voluntary, collective punitive measures could not be taken against those members that violate the regime's principles. However, each member nation should, as part of its domestic legislation, enact policies for dealing with both members and non-members that violate the framework's principles.
The creation of this forum would be a critical first step toward ensuring that space remains a secure environment for the assets of all space-faring nations. The group would then be in a strong position to engage new emerging space powers and to address other important space security issues such as minimizing space debris and fairly allocating communication frequencies and orbital slots.
PRINCIPLES
The establishment of an international agreement creating a regime of member nations who agree to work purposefully to prevent the deployment of destructive space-based weapons and the testing of any destructive anti-satellite weapon based on land, sea, air or space.
1. Definitions
1.1. A destructive space-based weapon: Any object deployed on orbit designed to permanently damage or destroy another space-based or earth-based object by directed-energy, explosives, or intentional impact.
1.2. A destructive ASAT test: The space test of a system based on land, sea, air, or space that is designed to permanently damage or destroy a space-based object by directed-energy, explosives, or intentional impact.
1.3. Coordinated Space Awareness Center: A center jointly supported and managed by members of the regime that is capable of detecting, tracking, and identifying man-made objects orbiting the Earth.
2. Basic Tenets
2.1. The regime would be an agreement by all members, as current or threshold space-faring nations, to maintain the status quo in space, allowing it to be freely used for commercial, scientific, and military uses, but to refrain from the space testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons and the deployment of any space-based anti-satellite system.
2.2. It would not require any reversal of the already adopted segments of the United States National Missile Defense program, nor would it ban potential equivalent programs of other nations. The regime would ban the deployment and testing of the weapons component of a space-based missile defense system, because it would be indistinguishable from a destructive space-based weapon.
2.3. There would be no prohibition on temporary and reversible interference with satellite functions or transmissions.
3. Individual Requirements of Membership
3.1. Members would be a part of a new forum in which to engage in confidence-building measures and discuss issues of mutual interest and concern with other major space players, eliminating the need to address these issues in other fora that may include nations who wield no power in space. An initial activity might be a joint effort to address the issue of space debris and engage in "orbit-cleaning" activities.
3.2. Members would pledge to enact domestic legislation as a confidence-building measure that commits each nation to the basic principles of this regime and sanction those members or non-members that violate them. An outline of this legislation is attached as an Appendix.
4. Joint Activities
4.1. A powerful and constructive initial trust-building activity by this regime would be to establish a jointly-sponsored Coordinated Space Awareness Center (see definitions) with access for all regime members. It would also serve to increase transparency among nations, so each could ensure that no destructive ASAT testing has taken place. Enhanced space situational awareness, much like early warning systems in the nuclear weapons field, is critical to a nation's knowledge of the security of its space-based assets. Lack of full knowledge about an event can lead to hasty and reckless actions.
In addition to all these collective rules and measures, the individual member countries or groups of them are free to undertake additional steps, such as redundancy and space situational awareness, to enhance survivability of their space assets. Redundant systems capable of rapid deployment might serve both as a deterrent to those interested in attacking space assets and insurance against any such attack.
Responsive space, consisting of flexible systems, infrastructure and launch capabilities, seeks to assure that if a country has the capability to replace any lost space asset within a very short window of time it would become economically and tactically difficult for an adversary to eliminate that capability. Even though responsive space techniques and technologies provide a range of diverse measures that can quickly meet a threat in space, the systems reside on the earth, thus eliminating weaponization while providing a deterrent.
Space-faring nations would be free to use a range of measures to help protect their assets without threatening other space powers. Among these options are:
- hardening of satellites to radiation;
- investing in the physical hardening of space structures;
- investing in more redundant lines of communication between the ground and satellites to counter any attempts at jamming;
- adopting passive measures, such as a robust defense for ground-based systems;
- assuring dispersal of space systems. In space, dispersal would involve deploying satellites in a multi-satellite system such as GPS into various orbital altitudes and planes. On the Earth, dispersal would involve deploying mobile ground stations to multiple locations;
- providing for mobility of space assets to defend themselves and their connection with terrestrial nodes. The limitations of space maneuverability as a means of deflecting attack are on-board fuel capacity, orbital mechanics and advance warning. Limitations of terrestrial nodes include maintaining "line of sight" positioning with its space partner;
- establishing system configuration changes - RF amplitude changing and frequency hopping techniques to prevent jamming, encryption, orbit altering physical shape changing;
- and networking satellites to reduce single-point dependencies and to minimize the impact of single-point failures.
CONCLUSION
The cost of weaponizing space would not only be extraordinarily high, it would probably result in a net reduction of security for all space-faring nations and for the rest of the world. We believe the strategy we have put forward would significantly enhance space security by offering greater transparency to the international community, while making it possible to isolate countries that have illegitimate or hostile objectives with regard to space. Furthermore, such a plan would also include measures that should be acceptable for all space-faring nations to employ without reducing the security of the others. By creating a regime dedicated to averting the necessity of developing and deploying destructive space-based weapons and preventing nations from testing any permanently destructive ASATs, all current and future space-faring nations would be taking the necessary first steps to enhance the security of their assets, while avoiding the great cost of developing a new field of weapons.
APPENDIX: SUGGESTED OUTLINE OF DOMESTIC LEGISLATION FOR THE UNITED STATES (OTHER NATIONS WILL VARY)