NATO Transformation by Andrew J. Goodpaster
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NATO TRANSFORMATION:
Pillars from the Past for Building the Future*
By Andrew J. Goodpaster (Oct. 7, 2003)
The substantially changed world security environment of the 21st century demands comparably substantial changes within NATO. They amount to a full scale transformation to re align the Alliance to meet the new, more uncertain challenges. This transformation, however, is compounded by the lack of common purpose among member nations and deep fractures within NATO. Nevertheless, the continuing value of NATO is incontestable and I trust that sufficient common interests will be found for the members and partners to go forward with the transformation required to reshape the Alliance so that it may act in concert against the new risks and dangers.
In approaching the task of transformation I believe there are some useful parallels with the task of building NATO in its earliest years, particularly the principles that guided the original effort. The specific circumstances of the two eras are, of course, drastically different. The main challenge then was far more clear and definite: the menace posed by the hostile expansionist communism of the Soviet Union. Now the threats are far more diversified and uncertain, though no less real and demanding.
Catalyst for Change
The original process of building NATO was given an unexpected sense of urgency by North Korea's invasion of the South. Many in the Alliance believed that this signaled the first move of outright aggression instigated by Moscow. The sudden shockwave that reverberated through Europe was magnified by a series of battlefield disasters suffered by U.S. and South Korean forces in the chaotic first months of combat. In Europe, one of the early consequences of the war was to draw the United States more closely into the defense of Europe. This involved creating the post of Supreme Allied Commander to form and lead a collective force to defend Western Europe. Also, the United States pressed for the creation of a West German military force as part of the alliance.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a similar catalyst for transforming NATO after the end of the Cold War. The Alliance, lacking a common unifying threat like the Warsaw Pact, had been hollowed out by sharply reduced defense budgets and a growing gap in the military capabilities of member nations that threatened the ability of NATO forces to fight together. But the day after September 11th, 2001, NATO enacted Article 5- An attack on one member, is an attack on all- for the first time in its history. Indeed, the headlines of a leading French newspaper reportedly proclaimed that, "We are all Americans." Unfortunately much of that unity and sense of urgency has been lost because of the controversy over the war in Iraq. However, the security agenda for the Alliance is no longer a matter of debate. It is focused on international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
Purposes
While there is consensus that terrorism is a major security problem, there are important differences regarding appropriate roles for NATO in dealing with the problem. The discrepancy revolves around whether terrorism is considered more of a law enforcement and intelligence problem than one for which traditional military forces are needed and the resource allocations that flow from these differing views. This dilemma reopens a healthy debate about the purposes of NATO.
General Eisenhower in his First Annual Report of SACEUR noted that NATO was well on the way to establishing "an expanding spiral of strength and confidence." It seems to me that NATO transformation is still about expanding the international security sphere. Recently, such efforts have included the addition of new members, further cooperation with partnership countries and establishing new security dialogues.
The success of NATO ultimately is measured by how secure people feel. Eisenhower accepted the post of SACEUR in December 1950 and by April 1951, General Order No. One1 officially declared the command operational. The change of mood in Europe after the first year was palpable. Despite continuing shortfalls and nagging issues of many kinds, including nuclear weapons, General Eisenhower inspired confidence in the ability of the Alliance to bring security to places where it was badly needed.
One aspect of the more recent debate over the purposes of NATO is more encouraging. That is the "out of area" debate which has by now been definitively resolved; NATO is no longer conceived of as narrowly concerned solely with the territorial defense of its members. NATO is about promoting the collective security interests of its members wherever and whenever the North Atlantic Council agrees they should act.
Principles
Several principles, guided the early SHAPE efforts and remained valid some 1S years later when I assumed the post of SACEUR. I believe they `remain valid today, although their applications will no doubt vary for the process of transforming future NATO forces. I will briefly outline these principles- deterrence, defense, solidarity, détente and equity- and how they may relate to the current process of transformation.
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Deterrence was the primary objective for NATO - deterrence not only of war but also of threats of war and of pressures aimed at forcing concessions contrary to the peace and security of member nations and to the liberties and well being of their citizens. The central idea was to make it clear to any and all that the costs and risks of conflict would outweigh any likely gain for which an aggressor might hope. Deterrence requires capabilities both to punish potential adversaries as well as to provide protective and defensive measures to deny or greatly limit the destruction they might be seeking to inflict. Its credibility rests upon the combination of political will and the capability to act decisively. Today, there seems little temptation for others - major nations or lesser nations - to revert to the policies of threat and force that shaped the Cold War, though there are exceptions such as North Korea. NATO must avoid becoming overly oriented on a single type of threat, such as terrorism. Deterrence now means denying terrorists easy access to critical infrastructure as well as doing what we can to restrain and dissuade additional nations, particularly rogue states, from proliferating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Moreover, it means posing a credible threat of action against the threat of genocide and other forms of violence against civilian populations. Deterrence is certain to hold a continuing major role in the shaping of security strategy of the Alliance. |
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Defense - involving a respectable posture of defensive military strength - provided an essential underpinning for deterrence from NATO's earliest times. If deterrence failed, we were prepared to defend. Then, and even more so now, it was not possible to defend everywhere against every threat. The challenge then as now is to marshal available resources in a manner that provides a sound basis for confidence that, if conflict should occur, aggression will ultimately be defeated. The concept of defense today retains its former meaning but has a larger scope, including offensive military actions, even acting preemptively if so directed to eliminate the danger. The possibility of preemption, or preventive action, is a source of contention within NATO. Given the requirement for unanimous decision making and the increasing size of the Alliance, it will be difficult to build the necessary political will to act before a major act of aggression has been committed. Yet, regrettably, there is a tendency to respond to egregious acts of inhumanity only after they have crossed some intolerable threshold of violence. It will take the kind of wise, forward-looking statesmanship that gave us NATO in the first place to guide us through these new challenges. Nuclear weapons played a prominent role in early NATO strategy and planning. Today the problem has been characterized as "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)." I believe that this has not been helpful either for the United States or for NATO planning. WMD should be disaggregated because- they nuclear, chemical and biological weapons- constitute quite different threats and demand different responses. By lumping these concerns together, we have greatly confused and complicated the important process of establishing priorities. For example, people can characterize a pharmaceutical laboratory in Cuba in the same league with thousands of tactical nuclear warheads in Russia. Clearly, these pose far different dangers and raise the possibility of inappropriate manipulation of threat perceptions. |
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Solidarity soon came to be recognized as essential to the Alliance's success. It was expressed in tangible, visible form in the collective force in being. Through that solidarity, the nations were not isolated and exposed to foreign threats and pressures, nor would they waste their strength in inter country conflicts of the kind that had left them weak and devastated in the past. Eisenhower often spoke of this, declaring that the NATO nations working together could accomplish a result that, if they acted separately, would be beyond the reach of any or of all. Solidarity has unfortunately weakened in the absence of the single focused massive threat of the Cold War. Furthermore, the recent U.S. preference for unilateral action has further undermined the prospects for Alliance solidarity. I fear this will prove short sighted as we become increasingly aware of the broad needs for international support in the war on terrorism. Solidarity still lies at the heart of NATO's strength. Failures must be overcome by more consultative efforts to define future tasks. These efforts place a high priority on working with the Partnership for Peace countries and especially Russia to provide the wider circle of deliberation envisaged in the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 4. |
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Détente from the outset was part of the Alliance's aim - seeking regime change from within. To do this required efforts to reduce the dangerous military confrontation and to lower the levels of tension between the Soviet Union and the West. My approach at NATO was to emphasize reduction in the causes of tension the combination of Soviet expansionist and adversarial policies with a massive military force that far exceeded any needs of defense on their part. NATO's lengthy .efforts at mutual and balanced force reduction, along with a "war of ideas" that fostered openness (Gorbachev's "glasnost") eventually bore fruit and the Berlin Wall came down. The obvious analogue today is to "wage peace" (again in the words of Eisenhower), using NATO's considerable "soft power" as a positive inducement to change threatening behavior. An important part of Alliance transformation should include work to avert violence and ameliorate the causes of conflict by peaceful means, making full use of the many arts and instruments available from its members and partners as well as more coordinated efforts with the UN, EU, OSCE and other organizations. |
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Finally, equity was sought, meaning a fair sharing of the risks, burdens and benefits that the overall NATO undertaking involved. We soon learned that the peace and security that formed NATO's central common purpose fell in the category of a "public good", for which no simple allocation or formula could be written. Rather, the sharing formed a major part of the deliberation process that became the hallmark of the NATO commitment. The Secretary General plays a key role in determining how NATO burden's should be shared equitably. But the strategic commanders also are important in this regard. General Eisenhower, before accepting the post of SACEUR, insisted on access to national military and defense leaders, prime ministers and chiefs of state. This access proved to be essential in developing a sense of equitable sharing, while overcoming the many obstacles interposed by differing national and NATO bureaucracies. The North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session also provides a top level forum for deliberation of equity issues. Burden sharing and risk sharing will undoubtedly be continuing sources of argument and tension within the Alliance, particularly when the difficulties of achieving consensus loom so large. Inevitably, finger pointing weakens cohesion, but to be realistic we must recognize that it is probably inherent in the functioning of alliances. Responsible and accountable national political leaders must decide "Who pays how much and for what purposes." We learned early in this process that it is not useful to cast blame. |
Priorities
Determining priorities is an important part of the transformation process. It is not possible for the Alliance to defend all of the security interests of all of the members and partners, so priorities need to be established. Typically at the national level, this involves developing a set of categories of interests, such as those that are vital to preserve the freedom and well being of citizens; extremely important interests that, if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil freedom and well being; and important interests that would have major negative consequences if not safeguarded.2
In developing priorities for the many threats today for which NATO might be called upon, the vital category holds the greatest potential for causing serious harm to the NATO countries. Direct attacks on NATO members and their armed forces, such as the 9/11 strikes on the United States, must be a top priority. This category should also include the possibility, even if presently unlikely, of renewed major power confrontation. This suggests the need to accord a high level of importance to the relationships among NATO Allies, with Russia, and with China. Nuclear weapons in particular continue to pose a major threat to this category of vital interests, suggesting the need for efforts to prevent their proliferation and rein in existing inventories.
Extremely important interests involve widespread threats to regional and world order, including many related to terrorism. Failed and failing constitute such threats. Conditions of civil strife, instability and breakdown of law and order, and spreading violence in troubled areas can endanger long term regional security and well being. It is difficult to gain public recognition that these problems are serious and steps must be taken to deal with them in a timely manner to head off a crisis which would likely later entail much greater costs and more serious impacts on high priority interests and values. There is considerable room for improvement in dealing with such problems.
Important interests can be threatened by regimes that deny human rights on a widespread basis. Such severely troubled countries are often marked by civil disorder, genocide or flagrant crimes against humanity. They have occasioned further important instances of military intervention, sometimes of limited scope, in U.S. or multinational (often UN) actions. They may require the commitment of troops for peace enforcement or peace keeping to bring stability to the situation. NATO has gained some valuable experience along these lines in the Balkans. Furthermore, if such operations are undertaken as an Alliance, they have much better prospects for being politically sustainable for the longer term usually required than if undertaken on by individual countries.
The Transformation Perspective
Each NATO member and partner may see priorities differently. It is therefore critical to have an ongoing dialogue to develop consensus on threats, priorities and appropriate responses. This suggests that the transformation process in perspective somewhere between the continuing challenges and collective responses. The challenges will require NATO to build and sustain political will, develop appropriate policies and direct military actions to safeguard peace and expand security- not just to the member nations- but to their global interests. Just what NATO's responses should be to the challenges is unclear, although many of the essential elements are surely in place. What is of key importance is our collective wealth of experience and wisdom, on which to build NATO's future can confidently be built.
1Editor's note: General Goodpaster, serving on Eisenhower's staff, was the author of NATO General Order #1 and many other key SHAPE staff actions.
2 These categories are based on the report America's National Interest by the Commission on America's National Interests, July, 1996.
* For the The Atlantic Council of the United States