Counter-Terrorism and U.S. Security by Andrew J. Goodpaster

Counter-Terrorism and U.S. Security -
Shaping a Strategy for the Future

By Andrew J. Goodpaster (July 9, 2002)

(General, US Army Ret.)

To guide and govern U.S. Counter-terrorism beyond al Qaeda and bin Laden, our country will need a long-term, comprehensive, action-oriented basic strategy, closely keyed to the future terrorist threats and dangers that we must anticipate, confront and overcome.

Foreword by Susan Eisenhower

Success in our country's pursuit of counter-terrorism can only come with the patient understanding and sustained support of the American public. This is a need and a mission the Eisenhower Institute - a living memorial to our 34th president - is dedicated to serving.

As a contribution to such understanding and support, General Andrew Goodpaster, a senior fellow of the Institute, has drawn upon long experience in matters of American security to outline essential elements of a strategic framework that can guide and govern U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. The principal implementing steps (and the issues that will have to be resolved and overcome) to make it effective are also described.

When the September 11th terrorist attacks occurred, General Goodpaster in an earlier Institute "Occasional Paper" grouped the responses immediately needed into three principal, interrelated "Action Fronts": actions on the homefront; those abroad involving our cooperation with friends and allies; and those directly attacking against the terrorist network and its supporters. With Al Qaeda and the Taliban now defeated and almost wholly destroyed, there is need, in his terms, for an enduring future strategy long-term, comprehensive, action-oriented, that will not only respond with quick and overwhelming power to whatever future attacks may occur but also to the fullest extent possible, anticipate, head off and prevent - preempt - such attacks.

With a careful look at the place and priority of future terrorist threats and dangers in the world's emerging overall security environment, his proposal builds on the three "Action Fronts" created after September 11th by bringing to bear the coordinated resources of diplomacy, deterrence and defense to achieve a security posture responsive to future needs.

I. Strategic Framework: Action Fronts; Action Agencies; Action Instruments

Action Fronts. For such a strategy we can look first to the three "Action Fronts" of the quick and decisive response to the 9/11 attacks -

• At home, by immediately tightening security and speeding recovery operations;
• With friends and allies, by swiftly building foreign cooperation, commitment and support; and
• Against the terrorist network and its supporters, by direct, overwhelming attack, defeat and destruction.

These three "fronts" can form the basic framework for the future. They need to be built upon - extended, adapted, and augmented - to put us in position to deal with whatever terrorist challenges the years ahead may bring.

Action Agencies. The principal responsible "Action Agencies" will be the proposed new Department of Homeland Security, the Defense Department and the State Department, all serving at the operating level under the policy direction of the President, guided by the goals and processes of the approved basic strategy.

Action Instruments. For the work that needs to be done, the overall strategy can draw upon a "composite" of three time-tested security Action Instruments - in shorthand, diplomatic action, deterrence and defense.

• Diplomatic action, geared to counter-terrorism needs, includes intensive and sustained foreign policy activities, multilateral and bilateral, aimed at building foreign cooperation, participation and support, and engaging the whole body of international institutions, agreements and responsibilities in which we are a major, active participant.
• Deterrence will be provided primarily by our unmistakable capability and demonstrated will to use our military forces quickly and decisively in case of necessity. It rests upon the ability to inflict massive immediate punishment on any attacker or threatener, to deny to any attacker the gains he might be seeking, to limit and mitigate the damage he could inflict, and to protect our people and our territory.
• Defense, understood in its most fully inclusive sense, which includes the whole complex of civilian and military actions and capabilities by which to head off possible future attacks, protect our people, their way of life and infrastructure from such attacks, take prior action to reduce our key vulnerabilities and mitigate the effects of attacks, and recover from them should they nevertheless occur. This "defense" should envisage action against the terrorists from their cradle to their grave. Militarily, it centers on our "general purpose" military forces and their capabilities for offensive and defensive action when called upon.

Schematically, the strategic framework may be portrayed as follows:

Success will be measured by the extent to which the "Action Instruments" are effectively applied to the respective "Action Fronts" by the respective "Action Agencies" in coordination - and the extent to which, in doing so, the many difficult obstacles and resistances sure to be encountered are resolved and overcome in the overriding interest and goal of strengthening our security against the new threats and dangers that we now and in the future confront.

The basic requirements of a viable and understandable guiding strategy - what to do, how to do it and what to do it with - will thereby be well fulfilled: the "what" by the central goal of security and protection; the "how" by sustained action on the three fronts; and the "what with" by the employment of the three action instruments in the operations of the Departments of State, Defense and (proposed) Homeland Security.

The following sections present key highlights involved in the implementation of this strategic framework.

II. Implementing the Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Homeland Security
Coalition/Institutionalized Cooperation
Direct Action against Terrorist Organizations

Homeland Security: Counter-Terrorism's First "Action Front"

Primary reliance is placed on Defense, the third security action instrument, including first of all the operations of civilian agencies, the bulk of them now proposed by President Bush to be gathered together as the new Department of Homeland Security, as well as the activities of military forces within the Continental U.S. The Defense activities will have the support of Diplomacy, especially in achieving cooperation and commitment from other countries, and Deterrence, especially as the effort to head off terrorist activity in its earliest, formative stages.

What is needed for homeland defense seems reasonably clear in its main dimensions, as derived from the response to the al Qaeda attack, and a broad range of initial steps have in fact been undertaken, though we still stand well short of the level of security and protection of our people that must be our continuing goal. More specifically,

• The state of organization and preparations of government, at federal, stage and local levels, when weighed against the massive losses and damages that terrorists can inflict on our society and our people at large is still at a stage where much more must be done. The new organization proposed by the President provides a framework that takes a long stride along that path. His proposal remains, however, to be brought into being through legislation and then implemented in practice, surmounting and working through the many obstacles and resistances that are sure to be encountered.
• 
  The first key step forward on the side of civil organization and capabilities was taken through the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security in the office of the President. Because much doubt and debate persisted, however, as to whether sufficient power and authority - funding authority in particular - were vested in this organization and its leader - i.e., to give necessary direction to the large number of separate agencies (46 to as many as 100 according to various counts) charged with responsibilities in this area - the President's further action, to create the Department of Homeland Security, became an urgent necessity. By making this a Cabinet Department, with legislated powers and a head subject to Senate confirmation and responsive to congressional oversight, the strengthened coordination authority sufficient to the need may now prove possible. After establishment, implementation will take center-stage. Progress will be gauged by specific actions, such as the following:
• Creation of a forward-looking planning group with a comprehensive mandate, and a "Red Team" of challengers, uninhibited by past agency positions.
• High priority to information acquisition, fusion and timely dissemination - a crucial shortcoming in the past - to which recent initiatives announced by the FBI and CIA must respond and be evaluated as part of an urgent, thoroughgoing review and revamping as necessary of the total U.S. intelligence community.
• To this end, workable methods for prompt provision of intelligence of the highest possible quality, together with timely operational warning.
• At the same time (as in the military) processes to guard against overload from the mass of less essential information, and to protect truly vital sources and methods.
• A new primary focus on the protection of our citizenry as against the traditional prosecutorial role and urge to secrecy. Even so, evidence of resistance and inertia to change of this kind tells us that the process will not be quick or easy.
• At this time of rising bio-terror concern, support of state and local public health infrastructure and the establishment of systems of disease alert, along with improvements in international disease surveillance.
• An intensive program of financial tracking and blocking, domestic and international, aimed at drying up the flow of financial resources on which the creation and continued operation of terrorist networks depend. In these areas (and others) the counter-terrorism action must equal or exceed the scope of activity of the terrorists themselves.
• Control of our borders, both as to individuals and to materiel coming into our country, perhaps the most difficult task to confront and resolve.
• Recognizing and then acting on activities (such as flight training and operating within our flight control system) that could be preparation to act against us. It is a daunting task, inherently difficult; traditional procedures are ill-suited to the new security needs; and we are far from having adequate safeguards.

The challenges are clear: We have by now seen how demanding in political skill and judgment will be the work of balancing security protective measures against constraints on individual freedoms, as expressed most notably in judicial processes, especially the legally required handling of evidence. The tasks of realigning and integrating the agencies of government, emphasizing and strengthening their protective role and responsibility, and bringing them to anything like the enduring levels of effectiveness needed, involve strongly conflicting interests and contradictions that have only been glimpsed to date.

On the military side, new organizational structures are being devised and proposed. Forming these structures, and bringing them to operational effectiveness, establishing the terms and limits of their authorities and responsibilities (with attention to the provisions of the "Posse Comitatus Act" in particular) will be tasks of major scope, sensitivity and complexity essential to our future strategy. The judicial processes to be applied to terrorist criminals are but a single unresolved dilemma.

Coalition/Institutionalized Cooperation: Counter-Terrorism's Second "Action Front"

Here the basic task falls to Diplomacy, with the State Department shouldering the major responsibility and leading operational role, acting to build and sustain the necessary structure of cooperation with other countries to support and join in the whole range of efforts that U.S. counter-terrorism will require and undertake. Our diplomatic efforts should be keyed to the goals and responsibilities of Deterrence and of Defense operations mounted against actual attack, both in protecting the homeland and in defeating and destroying the terrorist network of the attackers.

• A shared, agreed assessment is needed of the menace of terrorism and of strategies for countering it. It will provide a common foundation for international policy and action in support of such collective endeavor. The provision of intelligence from foreign sources, for example, on terrorist organization, activities and infrastructure will be of constant value for our homeland security. Likewise, concerted action will be needed to identify, apprehend and neutralize terrorists located on their national territories as a major contribution toward nipping in the bud the threats the terrorists pose.
• Full and active participation in WMD nonproliferation activity - now lacking or desultory on the part of many countries - will serve to reduce the threat of terrorist-caused mass casualties and massive destruction of critical infrastructure.
• Coordinated action to deny and obstruct economic and financial support to terrorist groups, to break up their communications processes and halt their use of schools to foment hostility and violence toward the West, especially in the Arab countries, should be sustained diplomatic goals, widely shared and intensively pursued.
• The grant of access, use of bases and passage rights will be vital to swift and decisive success where military action is undertaken. And the sight of nations joining in collective military action to defeat and destroy the terrorist groups will demonstrate solidarity and reinforce American support.

A whole second area of diplomatic effort will likewise be of the highest order of importance - public diplomacy to tell America's story and to counter false foreign propaganda. It will provide crucial help to "demotivate" the publics the terrorists now draw upon to mobilize against us. This has been a grievous neglect on our part over many recent years, while al Qaeda was being organized and trained against us, to which countervailing effort is only now being undertaken. There is far from consensus and common understanding in this regard as to how far the animus of al Qaeda toward the West - and toward the United States in particular - is authentically grounded in the essence of Islam and in demands it really imposes on its members, how far it is actually centered solely in Arab nations (and not all of them), and how far it reflects other "drives," such as simply a reach for personal power in the Arab world, as in the case of Saddam Hussein. In shaping and implementing long-term strategy it will be vitally important to establish, as its basic premise, the fullest and deepest possible understanding of this range of issues.

Direct Action against Terrorist Organizations: Counter-Terrorism's Third "Action Front"

Heading off attacks before they occur, through bringing powerful Deterrent pressures to bear on the terrorist leadership is by far the preferred avenue to U.S. security against the dangers of terrorism. While recognizing that the terrorist leaders may be guided by values and rationales far different from our own, there are important messages we can send that will exert pressures in that direction.

• The first is to leave no doubt that an attack will be met with quick and overwhelming force, sufficient to defeat and destroy the attacker's organization as well as its supporting activities and infrastructure. Demonstrating such a will to respond should be coupled with evidence of firm resolve to sustain the effort and complete the task.
• The second is a demonstrated ability to defend against the attack, protect against its effects, quickly recover, and thereby show that the attack will be unavailing, completely or in large part, while the costs to the attacker will be severe if not wholly destructive. In short, the demonstrated ability and determination of the U.S. to punish and destroy any attacker, as well as to thwart his intended terrorist damage and destruction, can be an important means of sparing our people from terrorist assault.
• Defense against actual attack, if and when it should nevertheless occur, must be broadly provided. It includes direct attack on the terrorist perpetrators' capabilities in all their dimensions, as well as our direct homeland defense against any and all attackers, protection of our citizens to the maximum extent practicable, and recovery operations.
• Our strategy must include a capability constantly maintained at the ready, to swiftly defeat and destroy the enemy force if the U.S. or its allies should be attacked. The transformation of our military forces now underway, to include units designed with the flexibility to respond to the various forms that terrorist forces and activities might take, is an indispensable forward step.
• It must include operational planning, organization, doctrine, training and equipment, and intelligence, communications and logistics. Flexible patterns of operations both offensive and defensive will be required as an essential component of our military tactics and strategy. This has been well illustrated in the combined use of the power of U.S. air forces with the skills of U.S. special operations units and indigenous ground troops in the defeat and destruction of al Qaeda and Taliban in the military campaign in Afghanistan.
• A thoroughgoing assessment must be made of the vulnerabilities of key elements of the American economy, and of the feasible steps to reduce that vulnerability, and mitigate the impairment should they be attacked. The valuable contributions of America's powerful scientific and technological capabilities should be systematically brought to bear in this regard.

The vexing problems of organization, coordination and integration of effort for homeland security must be resolved in the interest of the overriding mission of providing protection to our people, to their activities and way of life, and to the infrastructure on which they depend.

Key Issues

Among the issues encountered in shaping and acting on future counter-terrorism strategy, several require particular attention at the highest levels of government decision, for their far-reaching importance combined with their special difficulties and complexity. They include, among a challenging list of others,

For Homeland Security:

• The building of an organizational structure of adequate strength and unity of effort.
• The urgent strengthening and reform of U.S. intelligence institutions.
• The establishment in legislation of Executive-Congressional relations appropriate under our Constitution, governing this structure and its operations as a major component of government.
• The working out of effective operational ties of federal, state and local authorities.
• The resolution of the role of the U.S. military in domestic counter-terrorism activities, with particular attention to the provisions contained in post Civil War "Posse Comitatus" legislation.

For International Cooperation:

• The formulation of national policy resolving the question of the extent of U.S. reliance on multinational processes in carrying out Counter-terrorism strategy, balancing unilateral activity with bilateral and multilateral efforts, including those of major institutional structures such as the UN, NATO and comparable treaty arrangements.

For Direct Action against actual and potential sources of terrorism

• The rebuilding of U.S. public diplomacy activities aimed at countering terrorist recruitment and support.
• The pursuit of efforts to alleviate, reduce and resolve issues creating adversarial postures and policies toward the United States.

The extent of success to be anticipated from the U.S. Counter-terrorism strategy will inevitably be dependent on the wisdom, skill and energy devoted to the resolution of these and comparable issues.

A Concluding Comment

As to the necessity for the actions delineated - and for others to go with them as problems are faced and acted upon - there can be little doubt. There can be high confidence that they will contribute in ways of great value to the state of security for our people.

It is the sufficiency of such measures of which we cannot be sure in advance. Perfect security is realistically not possible. The threats themselves will not be fixed or static. And many specific problems will involve intrusions and burdens beyond what we are accustomed to, in order to carry out such a strategy. Nevertheless the will and determination shown across the nation after September 11th, coupled with the "sinews of strength" embodied in our dynamic, free society, warrant confidence in our ability to meet whatever challenges may come.

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