Arunachalam Article

Desire and Denial: The Nullification
of Cryogenic Rocket Motor Technologies to India

By V.S. Arunachalam

The Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR for short, was formed in 1987 by seven countries, mainly from Europe and North America, to control the export of missile and rocket systems and technologies. The rationale behind this initiative is that by controlling the technology flow it would be possible to prevent, or at least minimize, the global spread of carrier systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. This regime was seen as an addition to the other two existing groups, Nuclear Suppliers Group formed to control the export of nuclear materials and technologies and a similar Group set up to prevent the export of materials, equipment and technologies for manufacturing chemical and biological weapons [1]. In 1993, India experienced the impact of the MTCR guidelines on its major space program when its purchase order for technologies needed to manufacture cryogenic rocket motor stages was refused by Russia, after the contract was signed, and when India and Russia were actually working to implement the project. It became known that Russia was forced to abjure its commitment citing force majeure clause in the contract because of the pressure exerted by the United States. The pressure to nullify the contract was so intense, it was said, that Vice President Al Gore had cancelled his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in early 1993 to express US dissatisfaction with Russia's continuing commitment to honor the Indian contract. There were also warnings of cancellation of the lucrative Space Station contracts that could have gone to Russian agencies and black-listing them if Russia went ahead with the Indian project.

Ten years down the road after the technology was denied to India, we notice no long-term consequences excepting for some delays in India launching its indigenous rockets. Without allowing this to interfere with its space programs, India continues to launch its geosynchronous satellites, INSAT using either imported engines or from abroad. It is also working hard to test and prove the indigenous cryogenic engine and set up the necessary infrastructure for its manufacture. India appears to have taken the denial in its stride and has moved on. Its often articulated commitment to become self-reliant in space and missile technologies or, for that matter, in all areas of advanced technologies has only grown stronger. Party changes at the Center have not altered the political leadership's insistence on self-reliance. The present occupant of the country's highest post, President APJ Abdul Kalam is a vociferous proponent of indigenous technology. It is argued that economic liberalization of the 1990s and improved political and economic relationship with the US are no substitutes for self-reliance in critical technologies [2]. There seems to be some introspection among Indian scientists and science policy makers on how the country failed to appreciate the importance of cryogenic motors to it space program, and instead persuaded itself to be dependent on imports. And, the Russian space agencies are still waiting for the bonanza to materialize from the space station contracts that the US had predicted.

While Indians would argue that sanctions and embargoes on civilian technologies are immoral-knowledge is a after all a common heritage of humankind, and punishment is no guarantee against irresponsible behavior-and in today's world of instant communications and supersonic travel, many from the West, and more specially those from the United States, would insist that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the concept of technology denial or its relevance. Instead, the more interesting question is how sanctions are imposed and implemented. To start with, the West (we include Japan to this list as well) is a reluctant jailor when it comes to imposing sanctions against democratic countries and open societies like India, Israel or Brazil, and the restrictions are also allowed to become benign with time. There is also an element of how countries react to such technology denials. The technological competence of the Indian Space Research Organization and its ability to rapidly move beyond such denials shaped India's measured political response and helped to save and sustain its traditional friendship and cooperation with the new democratic Russia.

INDIAN SPACE PROGRAMS

The Indian Space Program is more than 40 years old and is the only space initiative, apart from the Japanese one, that traces its origin exclusively to civilian aspirations of space technologies. Even after four decades of existence, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) jealously guards its identity and separation from the military establishment, and its mandate extends only to civilian applications of space. The founder of the Indian space program was a distinguished physicist Vikram Sarabhai [3]. Hailing from a family of famous industrialists, Dr. Sarabhai was deeply committed to the development of science and technology in India. When the Indian government requested him to head the Indian committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR), he readily agreed and later created the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO).

We can divide the growth of ISRO into three distinct stages, and at every stage there have been significant and useful collaboration with other countries. During the initial stage, there was extensive cooperation in space science and technology with US and France. A batch of Indian scientists and engineers were trained at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and Wallops Island Facility in assembling and launching sounding rockets [4]. The initial sounding rocket launches from India's Thumba's Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS), located in the western tip of South India, involved imported systems. Later, an agreement was signed with Sud Aviation in France to locally manufacture Centaure sounding rockets. It was during this period, India, in collaboration with the US that stationed its ATS-F satellite at an appropriate space location, conducted what turned out to be one of the largest social experiments, linking 2,400 villages and covering 200,000 people. The success of the Satellite Instructional Television Experiments (SITE) that beamed information, education and entertainment to villages confirmed the effectiveness of satellites in bridging different regions of the country that were otherwise poorly linked. Indian scientists, more than many others, were the earliest to appreciate the tremendous impact the satellites would have on integrating such a diverse society as India, and there were talks of building the "space bridge" that connects, irrespective of the terrain, all regions of the country. The technical evaluation of the SITE experiments is described in [5], but the social impact-an important consequence of SITE-has, alas, not been adequately described. There were similar experiments with LANDSAT exploring the Indian landmass and also experiments on other areas of space technologies such as in weather monitoring and forecasting. This phase of learning led to the launch of an indigenously designed and fabricated Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV-3) in 1980 that injected a 40 kg satellite into a low-earth orbit [6]

The many successes of space experiments conducted in collaboration with France, US and Germany and its relevance to the economic growth and social integration of the country convinced ISRO that it should develop and manufacture its own launch vehicles and ground systems. The organization thus moved into the second stage of its growth, which the present chairman of ISRO calls as end-to-end capability in the design, development and in-orbit management of space systems [7]. During this phase, ISRO followed a two-pronged approach of combining the second and the third stage of its mandate. Instead of waiting for the indigenous systems to be ready before embarking on applications and becoming a service provider, it chose to work with space agencies and corporations from other countries that provided launch and satellite fabrication facilities. This initiative enabled satellite communications, television broadcasting and weather forecasting to reach India well before Indians were ready to launch their own vehicles or manufacture satellites. In the beginning, the satellites were designed and built in the US, and were launched from Kourou, in South America by Arianespace or from the US space centers. Remote sensing satellites were fabricated in India but launched from the Soviet Union and later from India. In parallel, ISRO engineers, worked along with national laboratories, universities and industries to build indigenous capability in ground, command-control and guidance systems. They also developed high energy materials for rocket propulsion and special alloys for space hardware. Even though the US was denying export licenses for any system or component that appeared to help India in building its space system capability [8], other countries that had years of fruitful collaboration with ISRO and were convinced of its vision for common good were more forthcoming. Collaboration with France proved to be precious. Indian engineers, for instance, contributed more than 100 man-years of work to the building of the Viking liquid propulsion engine for the Ariane rocket in France and also supplied a large number of pressure transducers. In return, the French exposure provided them with valuable design experience in building a large liquid propulsion motor named VIKAS that powers both the first (as strap-ons to the solid booster)stage, and the second stage of India's Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) and also the second stage of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). The thrust of this motor exceeds 700 kN. Learning by doing also enabled the liquid propulsion group to design and build a small, but efficient, liquid propulsion motor for the upper stage of the PSLV.
Solid rocket motors, on the other hand, were totally indigenous products. Weighing over 130 tonnes and containing Hydroxyl Terminated Polybutadiene (HTPB) as propellant, India has developed one of the largest solid rocket motors of its kind in the world. With a thrust of 4,628 kN, and with strap-ons it provides for the first stage of propulsion of both PSLV and GSLV. Even before this booster, India had developed smaller boosters as strap-on for PSLV and other earlier rockets. These boosters typically have thrust in the range of 660kN.

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GSLV AND CRYOGENIC ENGINES

In spite of its ambitions to launch geostationary satellites, where cryogenic engines are a must for injecting respectable sized satellite payloads, [9]. India didn't seriously embark on the development of either cryogenic or semi-cryogenic engines, though it came very close to sustaining such programs in the early 1970s. For their initial experiments, ISRO scientists worked to build an engine using liquid oxygen (LOX) and kerosene. Such systems continue to be the workhorse of Russian rockets. There were also a few laboratory scale experiments using liquid oxygen and hydrogen gas as propellants. Because of the commitment of ISRO engineers to the development of the VIKAS engine, there wasn't enough enthusiasm then for developing yet another liquid propulsion engine containing liquids at very low temperatures. Liquid hydrogen was not available in quantities then in India and engineers appeared overwhelmed with cryogenic technologies needed for handling liquids that boil at very low temperatures (the boiling point of liquid hydrogen is -253 degrees C and liquid oxygen -183 degrees C) and in the design of pumps that feed propellants to the combustion chamber. When India was collaborating closely with SAP in France in the development of a liquid propulsion engine, France appeared to have offered to share its knowledge of HM7 cryogenic engine for a very nominal amount. Again, because of its perceived and overwhelming commitment to the development of VIKAS engine, India appeared to have allowed that offer to lapse [9].

Meanwhile, detailed Indian studies showed the criticality of cryogenic engines for the space program and suggested that the country should develop a 10 tonne class cryogenic engine with a stretch potential for higher thrusts [10]. Indian engineers argued that it would take at least 10 years to develop the engine, and a lack of this critical stage during this period would delay the indigenous development and launching of GSLV. It was then India considered importing the cryogenic motor technology for its geostationary satellite launch program.

Indian requests for this technology were rebuffed by both the US and Japan. India, in fact, wanted to acquire RL-10 cryogenic engine from Pratt & Whitney [11]. France which earlier offered to share the technology for a modest cost, now escalated the price higher than India could accept [12]. Many Indians felt at that time that France was concerned about a possible and growing competition from India for commercial launches. India then decided to explore the other remaining option viz., requesting the Soviet Union for the technology. India has had excellent political, economic and trade relationship with the Soviet Union almost since India's Independence. For many years, the Soviet Union remained as India's largest trading partner. Many of India's defense hardware, aircraft, frigates, submarines and battle tanks were imports from that country. Two major Indian steel plants, a heavy electricals plant and an Indian Institute of Technology were built with Soviet collaboration. Even in space programs, India received excellent cooperation from the Soviets. For over 15 years, the Soviet Union launched a number of Indian scientific satellites (Aryabhatta, Bhaskara-1 and Bhaskara-2), and IRS-1 series, India's operational remote sensing satellites [13]. Indian Cosmonaut Rakesh Sharma was in one of the Soviet Soyuz T-11 rockets in 1984, and along with Soviet cosmonauts performed a few scientific experiments in Salyut -7 orbital station.

THE SOVIET CONTRACT

Discussions with the Soviet went off well. Indian design studies suggested a cryogenic engine carrying 14 tonnes of propellants developing a thrust of about 12 tonnes. When integrated with the first two stages of the Indian design, this would form the third stage and be able to place a satellite about 2,000 kg into a Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO). The soviets offered a cryogenic engine with a thrust of 7.5 tonnes and the design studies showed this would be adequate to launch satellites weighing between 1500-2000 kg. The contract was signed in January 1991, with the Soviet offering two flight-ready cryogenic stages containing the cryogenic motor and vernier engines for control. In addition, the Soviets would transfer the needed technologies for manufacturing these stages in India. The technology transfer would take place over a period of six years and the contract was valued at Rs. 2350 million [12]. In 1991 exchange rates, the contract was valued around US $130 million. During the signing of this agreement, neither the Soviet Union (the Russian Federation was not formed by then) nor India was a member of the MTCR. After the contract was signed, ISRO and Glavkosmos (the Soviet agency that inked the deal) began all the necessary preparations including site visits, acceptance of specifications and engineers training. India also went ahead setting up establishments to ground-test the cryogenic engines and for large scale manufacture of liquid hydrogen and the transportation of cryogenic liquids.

India, or for that matter the Soviet Union did not view this sale or the technology transfer as acts of proliferation. Nowadays, cryogenic engines are used for launching only space rockets and the cumbersome procedures involved in fuel loading make this stage unviable for missile propulsion. At the present time, no operational missile of any country is powered by cryogenic motors. India was also rightfully proud of the complete separation of ISRO's projects from the country's military programs. The separation was so strictly enforced that many technical facilities, in spite of those becoming uneconomical and redundant, were built separately for the two agencies [14]. One could argue with some justification that when both programs exist in a country, it is impossible to prevent an overlap. After all, people could change jobs and know-how could be easily passed. There is some validity to this argument, but the facts on the ground suggest a different story. Apart from the Head of the country's missile program (who was a defense research employee before he moved to ISRO) there were few recruits to the defense program from ISRO. All programs of ISRO were targeted to civilian applications and there were many ongoing international scientific and applications oriented collaborations. ISRO's projects and publications were not classified. By 1990, Indian defense programs were all also well advanced with the test firing of AGNI and PRITHVI. The country was then in a position to manufacture large amounts of solid rocket propellants and strong and fracture-resistant motor casings with self-sufficiency extending to the manufacture of composite propellants and fuels, bonding and curing agents, plasticizers, stabilizers, oxidizers and necessary catalysts. India also began manufacturing large tonnages of maraging steel and developed its own processing schedules to retain high strength with high fracture resistance [15]. If India were to design a long range ICBM, all the necessary solid rocket motor technologies were readily available within the country and these are adequate to provide the required thrust for firing such missiles. Practically all the operational long-range missiles of the US and Russia are powered only by solid rocket or storable liquid propulsion motors. India was therefore convinced that its need for the cryogenic stage would not be construed as another instance of missile proliferation, but for launching INSAT, India's geosynchronous satellite for communications, broadcasting and weather forecasting [16].

There is also an operational reason for requiring the cryogenic engine for the GSLV and this is to do with the geographical location of the Indian rocket launching range. Sriharikota Range-recently renamed as Satish Dhawan Space Center in honor of the second head of ISRO-is situated in the east coast of South India at a latitude of 13.9 degrees N and longitude of 80.4 degrees E. For PSLV, which launches satellites in sun-synchronous orbits, this site presents no problem. Ejection of spent rocket stages could take place over Bay of Bengal once the rocket clears South Indian and Sri Lankan landmass and the exclusive economic zone of Sri Lanka. For GSLV however, stage-separation of spent rockets and their ejection becomes a critical issue. The first stage and VIKAS strap-ons of GSLV could be ejected in about 160 seconds over the Bay of Bengal itself. Dumping the spent second stage is the problem. If the second stage were designed to provide the required velocity before igniting the cryogenic stage, then the ejection would have to take place over the South-East Asian land mass or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of those nations. By choosing to eject over the Bay of Bengal itself, the vehicle would need a third stage with sustained power for over 720 seconds and a better specific impulse. Only a cryogenic motor would be able to meet these stringent specifications and place the satellite in appropriate Geosynchronous Transfer Orbits (GTO), if we have to save on the fuel reserved for satellite propulsion that effects minor corrections to its orbit [17]. Cryogenic motors have multiple start options while in space and this would help in providing appropriate velocity to the satellite in GTO.

US AND MTCR CONCERNS

However, the US and the MTCR Guidelines came in the way of the USSR or its successor Russia, honoring its contract with India. The guidelines as defined by the seven nations in 1987 and elaborated in great detail in a 1993 document actively discourage exports of rocket and missile hardware and technologies. Though, a careful perusal of the various sections of this document shows the guidelines to be ambivalent. On the one hand, the document talks of complete rocket systems or individual rocket stages as category I items and thus items of great sensitivity. The document goes on to say that "particular restraint will be exercised in consideration of category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of category I production facilities will not be authorized" [18]. Having almost rejected technology transfer, the guidelines become a trifle conciliatory: "the guidelines are not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction". In the case of cryogenic rocket motors to India, it appeared that the US, for reasons known only to its government, was attempting to do precisely the opposite by impeding a national program that had nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction.

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THE UNRAVELING OF THE SOVIET UNION

The deal which India called a straightforward commercial transaction got entangled in the politics then rapidly unfolding in Moscow. Mikhail Gorbachev, a friend of India who was well briefed on the deal was temporarily deposed in an abortive coup in the summer of 1991, and he didn't stay long in power even after the coup was crushed. The Soviet Union disintegrated into many republics and the leaders who came to power in the republic of Russia at least during their initial months appeared to be unaware of the realpolitik and were more concerned about distancing themselves from the past regimes and were readily appeasing the Americans. At least, this was how Indians perceived the post-coup Russia, a Russia that appeared so unfamiliar to them [19]. But Boris Yeltsin who became President of Russia assured the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao that Russia would honor all the contractual obligations of the Soviet Union and build on the longstanding cordial relationship with India. During his visit to India in the winter of 1992 President Yeltsin scoffed at the suggestion of Russia bowing to the American pressure and canceling the contract [20].

AND THE DENIAL

The US wasn't persuaded by the Russian explanation of a close international supervision of the sale that would guarantee that the engine was used only for the purpose specified, of the help that this transaction (now transferred to payment in hard currency instead of Indian rupees) would provide for the collapsing Russian economy and of the job stability such contracts would provide for the Russian scientists and engineers [21]. During this period there were also widespread concerns about highly qualified scientists and engineers from Russia emigrating to countries that might be interested in acquiring strategic weapons capabilities. The author of this report visited Washington DC during those months on the instance of the Indian Government and explained to senior US officials including the Undersecretary in the Dept. of commerce, the uselessness of cryogenic motor for missile technologies. American officials were not willing to hear the technical arguments, but insisted on following the MTCR Guidelines to the letter. According to a senior official, "technology and applications are not the issues, but compliance is". This attitude was amplified in the April 1992 statement of the State department Spokesman Boucher:" We are dealing with a class of technology that is virtually identical no matter what the purpose it is......No way to draw a line between peaceful and non-peaceful purposes" [22]. The US therefore imposed sanctions for 2 years on ISRO and Glavkosmos, denying them the right to import from or export to the US. Boucher justified the sanction by stating "that is the way international understandings work and that is the way our law works in terms of applying sanctions." He added that the sanctions would be waived if the transaction was terminated. While Indians were accustomed to the US going back on its contractual obligations (Tarapur is a case in point [23]), for the many Russian space agencies who were longing to collaborate with the US in building the space station, the sanction came as a rude shock.

During this period, there also appeared a few newspaper articles in Russia criticizing Russia's closeness to India and about signing the cryogenic engine contract [24]. Indian observers also noted pressure coming mainly from the Russian Space Agency and the Foreign Ministry on Glavkosmos to renegotiate the contract. President Boris Yeltsin, in spite of his earlier promise to the Indian prime minister that Russia would honor its contractual obligations, meekly promised President Clinton in Vancouver that he would settle the problem "somehow". There were also unconfirmed reports that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to the US in the summer of 1993 was called off as Russia had not settled the cryogenic motor issue with India to the satisfaction of the US [25].

If Indians were feeling the pressure exerted on Russia, they chose to ignore it at least in their public statements. Prof .U.R. Rao, then Chairman of ISRO, spoke confidently about Russians honoring the contract after his meetings with the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shoklin and Foreign Economic relations Minister Glazyev in the first week of July [26]. The first inkling that Russians were bowing to the pressure came when an Indian Minister spoke of the negotiations between Russia and India being at a delicate stage and urging Russians to honor the commitment [27]. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed a non-paper to the Indian ambassador in Moscow about Glavkosmos invoking force majeure for its inability to honor the contract regarding technology transfer and production equipment for cryogenic rocket motor systems [28]. On 19th July, Prime Minister Rao spoke in a public meeting of his disappointment over the deal and implored Indians to become self-sufficient in every field. He added that while he had no documentary evidence (to prove), he had information that some countries were opposed to the technological improvements in underdeveloped countries [29]. ISRO chairman Prof. Rao also appeared totally disappointed and was quoted as saying that technology transfer was at the heart of the contract and any modifications excluding this aspect would be unacceptable.

If Indians were disappointed, Americans were euphoric. State Department spokesman Michael McCurry spoke of reaching satisfactory agreements with the Russian delegation on the cryogenic motor issue [30]. Russia, he reported, had agreed to "freeze" its contract with India for the sale of cryogenic engine and its technology. He talked of the common approach emerging between the US and Russia on such non proliferation issues and of the coming meeting between Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vice President Al Gore. He speculated that the ensuing cooperation in Space between the two countries could be worth to Russia a billion or billions of dollars. While many Indian scientists were reluctant to renegotiate the deal, the Indian Government persuaded them to continue. It was agreed that within the original cost, Russians would supply in addition to the contracted two stages, two more flight-worthy stages and two ground models. India, in addition, exercised its option for three more stages at a cost of $ 9 million. As we mentioned earlier, the contract terms were also converted to hard currency.

Was it all necessary for Russia to abrogate the deal? MTCR Guidelines suggest some stringent options for technology transfer: "the transfer of category I items will be authorized only on rare occasions and where the government (a) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in paragraph 5 of the guidelines, and (b) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use". This was the guideline that president Yeltsin's advisor Gennady Burbulis suggested following, and also the author of this report in his discussions with the US officials. There is also an overriding clause in the Guidelines: "it is understood the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the US Government" [18]. By invoking the specter of sanctions against Russia, the US was able to have its sovereign judgment adhered to by Russia as well.

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BEYOND DENIALS

Why did Indians agree to the abjuration of the contract and still agree to collaborate with the Russians? The obvious reason is that Indians didn't want to delay their launching GSLV from Indian soil, and anyway the original plan was to launch a few rockets with cryogenic stages imported from Russia. The denial of technology would only delay the subsequent launches. In the 1990s, INSAT had become the workhorse of Indian broadcasting and communications systems, especially for remote locations, and ISRO didn't want to disrupt this relationship. There was also an underlying confidence that in a few years, Indian engineers would take up the challenge and develop an indigenous cryogenic motor. It was also suggested that the central government didn't want to strain its relationship with Russia because of its dependence on spare part imports for defense from that country. There were also ongoing discussions with Russia for the import of Sukhoi fighters and T-90 battle tanks for Indian defense, and the political leadership wanted to place no obstacle in building its relationship with the new Russia. Indian trade with Russia and its past political closeness with the Soviet Union were considered too important to be abandoned because of a contract failure. Surprisingly, the political sentiment, as could be gleaned from Indian parliamentary proceedings, suggested that parliamentarians were angrier with Americans than with Russians whom they saw as another injured party in the whole episode [31]. Indians were accustomed to the Soviet Union occasionally delaying supplies of critical items and of denying the very existence of systems or hardware in their repertoire. But these tactics were seen by Indians as excuses to increase the already negotiated price or as due to scarcity of supplies in the Soviet Union itself [32]. Indians therefore saw this abrogation as more due to external circumstances than due to some new laws enacted by the Russians.

Indians had experienced such cancellations before. After the Pokhan nuclear device tests in 1974, the US cancelled the supply of fuel elements to the Tarapur Nuclear Power Station. Only with great difficulty was India able to get the fuel from the French-of course after Americans approved that sale. This reactor still runs on imported fuel as Americans would not allow the Indian mixed oxide elements to fuel that reactor. Canada abruptly cancelled all its nuclear agreements with India after the Pokhran nuclear test leaving Indians to complete the half-built Rajasthan reactors. The French promised to fuel India's fast breeder test reactor, but when the time came, quoted such an unreasonable price that Indians decided to fuel the reactor with their own composition. The US canceled the export of tracking radars for the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization at the last minute, after India obtained the necessary export clearances. Even after all such cancellations that appeared crippling and insurmountable at first sight, India has managed to complete the projects and has grown technologically stronger. On a philosophical plane, Indians realize that they alone should be responsible for their destiny and refuse to carry the baggage of bitterness that sanctions could provoke. The Mantra of self-reliance and self-sufficiency runs deeply into the Indian soul, more specially since the days of Freedom struggle. Any new sanction or an embargo is seen as yet another challenge that one must overcome to reach the cherished goal of self-sufficiency. This may perhaps explain why in spite of technology denials and sanctions, Indians hold no ill-will towards the West. Indians view such denials as remnants of the earlier colonial rule where the Western masters alone determined the rewards and retributions for the colonies. The occupation of India was an unacceptable imposition that inflicted great suffering on the people and damage to the country and Indians fought to remove it from their soil. They view the technology denials in a similar light and believe that this fight against technology controls should on a different plane: support for higher education and research, building technological and industrial infrastructure and developing the scientific temper that accepts the virtue of knowledge acquisition and also the risks involved in innovation pursuits. Colonial rule and technology denials have penalized India by delaying the realization of its rightful aspirations. But these delays become minuscule when viewed against the backdrop of India's long history.

In a recent article, Senator Jesse Helms, quoting the Founding Fathers of the Revolution argued that without sanctions, the US would be virtually powerless to influence events absent war [33]. If this were the expectation of the MTCR countries while denying the cryogenic technology to India, they are in for some disappointment. For, India has recently tested its own indigenous cryogenic engine in March 2002, and the results are reported to be satisfactory [34].

AFTERWARD

India launched its maiden GSLV development flight on April 18, 2001. This was the first flight that had the imported Russian engine as its third stage. The flight was successful and a satellite was injected in a geosynchronous orbit. The cryogenic motor added 5.2 km/s velocity in taking the spacecraft to GTO. Because of a shortfall in mission velocity, the satellite propulsion had to operate to place the satellite in the appropriate orbit [35]. Dr. Kiselev, Director of the Russian cryogenic stage while expressing great happiness over the Russian contribution to the program also pointed out the difficulties in integrating the Indian electronics with the Russian system [36]. After the launch, Dr. Alexander Dunayev, Chairman, Glavkosmos talked of the Russian willingness to sell more powerful cryogenic engine that develops a thrust of 10 tonnes to India. The Indian group also talked of the task of interfacing the technical complexities and integrating differing work cultures of the two countries [37].

The indigenous development of the cryogenic engine appears to be proceeding satisfactorily. On March 30th, India successfully tested its cryogenic engine for 12 minutes at its Mahendragiri test center. This was the fifth test, the second within the last two months and was reported to have developed thrust in the range of 7 tonnes. The Chairman of ISRO said that this engine would be used in later flights of GSLV.
Another interesting development is a recent launch of PSLV in September this year [38]. This vehicle placed a meteorological satellite, METSAT in a geo-synchronous transfer orbit. Weighing over a tonne, this satellite has over 500 kilograms of propellant to inject and maintain it in a geosynchronous orbit. ISRO has thus developed an option to launch geosynchronous satellites dedicated to single mission even without a cryogenic engine, thus freeing INSAT from having to meet different mission needs in a single satellite. This will also allow INSAT's communications capacity to increase, enabling its original mission of becoming the space bridge that would connect every village and all parts of India, a vision that the founder of the ISRO, Vikram Sarabhai dreamed and passionately preached.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

Considering the number of good English writers that India has produced, it is surprising that we don't have many writing on topics in science and technology of interest to India. For a source book on Indian nuclear program we may have to depend on George Perkovich's definitive tale ("India's Nuclear Bomb"), and about the Indian mathematical prodigy Ramanujan, please refer to Robert Kanigel's book on "The Man Who Knew Infinity". Fortunately, there is an excellent book on Indian space program ("Reach for The Stars: The evolution of India's Rocket Programme", Viking , Penguin Books of India Ltd. New Delhi) Written by Gopal Raj, a science correspondent of The Hindu, India's prestigious English daily, it traces the evolution of India's program from its beginnings and discusses its successes and shortcomings in great detail. There is also an excellent chapter devoted to the cryogenic engine ("The Saga of The Cryogenic Engine")

[1] Nuclear Supplier group (NSG), an informal and voluntary group of 34 nations established in 1978 to control the supply of materials and technologies that could lead to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Australia group was created in 1985 to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. This group is purely a voluntary one and has no enforcing authority. It merely monitors the flow of precursors for making chemical weapons and also equipment used for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Missile technology Control Regime (MTCR) is the only group that uses the term regime that is commonly used to describe a system of rule or authority. Contrary to its name, MTCR is also a voluntary body and carries only shared objectives.

[2] "Vikram Sarabhai: The Man and the Vision" Ed. Pranab Joshi, Mapin Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Ahmedabad ; also see the Biographical Sketches of Fellows of Indian National Science Academy (INSA).

[3] Shri. APJ Abdul Kalam, President of the Republic of India was one of the engineers sent on deputation to the USA. In his conversations with the author he spoke very highly of American's work ethic and their enthusiasm for and pursuance of advanced technologies.

[4] "Satellite Instructional television experiment"; Technical Report; ISRO-SAC-TR-06-77. Indian space Research Organisation, Bangalore (1977)

[5] "India's First satellite Launch Vehicle SLV-3", VSSC, Trivandrum; also see "Wings of Fire" An autobiography of Abdul Kalam with Arun Tiwari

[6] "Space-An Innovative Route to Development"; 4th JRD Tata Memorial Lecture; Dr.K. Kasturirangan, Chairman ISRO, (2001)

[7] USA refused the export license for a number of hardware items including Hot Isostatic Press, Vibration Platforms and technologies for making carbon-carbon composites

[8] Cryogenic engines are not a must for launching geosynchronous satellites. Many initial versions of Thar, Delta, Titan, and proton rockets from USSR didn't use cryogenic engine. Recently Indian PSLV launched a meteorological satellite to geosynchronous orbit without using cryogenic motors. But the payload was small. The specific impulse of cryogenic engine is far superior to the other proven rocket motors (4514, as against 2750 Ns/kg)

[9] In the 1960's and 70's, it was difficult to build large groups of qualified engineers in India in a short time. Indian Atomic Energy overcame this problem in an innovative way by establishing a training school where bright graduates in science and engineering were trained in nuclear technology. ISRO doesn't run a similar program. Cryogenics is also a field that has been neglected for many years by Indian universities and research laboratories. Liquid helium, for instance, was, and is continuing to be a rare commodity in Indian laboratories.

[10] "Cryogenic System Studies, An ISRO Report to Chairman ISRO (December 1983) cited in "Reach for the Stars"

[11] RL 10 engine was the first cryogenic engine to fly in space. It has powered Titan, Centaur and Atlas II rockets. With a thrust around 24,750 pounds and multiple restart options, it has become a workhorse. A mock-up of RL 10 is in the aerospace museum of Smithsonian Institution.

[12] UR Rao, conversation with Indian Press correspondents in Moscow, as reported by PTI (July 11, 1993)

[13] USSR had launched the following Indian satellites:
Aryabhatta scientific studies 1975
Bhaskara I Earth scanning 1979
Bhaskara II Remote sensing 1981
IRS-1A Remote sensing 1988
IRS-1B Remote sensing 1991
IRS-1C Remote sensing 1995

[14] Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and ISRO do not even share the same range facilities. DRDO uses Balasore Test Range in the State of Orissa (21.5degrees N and 22.92 degrees .E). ISRO uses the SHAR Range

[15]. Mishra Dhatu Nigam, India's Special Alloys Plant at Hyderabad became in the mid 1980's, the world's largest producer of maraging steel, at least for some years. The alloys had excellent mechanical properties and the Indian designed heat-treatments enabled the materials to exhibit good fracture resistance as well. The author in his meetings with the US Defense Secretary, pointed out this disconnect: of US refusing to sell maraging steel to a country that was actually the largest producer that year!

[16]. Indian Embassy in Washington DC in all its press briefings in 1992 and early 1993 spoke of GSLV not attracting MTCR embargoes because of the GSLV's mission of launching INSAT. They were more concerned about Defense Organization's missile programs attracting stringent sanctions from the member countries of MTCR.

[17] This problem actually surfaced in the first launching of GSLV with Russian cryogenic engine in April, 2001. As the velocity for injection was less by 60m/s, the satellite propulsion had to be used to place the satellite in GTO.

[18] http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trty/5073.htm

[19] The author was present in an informal meeting of cabinet ministers called by the then Prime Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao. During discussions, it became clear that not one member of the cabinet was familiar with the new Russian ministers who came to power then. They were learning about the new faces in the Russian political scene from the American media. Only Prime Minister Rao had seen President Yeltsin earlier when he was the Mayor of Moscow.

[20] Boris Yeltsin on the eve of his departure to India, January, 26, 1992, quoted in BBC Summary of World Broadcast, Jan 29, 1993.

[21] John R. Harvey, "Application of verification to dual-use technology: Export control and related issues", pp173 in Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold war Era, National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1994

[22] Richard Boucher, State Department Press Briefing, April, 1992

[23] After India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the US stopped supplying enriched uranium fuel to GE supplied Tarapur nuclear reactor. India had to depend on other countries for fuel supplies. As Indian designed reactors use natural uranium oxide fuel, it was difficult to find indigenous replacement for this reactor. US also insisted that India should not try loading that reactor with mixed oxide fuel elements that India was ready to try.

[24] Yuriy Koptev, as cited in a report by Press Trust of India, 5th August 1993.

[25] Sergei Yasterzhembsky hints this as much in a report by ITAR-TASS, June 29, 1993.

[26] UR Rao, as cited in a Press Trust of India Report from Moscow, 11th July, 1993.

[27] All India Radio English Report, July 4, 1993

[28] Quoted by Gopal Raj in "Reach for the Stars", p245, Viking, Penguin, India 2000

[29]. P. Narasimha Rao, public address, Gorakhpur, UP, 19th July, 1993

[30] Press Trust of India report of the US State Department, Statement, July, 16, 1993

[31]. Parliamentary Proceedings during the months of July, August and September, 1993 cite a number of questions from members to the Government criticizing it for its failure to avert the cancellation of contract, and blaming the US Government. There were no criticisms of Russia to speak of.

[32] For instance, USSR during 1975 delayed supplying aircraft brake pads, a critical spare part for the MIG fighters and India had to quickly develop that part indigenously and manufacture it. The Soviets also denied the existence of MIG 29 or SU 27 fighters for many months when India was looking at options for its Air Force. Only when Indian Defense Minister Venkataraman pointedly asked the Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov on the existence of these aircraft, did Indians come to know of their existence, performance and availability for purchase.

[33] Jesse Helms, "What Sanctions Epidemic", Foreign Affairs, pp2-8, Jan/Feb, 1999

[34] Press Trust of India Report, March 30, 2002

[35] R.V. Perumal et.al. "First Developmental flight of Geosynchronous satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV-D1"), Current Science, 25th July, 2001

[36] L.N. Kiselev, Interview in Frontline, Vol18, No.9, April-May, 2001

[37] ISRO, Press release, 12th September, 2002

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