Dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction by Andrew J. Goodpaster

Dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Framing a Strategy

By General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret)

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and most recently the attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and in Morocco were carried out with conventional arms and explosives. Should such attacks ever in the future be conducted with weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical, nuclear - the results would be incomparably more devastating than anything we have seen. The dangers and challenges they pose call even now for the utmost of skill and commitment to counter them, with a rigorous assessment in depth and detail of the risks and threats they embody, and clear strategic policies, programs and actions to deal with them. The issues and implications are so profound and far reaching that searching examination and debate are imperative. Yet there are some key steps we can take in framing that discussion.

We should recognize the differences in the types of weapons, especially their destructiveness, ease of manufacture, and use. It will be especially useful to separate chemical and biological weapons from nuclear ones, i.e. to "disaggregate" what we bundle together as weapons of mass destruction. For example, although chemical and biological weapons would be horrific in their effects, nuclear ones are by orders of magnitude of catastrophically greater destructive power. To produce nuclear weapons is a difficult and large-scale undertaking, in which the essential special-purpose infrastructure for producing them is hard, if not impossible, to fully conceal from inspection on the ground and overflight surveillance. The production of nuclear weapons material, even for a weapon of crude or primitive design, is the key requirement and makes any attempt to acquire such materials from outside sources a matter of high importance, and consequently of very high priority to detect and prevent. Even the radioactive materials that could be used to make a "dirty" bomb would be relatively difficult to hide.

In contrast, chemical and biological weapons are markedly easy to conceal, and to produce quickly and clandestinely. The production facilities needed, such as industrial and university labs, can be readily converted, and systems for their delivery can be quick adaptations of existing conventional means such as artillery shells, missiles, aircraft - or individual human beings. For these reasons, inspection programs targeting chemical and biological weapons face continuing difficulty, especially in tracking down evidence of limited, carefully hidden production and storage, though a vigorous inspection and surveillance effort can give some assurance against covert creation of a capability of militarily meaningful scale. While biological weapons materials, if not available, would not take long to produce, "weaponizing" and providing delivery means could take longer and be more visible to inspection. Even so, the U.S. experience in Iraq shows how controversial and uncertain can be the evidence, or lack of evidence, of the development and possession of chemical and biological weapons. Sure evidence comes only with the actual use or demonstration by the rogue nation or by terrorist surrogates to whom it furnishes them.

Finally, we should recognize the utility, or ease of use, of the various weapons also varies. Nuclear weapons, either "traditional" explosive types, or radiological "dirty" bombs (essentially a modified conventional bomb), require special handling and protective measures. A nuclear bomb, however, is not as vulnerable to wind, weather, and other environmental problems as are its biological or chemical counterparts when it is employed.

To deal with this diversity of risks, present and future, a comprehensive and coherent basic strategy is required, to be adapted according to the particular cases. It should include:

• A high and sustained priority intelligence effort making use of all practicable forms of collection and analysis, at home and abroad, targeted against all categories of weapons of mass destruction in hostile hands. The effort must form an explicitly recognized major part of total U.S. intelligence efforts, and should include close, cooperative activities with foreign nations.
  
• Active diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral, to impede and constrain the development and possession of weapons of mass destruction, focusing in particular on states hostile to the U.S. and/or supportive or tolerant of stateless terrorist groups. Such diplomatic efforts should be reinforced by deterrence in strength, U.S. and collective, against any actual use of such weapons against us or our friends and allies, backed by protective measures, and military forces for defense and for overwhelming response against any attacker.
  
• With respect to the threats of hostile biological and chemical weapons and the means of their delivery, primary reliance must be placed on the foregoing measures against actual attacks. At the same time, recognizing the challenges presented to inspection and monitoring by hostile concealment of weapons development, clandestine production and possession, and hidden provision of such weapons by hostile states to terrorist stateless groups, such action by such states and groups must be a prime target of intensive, comprehensive intelligence effort.
  
• Against the threats, actual and potential, of nuclear weapons in hostile hands, further action additional to the protective and defensive measures just described must be taken. Vigorous, comprehensive counter-proliferation effort should be conducted at high priority, and our deterrent measures should be explicitly and overtly extended to include the deterrence provided by our nuclear capability, backed by visible readiness to take quick and powerful military action if required. It should include a ready capability to take preemptive action, if so directed, against hostile nuclear attack or threatened attack deemed credible and imminent.

Under this strategy, military action - in contrast to the intervention in Iraq - would be reserved to respond to three principal challenges: an actual attack with any of these weapons, an obstruction of sustained intelligence and inspection, and/or an unacceptable ambiguity regarding attempted hostile development of nuclear weapons.

With the possibility of military action focused in this way as a necessary last resort, the U.S. would create a strong strategic basis for developing, bringing to readiness, and if necessary carrying into action, the capability to eradicate all elements of a hostile weapons of mass destruction production complex. It would also provide a well-understood basis for cooperative international policy and action, consistent with our wider national interests: assuring and maintaining positive relationships with the other major nations of the world, Russia and China in particular, rebuilding NATO cohesion and improving our ties with the whole membership of the United Nations.

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