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A European Perspective on Current Trends in Military and Commercial Space
Paris, July 15, 2002--The Eisenhower Institute convened a group of preeminent European scientists and other experts on outer space to analyze current trends in military and civilian space use and to formulate an approach to creating international political and legal consensus on these new developments. This meeting was held as part of the Institute project, "The Future of Space: The Next Strategic Frontier."
The participants are members of a larger international panel of scientific experts and space practitioners who will recommend a framework that seeks to delineate between those military uses of outer space necessary for national defense and international security and those which could be detrimental for global stability. Throughout the course of the project, the panelists have been interacting with military, commercial and scientific stakeholders in the future of space in order to ensure that this process is informed by the widest possible perspective. The meeting marked the first time that the European members of the panel met together as a full group to discuss the project.
Introductory Presentation
 Dr. Vittorio Manno and Dr. Jacques Blamont |
An introductory presentation detailed the growing debate in the United States over how to best protect the nation's space-related national security interests. Although a diversity of viewpoints has been expressed on the topic, two general lines of reasoning have surfaced as recurring themes. One holds that the only way in which the US can safeguard its vital military and commercial space assets is by preserving its military options in space through means that include developing space weapons and contingency plans for their use. This side maintains that it is not sufficient to rely on international organizations or treaties. The other line of reasoning states that the US development and deployment of weapons in space will invite a similar response from other nations and will ultimately make the US less secure. This group advocates implementing a strengthened regime of legal instruments such as treaties and multilateral and bilateral agreements. But while groups advocating both lines of reasoning are increasingly vocal, there has been no serious public discussion about the practicality of the proposed means for protecting these assets.
As technical capabilities continue to improve at a rapid pace and the world continues to become more reliant on the military, developmental and other economic benefits space can provide, the need for such a discussion has become more apparent.
I. Threat Scenarios
The experts present at the meeting agreed that gauging the utility of proposals for defending commercial and military space assets from attack depends largely on determining the extent to which the suggested response meets the threat. Thus selecting which of these programs will meet security objectives requires an accurate assessment of space-related threat scenarios. The scenarios discussed at the meeting are listed below:
Anti-Satellite Weapons
 The participants watch Dr. Sagdeev's project update briefing |
- Ground-launched or air-launched ASATs aimed at inflicting a direct hit on a satellite: require an almost ICBM-class launch capability plus guidance and terminal navigation approaching the sophistication of an NMD-class interceptor.
- Advanced ASATs, i.e. those that are first inserted into orbit and then maneuver like a satellite to track down their targets: would need all of the above requirements plus its own life resource to stay in orbit and additional maneuverability.
- ASATs capable of intercepting satellites in high orbits: Require launch, maneuverability and guidance technology equivalent to that needed for "Deep Space" exploration. One participant noted that an attack on such a satellite is unthinkable because it would require a substantially higher than the 4 km/sec required for a mission to Mars.
Nuclear Explosions in Space
More information on this topic, which was elaborated upon in the Paris meeting, can be found in the summary report on the December 11, 2001 seminar.
Jamming
As one participant explained in his presentation, the jamming of GPS signals from satellites or from ground control and communication centers represents another serious potential threat to the normal functioning of the world's satellites. Although complaints have been voiced about the proliferation of jamming devices that have been marketed internationally, jamming has not yet become a volatile political issue, nor has substantial action been taken to ensure that it does not become a problem in the future.1
However, GPS jamming has the potential to be very disruptive. It is reported that several of these jammers have been sold in the Middle East, where it is not inconceivable that the US could soon be involved in a military operation. Just a few of these devices could create a battle environment where the signal to noise ratio is insufficient for effective utilization of GPS. One participant noted that should proliferation of jamming devices continue unabated, the benefits GPS applications provide to the US military could be nullified.
Before Russian jammers appeared on the market, cooperation on Global Navigation Satellite Systems was discussed during the US-Russian bilateral discussions of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. But at the time there was not sufficient support for cooperation with Russia in this area because of the considerable head start GPS had over Russia's GLONASS system. Despite arguments in favor of increased engagement, the interagency panel responsible for the decision could not be convinced. One member of the Institute's project made the point that it may be time to reexamine this stance, however, especially since the US will also have to address the development of Europe's Galileo system. Had early cooperation on global navigation satellite systems actually been initiated, he said, the world would now not be in a position where Russia is responding to a US monopoly on GNSS by developing jamming devices and marketing them internationally-a reaction that is counter to US interests and potentially destabilizing for global security.
GPS Navigation in the Hands of Terrorists
Since GPS receivers are so widely available, it is quite possible that "technologically literate" terrorist groups or rogue states could use GPS-guided weapons against the US and its allies. This could be accomplished even with relatively unsophisticated short-range missile technology similar to that of the V1 and V2. Alternately, a GPS device could be attached to a jet ski armed with explosives, creating a weapon capable of the unmanned equivalent to the attack on the USS Cole. Such scenarios, speculated one individual, may be more likely than the threat of a surprise intercontinental ballistic missile attack.
Attacks against Ground Control Centers
An attack against a ground center is currently a more attainable way for rogue states and terrorists to disable the space operations of the world's major powers than is a direct attack on a space-based asset. This threat falls into the category of those confronting elements of the US Critical Infrastructure, such as power stations, nodes of transportation and water and food supplies. This is more likely to be employed during a campaign of "mass disruption" than in a tactical, battle situation.
II. Approaches to Safeguarding Space Security
After carefully considering the threats, those present at the meeting reviewed proposed preventative measures and responses and then analyzed and discussed the necessary elements of a new approach that seeks to provide both for national defense, including the defense of space assets, and at the same time maximize international stability.
Summary of the Military-Focused Approach2
In order to counter these and other threats to US security, some proposals have been put forward by individuals within the US, by government sponsored commissions and by the US military that advocate a strategy for space that focuses primarily on military responses. Some US government documents, for example, call for the preemptive development and deployment of ASATs to defend US space assets. In addition to defending space assets if an attack actually does occur, it is thought that such a deployment would serve as a deterrent. First, it could provide a means for retaliation against the satellites of other nations whether or not they are used for aggressive purposes. A second deterrent function would be to dissuade potential adversaries from developing ASATs in the first place by helping to sustain an impression that it is futile to compete militarily with the US, given its technological superiority. Many advocates for military-focused responses argue that because conflict in space is inevitable, such action is necessary not only to defend against current threats, but also against potential future threats. For some of these people, the US should pursue a policy of "Space Control," or military dominance in space. 3
Summary of the Legal-Focused Approach
Others have argued that the same protective functions can be accomplished by agreements and treaties. The current legal regime has not been updated to account for the rapid proliferation in space technology over the previous decade-indeed, since the adoption of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibited the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space, very few international agreements regarding the military uses of space have been reached. Advocates of this approach argue that more treaties are needed to close existing legal loopholes. This is the best way to protect both military and civilian space assets and at the same time avoid an arms race in space, they say. Advocates of this approach back policies that range from declaring space a sanctuary that would ban all military activity in space to those who support a more measured approach that seeks to legitimize certain military activity provided that an international agreement of some kind can be reached.
The Panel's Views on Responding to Space-Related Threats
The panelists recognized international terrorism as the foremost current threat to the US, and acknowledged that it is a threat against which the US must defend itself, including its space assets. One participant, however, argued that the worldwide struggle against terrorism will not be a space war, but an information war. Terrorists, he said, are more likely to engage in cyber attacks and suicide bombings than in a direct attack on objects in orbit, and it is these contingencies for which the US should concentrate on preparing itself. Another member of the group concurred, noting that terrorist groups rely on information-based networks rather than on a particular geographical location as bases from which to launch their attacks. And since one cannot strike against a network from space, let alone with any other conventional military weaponry, he continued, space weapons have very little utility for countering the terrorist threat. However, the renewed threat of terrorism does indeed provide impetus for carefully considering various means for shielding space assets. It was also noted at the meeting that given budgetary constraints and limited political will, it will be difficult to wage a campaign for space control and the war on terrorism at the same time.
As far as the actual utility of space-based weapons for defending space assets from attack, one individual reasoned that weapons in space could serve two functions: they could either be protective weapons or weapons of deterrence. One problem with the space-based deterrent function, however, is that it does not address the threat posed by nations without space assets any differently than would ground-based deterrents. Regarding the potential shielding functions of space weapons, he argued there is no way to intercept a weapon launched at a satellite without a vast, layered system like that proposed under the Strategic Defense Initiative. The only role weapons could play would be to serve as agents of a space deterrence strategy directed at other space powers.
Meeting participants noted some negative consequences of relying too heavily on a military solution to the vulnerability of satellites. One member of the group reasoned that should the US deploy offensive systems in space it is inevitable that other nations will accelerate efforts to develop countermeasures. Just as many nations have endeavored to develop nuclear weapons programs in order to acquire the power and prestige enjoyed by other members of the nuclear club, and just as enterprising Russians developed GPS jammers to obstruct US targeting capabilities, it is very likely that the same will hold true for space. But despite the reluctance of the European participants to support a wholly military solution, they acknowledged that nations must be allowed to develop systems to defend space assets. The key to an acceptable solution, offered one individual, is to find a way to verify that such a system is a shield and not a sword.
The Legal Status of Space Assets: The European participants all favored greater international discussion of the legal issues pertaining to space assets and their protection. One legal expert stressed that currently space assets are no better protected legally than are assets on earth-the same property laws apply in both cases. The Legal Subcommittee of the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, he continued, recently agreed that certain investments should be granted greater protection than is currently the case. Exploring this concept further at bilateral and/or multilateral levels would be an important part of a new initiative to protect space assets. Such discussion could serve to introduce strict enforcement mechanisms-thus ensuring that the members of the international community understand that the consequences of damaging a satellite would be severe-and establishing mutually accepted procedures for filing complaints in cases where damage or interference is not covered by the Liability Convention.
Global Utilities: Elevating the status of space assets, it was agreed, should apply especially to those satellites deemed to be global utilities. The US government-run GPS, for example, is already deeply embedded in the world economy and has an extensive array of commercial, scientific and military uses. In addition to navigation satellites, telecommunication, weather and remote sensing systems also have significant universal value and more discussion should take place as to exactly which assets should be afforded special legal status as global utilities. With the right type of agreement, all nations could be made to feel that it is in their best interest to prevent an attack against these assets.
One participant raised the concern that regardless of whether these assets eventually come to be officially considered global utilities, the fact remains that one nation could still utilize them in an aggressive nature against another state. It was suggested that diplomacy would offer effective options in such an event. A group of nations consisting of either a select group of space powers or a larger consortium could be brought together to decide to cut off the offending state's access to global utilities in the same way as the international community cooperated to freeze the assets of terrorist networks following the September 11th attacks.
Verification and Enforcement: It was also suggested that any international agreement would have to include strict, substantive verification mechanisms. This evoked a complaint commonly used by skeptics of arms control: if compliance cannot be assured, relying solely on legal arrangements could substantially reduce security by convincing stronger, compliant states to disarm, while militarily weaker states could secretly violate an agreement in an attempt to improve their position in the strategic balance vis-à-vis neighboring states or the world powers, or to prepare for an attack against a nation that has been lulled into complacency by a treaty. He advocated that a verification mechanism should attempt to identify perpetrators in advance of a potentially dangerous launch by requiring nations to open their launch facilities to non-intrusive on-site inspections upon request. An effective agreement also requires an enforcement mechanism. Punitive measures, he argued, should include counterproliferation, or preemptive strikes if a launching state refuses to allow international inspectors to monitor a launch. Instituting severe criminal laws is not sufficient, especially for preventing the launch of a dangerous payload on short notice. For this reason, it is necessary to preserve some military options, he said.
The Europeans supported the idea of counterproliferation as an enforcement mechanism in a prospective security framework for space provided that it would not be undertaken on a unilateral basis. It was mentioned that this is also the Russian position on the issue of counterproliferation. Another suggestion was that at least at first an agreement should include as its main parties a core group of space-faring nations, rather than seek full global participation.
III. The European Role in the Future of Space
As America's most important allies, one participant stated European nations will likely play an important role in getting the US to reach a new agreement for space. Some, however, were concerned that the amount of policy momentum the US has built up on the space issue, 4 combined with its tremendous technological advantage, will make it difficult for Europe to exert any influence on the US at all, especially on defense-related issues. Currently, asserted one individual, the gap between the position of the US and its NATO allies is widening. He cited a statistic stating Europe spends only 15% of the total spent by the US on space, and only 4% of the total spent on military space. In France, R&D has been cut in half over the last five years. While the notion exists in the US that science and technology are the bases of strength, he continued, this is not the case in Europe. Therefore, Europe should not be considered a serious player in the political maneuvering over the future uses of space.
Another European participant was not as pessimistic as his counterpart about Europe's role in space. The European Union has only just recently discovered space as a political issue and only now can one hear the first speeches elaborating the European position, he said. For one, when Galileo becomes operational Europe will have a much larger stake in safeguarding space assets, he said. Furthermore, Europe is now well represented in the space industry, whereas before space was the realm only of its government organizations. Space, he continued, requires a prince. In other words, only a strong leader who is also interested in space can make it a political priority. He recounted that Charles de Gualle's patronage was very important in the creation of the French space program. Today, he remarked, the European Union has its own such advocates, and as an example named EU Transport and Energy Commissioner Loyola de Palacio of Spain, who played an instrumental role in obtaining the funding necessary to move forward with Galileo. In short, he believed that all the pieces are in place for the EU to become a key player in the development of space.
Although they expressed the sentiment that it is important for Europe to be able to do as much as possible on its own, the European participants recognized that Europe would continue to cooperate with the US with respect to space, including on the protection of space assets. The existence of NATO prevents US and European interests from diverging too greatly on security issues, added one member of the group. It was also noted that no European country altogether opposes the use of space for military purposes, as opposed to previous years when Sweden, Switzerland and Austria had adamantly maintained that space should be used for non-military purposes only.
Footnotes
1 One historical precedent was raised at the meeting that demonstrates the world's current institutional inadequacy for dealing with jamming scenarios. In 1992, Indonesia transferred their Palapa B1 satellite into a geostationary orbital slot that had already been secured by the Pacific island nation of Tonga and refused to pay for the rights to it. The ensuing dispute between the two nations escalated in July 1993 when Rimsat, a US-based firm that was leasing Tonga's orbital slots, moved a Russian-made Gorizont satellite into same slot. The two sides met on October 28, 1993 to discuss the issue and came to a coordination agreement in which Indonesia would be permitted to use the slot, thereby deferring the matter. But the quarrel erupted again in July 1996 when a licensee of Tonga, APT Satellite Company (a Hong Kong based consortium), launched its APSTAR-1A into the disputed slot. After arguing over the exact terms of the 1993 agreement, Indonesia's Pasifik Satelit Nusantara, began to jam the APT's satellite signals, disrupting its transmissions to the Chinese mainland. The Hong Kong company was able to circumvent the jamming by tilting the antenna angle. Nevertheless, it is significant that throughout this process Indonesia disregarded the ITU, and claimed that its Regulatory Board lacked the authority to stop them.
2 In addition to military proposals for safeguarding space assets, some (again, mostly individuals in the US)also support developing a space-based offensive capability that can be used for conducting military operations on earth.
3 According to US Space Command's Vision for 2020, Space Control includes securing assured access to space, assured use of one's own assets in space and the ability to deny the use of space to an adversary.
4 The participant cited numerous US Government and military reports which advocate an assertive US military role in space and the fact that Donald Rumsfeld, who chaired a commission that authored one of these reports, currently serves as Secretary of Defense.