U.S. Nuclear Posture by Andrew J. Goodpaster

U.S. Nuclear Posture: Time to Reshape and Realign

By Andrew J. Goodpaster (Spring 2001)

FOREWORD

The Eisenhower Institute, a living memorial to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, has a strong, enduring interest in issues of nuclear security and the shaping of America's nuclear future. Such is quite fitting: nuclear dangers, and the promises of "Atoms for Peace," his historic message of hope, stood high among the responsibilities and the aims to which he dedicated himself throughout his presidency.

General Andrew Goodpaster, the author of this paper, worked closely with him in these efforts, as well as in his own subsequent high military posts. In the years of his retirement he has continued with groundbreaking proposals aimed at tighter limits and further reins on nuclear arms, notably including major reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals in response to the opportunities to strengthen stable security and peace afforded by the end of the Cold War.

This has been - and in his view remains - a work in progress. Its development has been greatly aided by a distinguished group - civilian and military - of experienced individuals with deep understanding and insight on these matters in the context of U.S. security and international affairs, all of whom have been willing to read and comment on some of its earlier drafts. The text as it now appears is of course a matter for which he himself takes full responsibility, joined with the hope that through widening consideration and debate, early and continuing action will result to achieve strengthened assurance of nuclear peace.

Susan Eisenhower
President, The Eisenhower Institute

INTRODUCTION

This paper responds to a growing belief that the time is opportune for a renewed look at the means of assuring and advancing our nuclear security. It takes as the appropriate starting point an examination of just what security needs and purposes our country's nuclear weapons forces and nuclear weapons establishment should serve, acting as they do in conjunction with "associated measures" such as verification, non-proliferation and missile defense, all joined in nuclear security efforts as part of our overall framework of security strategies and policies in the world's "geopolitical" environment now and foreseen.

It considers, as a priority, our security needs and purposes with regard to relations with Russia, China and "rogue states," as well as the need for "hedging" against future uncertainties. It then proceeds to examine the essential tasks that will be involved in reshaping and realigning U.S. nuclear posture in accord with the needs and purposes thus redefined.

These tasks include resizing, reconfiguring and reorienting our nuclear forces, reshaping the nuclear establishment, safely dismantling and disposing of the weapons and warheads that will be rendered excess, and taking action on the "associated measures" that will serve in company to safeguard and strengthen our nuclear security. Finally, the paper reviews the tasks, challenges and issues that must be dealt with to bring us from where we are to where we ought to be.

What follows is an impressive list of action requirements for the U.S. Government. It involves, in addition to actions that the United States can take alone, many that involve interactions with other countries, Russia especially. None look to be infeasible. All require intensified, well-focused, sustained top-level leadership.

U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE: TIME TO RESHAPE AND REALIGN

The comprehensive U.S. nuclear posture review now underway with a December 2001 due-date offers an important new opportunity. It is time for a thoroughgoing fresh assessment of the security needs and purposes that our country's nuclear complex - nuclear forces and nuclear establishment - should serve in the years ahead. These needs and purposes are centered on the protection of America's security against nuclear danger from abroad in all its dimensions. Our nuclear capability is joined in that purpose with an expanding battery of associated measures, ranging from anti-proliferation efforts and safeguards against "loose nukes" to various levels of ballistic missile defense. And all this should be viewed in conjunction with our overall strategic policies regarding especially our alliances, as well as Russia and China.

The key outcome of the posture review can and should be a major reorienting, reshaping and resizing of the U.S. nuclear complex, aligned to the future, shifting away from the outdated elements of the Cold War nuclear legacy that still, to too great an extent, form the core of our nuclear capability. In assessing the security needs and purposes to be served in the future, those of primary importance pertain to Russia, to China, to possible proliferators ("rogue" states and terrorists) and to a prudent "hedge" against the possibility - however remote it may now appear to be - of a serious worsening, or even breakdown of the now relatively benign world security environment. These should shape our future nuclear posture and capability.

The Principal Needs and Purposes

Russia, with its still massive but aging nuclear arsenal, continues as the primary influence on the size, composition, posture and doctrine of our nuclear forces. President Putin's recently announced decision to reduce the Russian strategic nuclear weapons arsenal to a total of 1500 weapons, and perhaps much less, gives a timely lead to the United States to consider a comparable move. His decision, clearly addressed to his own country's nuclear needs and purposes - just as our own decisions should be addressed to ours and our allies' - shows that he senses (as he should) no threat of nuclear attack by the United States, just as we sense no nuclear threat to ourselves from Russia on the course it has clearly chosen. The overall security of both countries stands to gain by large-scale weapons reductions of the kind he intends to make. They will greatly lower the massive destructive nuclear potential that has long existed on both sides, constituting, in President Eisenhower's words, "the only thing that could destroy the United States of America" (and, as we may add, many other countries including Russia as well).

There are, however, lesser dangers that exist in the Russian nuclear establishment - as distinguished from threats of attack - which remain serious grounds for concern: the continuing potential for launch by accident, by miscalculation or without authorization, together with the constant possibility of theft or diversion of weapons or weapons-grade materials to possible nuclear proliferators. Dangers such as these have now risen to the fore, causing a shift of the U.S. needs and interests regarding the Russian nuclear stockpile - most notably to the weapons and materials that will be rendered excessive by President Putin's decision. The United States should continue its cooperation with Russia, working together to safeguard against "loose nukes" as a common goal. But by far the most important means of responding to our needs and purposes is to give added emphasis to building a firm foundation of productive relations with Russia as a means to strengthen mutual nuclear security.

China presents a different concern. Whether a positive future security relationship with China can and will in fact be achieved is by no means clear. The question is complicated, in particular, by the unresolved issues over the future of Taiwan. It is aggravated as well by the dispute over the U.S. limited National Missile Defense (NMD) program. As matters stand today, the relationship remains troubled by Chinese intimations of the possibility of a military clash. The recent provocative reference, for example, by a senior Chinese military officer to the possibility of a nuclear strike against Los Angeles cannot be summarily dismissed as rhetorical excess. A degree of uncertainty will endure for some time as to the future course of the relationship between our two countries, but at least no reversion to Cold War attitudes has occurred or is in sight. The U.S. nuclear arsenal simply by its existence serves to discourage any resort to force that could threaten to unleash a nuclear exchange. It should be seen as part of a wider effort, productive in nature, to lessen confrontational tendencies, even while we keep a watchful eye on possible Chinese moves to attain a full-scale offensive capability.

The so-called "rogue states" (Iraq and Iran, perhaps Libya and now less-certainly North Korea) plus transnational terrorist groups such as Osama bin Laden's must be recognized as potential nuclear proliferants inimical to the United States. These are the next source of concern, ranking in fact as the most likely active and compelling source of future nuclear threat or attack on us or our allies. The worldwide non-proliferation program, of which the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are major components, has as its primary aim the blocking and preventing - preferably by non-military means - of the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of these states through early detection of suspicious activities, denial of access to weapons and weapons-grade materials, components and production equipment, and diplomatic efforts to dissuade potential proliferators from seeking to produce or otherwise obtain them.

But if, nevertheless, they do develop or acquire them, our nuclear weapons, together with our ballistic and other defenses against the delivery of such enemy weapons, provide an essential backup - deterring their use for nuclear threat or actual attack, and providing the capability for swift defeat and destruction if such are ever required.

Finally, "hedging" is required. Consideration must be given to the possibility that the favorable world security environment now existing among the major powers might somehow cease to exist, and that in an extreme case overt or clandestine action might be taken by one or more nations to build increased nuclear forces. The contingency that future relations of the United States with Russia and/or with China could take an adverse turn also has to be taken into account. Such a "worst case" possibility should not be exaggerated or made self-fulfilling, but should instead be carefully noted in the development of our policies and future programs. Unlikely as such a contingency may seem, there remains a necessity to maintain a readiness to respond, if necessary, with a halt in reductions, or even with an actual expansion of stockpile and forces. A capability to "ramp up" again if needed should be maintained, but need not, on present expectations, go beyond something very tightly limited in magnitude.

These four sets of needs and purposes provide a solid basis for the reorienting of our guiding policies and priorities and for planning and executing the challenging program of reform now needed. They should guide the realigning and reshaping (i.e. resizing, reconfiguring and reorienting our nuclear forces and nuclear establishment) as well as the reappraisal and redirection of concurrent associated protective measures such as ratification of the CTBT, the development of ballistic missile defenses and counter-terrorist measures, and the strengthening of positive, productive relationships with Russia and China.

Realigning U.S. Nuclear Posture

In resizing the force to conform to this assessment of U.S. security needs and purposes, there is good reason for moving to a new, much-reduced level as a next working objective, to match the level (1500) President Putin recently set for Russian strategic weapons. A question needing early clarification in this regard is whether the Russians - and the U.S. - will see fit to eliminate all nuclear weapons in excess of 1500, specifically including those now categorized as tactical, non-strategic, or non-deployed. Such action would constitute a valuable and reassuring step in reducing the total nuclear danger, carrying forward the initiatives of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War. The level of 1500 total weapons meets our identifiable needs: it maintains a stable, confidence-supporting balance with Russia; it takes adequate account of the uncertainties regarding future relations with China; it provides an ultimate nuclear backup to non-proliferation efforts dealing with rogue states and terrorists if ever required. And it provides at least a limited basis for "ramp-up" should that ever be needed.

In reconfiguring the force, an immediate question turns on the retention of the "Triad." The three forces we now maintain offer distinctive operational features: the lesser vulnerability of the submarine-based missiles, the quicker reaction of the land-based version, and the added flexibility of the bomber mode of delivery. For the present, at least, planning on the basis of retaining all three, subject to continuing reconsideration as the years go on, holds obvious attractions, even though the reduction of costs in money and personnel would thereby be delayed. Particular weapons types now in the stockpile would be selected for retention. The only further need - having the assured capability to counter possible proliferation by rogue states - would be a deep-earth penetrator, for which an adaptation of an existing tested and proven warhead might be deemed satisfactory. If this should prove to be needed, it should be recognized that an issue might be created that would require national and international resolution. Such would certainly be the case if a new design were to be created and tested.

In reorienting the force, the chief issues will be targeting doctrine and alert provisions. As regards Russia, both of these issues can and should reflect the shift of need and purpose from the deterrence that characterized the past to the new concept of mutual assurance. China's nuclear capabilities do not at this time require active deterrence on a standing high-alert basis. Future decisions in this area will remain dependent on the Chinese nuclear program and on the success achieved in building (and rebuilding) a productive China-U.S. security relationship. Only in the case of proliferation by rogue states or terrorist groups would active deterrence and high alert status be required - and that of limited numbers - and then only when and if the proliferation were to reach the status of an active threat of attack. Meanwhile, primary reliance can be placed on the general deterrent effort of the weapons, and on the ability to raise the alert levels quickly if and when increased threats should arise.

The reshaping of the U.S. nuclear establishment is already considerably advanced. Much of the past materials-producing infrastructure is by now out of action, and the main task for those facilities is to deal safely with the vast, dangerous residues that remain. The halt in nuclear testing - an essential element in non-proliferation - has to date been successfully accommodated, while maintaining the ability, through science-based stockpile stewardship, to certify the safety and reliability (i.e., the assured performance if ever required) of the legacy weapons retained. Serious questions remain open - notably the scale of needed remanufacture and the means of providing it, the provision of tritium for replenishment, the essentials for possible "ramp-up" if ever called for, and the assured capability to perform the needed surveillance and maintenance as retained weapons age through the years. Attracting and holding the talents and capabilities in the laboratories and other elements of the nuclear complex, as well as in the supporting industries, while at the same time meeting the costs, will be a basic continuing concern. Our nuclear security, as changes proceed, will still rest on retained, reshaped and reoriented nuclear capabilities at lower levels, the continuing activities and responsibility of the U.S. nuclear military forces, and the U.S. civilian nuclear production complex.

Safe dismantling and disposition remains a high priority. The physical processes involved in the actual reduction of the nuclear stockpiles pose stringent requirements of their own, on which Russian-U.S. cooperation will be of special value. Here the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is of outstanding importance. The removal, storage and turnover for dismantlement of excess weapons and the safe disposition of their materials (the most critical need of potential weapons proliferators) must be safeguarded with utmost rigor and accountability at every stage. Exposure to possible loss will be a vital concern; there will be an enduring risk of diversion into the proliferation efforts of rogue states and of transnational terrorists.

A good start has been made in laying out the necessary controls. START II, which contemplated reductions of strategic weapons to 3000-3500 in both Russia and the United States, aimed at achieving these levels by the end of 2007, taking into account the five-year extension of time agreed at Helsinki in 1999. As also agreed, the warheads to be reduced were to be removed from their delivery systems well before that date. It is not known what timeline President Putin has in mind for the reduction to 1500, nor is it completely clear that the 1500 is to cover all weapons, including the so-called non-strategic weapons. In fact, many questions remain to be answered, and it is to be hoped that a stepped-up program of information exchange will be established.

The 1500 level could be reached in a further year or two beyond 2007 - i.e., by 2008 or 2009 - at an assumed rate of safe and efficient dismantling of weapons and their warheads, much of the groundwork having been thought through in the work on START II. The added time that would be needed for non-strategic, non-deployed or "reserve" weapons dismantlement is less clear, but could be on the order of two to three more years, perhaps a bit more. For the added increment of strategic weapons made excess in each country by the reduction below the START II levels to the 1500 level, it should be possible without undue difficulty to adapt the processes already laid out in START II and to carry out in that manner their orderly verified removal and turnover for safeguarded dismantlement.

A special problem must be dealt with regarding the disposition of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium. There are, first of all, sharply contentious views (largely relating to proliferation concerns) that must be resolved in favor of concerted, safeguarded disposition and utilization policies. Then comes a challenging task of establishing and conducting safeguard-monitoring operations that will give assurance that controls are in fact effective. And safety provisions for the transportation, storage and handling of these environmentally dangerous materials must be instituted as well. The congruence of Russian and U.S. security/safety issues suggests that with sustained high-priority attention to these issues throughout their respective national complexes, these problems can be mastered.

Action on the "Associated Measures"

Along with decisions and actions on the reshaping of our nuclear forces and nuclear establishment, concurrent decisions and actions must be taken on the "associated measures" earlier referred to (verification, non-proliferation and anti-missile defenses in particular). Though not addressed in detail in this paper, these have a role parallel in importance to that of the nuclear capability itself. The feasibility of many of the reforms identified herein for the U.S. nuclear complex will in fact be heavily dependent on the strength and effectiveness of these associated measures.

The first is the whole area of verification. This has been well thought through in connection with the START II negotiations. Its actual conduct will require extremely careful monitoring and continuing assessment. For the U.S. agencies involved, full and timely funding will be a critical requirement.

The second is nuclear proliferation. As suggested earlier, the essential tasks involved in preventing and responding to proliferation have been clearly defined. The major problem lies in their execution, especially where the cooperation of other countries is required. The handicaps are numerous and difficult; in some cases (Iraq in particular) actions by other countries, including our allies, have fallen short. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that in other cases the tools of diplomacy, discussion and negotiation have brought successes of great importance. Non-proliferation, for which our nuclear capability continues to serve as the ultimate safeguard, constitutes an essential avenue toward nuclear stability and nuclear security.

The third associated measure, direct defense, is the focus of the current political division, disagreement and contention over the planned U.S. limited NMD and risks delaying nuclear objectives over "linked" ABM issues. It is also the area in which there is a need, thus far not fulfilled, of developing defense capabilities for forces in the field and at sea, and for theater and regional defense if needed. In addition, the demands within the U.S. for NMD of some scope, together with other means of protection against all forms of possible rogue and terrorist weapons attack, generate a requirement for thoroughgoing reconsideration and comprehensive restudy of this whole issue, from policies to programs (including "boost-phase" alternatives), aimed at providing security against all methods of hostile weapons delivery or emplacement. Consultation and cooperation with other nations sharing a common interest will be very much in order.

A final consideration: If it were possible to eliminate all the world's nuclear weapons with certainty, such could well be the proper working goal. But so long as the possibilities of clandestine possession or undetected preparations for breakout continue to exist, or a turn for the worse in the international security environment remains a possibility that must be safeguarded against, full elimination would require a degree of verification that goes well beyond present capabilities. No country, the United States and Russia included, is ready for the intrusive measures that would be required (measures that have not yet been designed), nor for the degree of transparency that would be necessary. It is possible, however, to pursue more limited goals: the reduction of nuclear armaments to the lowest verifiable level consistent with stable security, and the shift from deterrence at high states of alert to shared doctrines of mutual reassurance. Safe reduction to 1500 seems surely attainable. Beyond that, given safeguards and verification procedures that already appear feasible, and depending upon a continued improving nuclear security environment and actions by the other nuclear-armed countries, further reductions to levels numbered in the low hundreds seem realistically possible once the 1500 levels are in fact reached.

Conclusion: Implementing the Reassessment and Realignment

To achieve the changes of the scale and importance envisioned herein, it will be necessary to confront an extensive range of tasks, challenges and key issues, which, in summary, include:

• Defining the needs and purposes that U.S. nuclear weapons and associated measures should serve - focusing on Russia, China, rogue states and terrorists, and "hedging"
• Resizing the U.S. Nuclear Force
  Is complete elimination infeasible? Is Putin's 1500 (or lower if he so moves) appropriate to U.S. needs and purposes?
• New composition of the U.S. force
  Retain the "Triad"? What weapon systems retained?
• Reorienting the force
  Changed target doctrine? Changed alert system?
• Reshaping the nuclear establishment
  What remanufacturing capability? How (and where) built? How provide needed tritium? What "ramp-up" capacity? What plant and laboratory structure?
• Safe dismantling and disposition of excess nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials and components
  How safeguard and carry out accountability? How deal with plutonium?
• Verification procedures
  What system to be put into effect? How to build and implement U.S.-Russian agreed provisions?
• Non-proliferation - non-military components
  What initiatives to strengthen international efforts and observance? How (and how soon) achieve ratification of CTBT?
• Military deterrence and defense activities
  Are present weapons types sufficient?
• Direct defense
  How resolve the intense NMD impasse? What defense of forces, theater, regions?

All this forms an impressive list of action requirements for the U.S. government. It involves, in addition to actions that the United States can take alone, many that involve interactions with other countries, Russia especially. None look to be infeasible. All require intensified, well-focused, sustained top-level leadership.

Because the many changes in store are of such importance (and benefit) to American security, it is vital that they be understood and supported by our people and our Congress. They involve "new thinking" and breaking away from long-established concepts and from the organizational structures and practices that go with them. These departures - responding to the new assessment of security needs and opportunities - will inevitably encounter many organizational and special interests resistant to the needed changes along the way. Well-informed and determined leadership, both in the United States and abroad, will be required to overcome the many obstacles. Breaking free from the past will not be easy, for past habits of thought die especially hard in the nuclear domain. The remnants of Cold War deterrence based on nuclear weapons in a high state of readiness must give way, most notably with Russia, to the new concept of mutual reassurance. The targeting now needed should be directed primarily against rogue states hostile to the United States as part of the integrated total non-proliferation effort.

Despite the difficulties, one may be optimistic because the highest guiding interest will surely be recognized as reducing, to the practical minimum, the dangers posed both by the existence of nuclear weapons around the world and by the potential of their further development. The major moves in that direction by Russia and the United States now in prospect, following President Putin's initiative, will make enduring contributions of vast importance to the security of the United States and to a peaceful future.

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