Whitman Domestic Seminar Series

Eisenhower Institute Convenes Series
of Whitman Domestic Studies Seminars

 Washington, DC, June 28, 2002 -- The Eisenhower Institute inaugurated the Whitman Domestic Studies Seminars, focusing on homeland security. Supported by a grant from Anne Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower's personal secretary, the Whitman Seminars will provide a forum for practitioners and policy-makers to evaluate how well Federal agencies are prepared to carry out their mandates to protect the security of Americans.

For the inaugural seminar, the Institute hosted the Honorable Jeffrey Smith, a partner at the law firm of Arnold and Porter and former General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency and the Senate Armed Services Committee.  Smith gave a speech entitled "Homeland Security: Will Reorganization Make Us More Secure?"  Smith discussed the implications for American citizens of recent decisions to broaden the powers of the intelligence and law enforcement communities as part of the domestic war on terrorism.  Smith has recently published an Op-Ed piece on homeland security in the Washington Post, which addresses some of the issues he discussed at the Institute.

  Whitman Seminar on Homeland Security
Meeting Report 

"Homeland Security: Will Reorganization Make Us More Secure?"


Institute President Susan Eisenhower opened the meeting by describing the Whitman Seminar Series, Anne Whitman's connection to President Eisenhower, and the endowment she gave to the Institute to support a program in domestic studies. The Whitman Seminars will examine the effectiveness of various federal agencies in fulfilling their respective mandates, focusing initially on the emerging department of Homeland Security. This topic is particularly important in light of the challenges involved in creating a new Cabinet department, which will consolidate numerous existing agencies and multiple missions.

Jeffrey Smith, former General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency and the Senate Armed Services Committee, outlined his perspectives on the organizational and political challenges ahead. Smith offered his views by posing four general questions that need to be addressed at the outset:

1. Do we have the right configuration of agencies in the Department?
2. How do we create the Department in a way that makes sense in the middle of a war?
3. What are Congress' oversight responsibilities?
4. What are the implications and questions of adding an intelligence aspect to the new Department?

Configuration of the Department
  • Smith commented that the Administration is correct in moving to combine the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Customs, the Coast Guard and the Border Patrol into one agency; the latter are all functioning agencies that can be melded under one umbrella with relatively little difficulty.
  • Smith acknowledged that the Administration's current proposal to consolidate disparate parts of other existing agencies, such as parts of the Department of Energy or the Centers for Disease Control, is likely to be more problematic. Separating them from their main agencies will only complicate problems of competence and coordination.
  • Concerns arise about the corporate cultures and management structures of so many agencies being melded together. Using the example of corporate mergers, it is clear that culture clashes are inevitable. These issues are very hard to overcome. Well-trained, dedicated people must be found to run the diverse groups that will make up the Homeland Security department. The best and the brightest must be given incentives to go into and stay in public service.
  • Smith observed that if we were to create such an agency, the director should have a fixed term of office. Such a measure could help create stability and lessen politicization in the leadership.

Building a Department During War While Ensuring Security
  • Can this Department come together efficiently at a time when the United States is vulnerable and at war? Effective consolidation and realignment of existing agencies will need to proceed slowly to ensure that the Department is prepared to perform its mandated functions. The current legislation to bring the Department into being, however, lacks clear and definitive language about how the secretary of the new department will interact with the existing Secretaries and undersecretaries of the other agencies, let alone more complex questions about how to ensure that there is a coherent leadership structure. 
  • A preoccupation with reorganization cannot be allowed to compete with the government's urgent attention to the war on terrorism.
  • Seams exist within the planned structure of the Department that may make the US more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These seams are manifested in gaps in communication systems, corporate culture clashes and the task of bringing over 170,000 people together into one organization. As the Department develops, those seams will magnify already existing problems with interagency cooperation and communication.
Congressional Oversight and Responsibilities
  • There are currently over thirteen separate Congressional committees and dozens of subcommittees that claim authority over one or more of the new Department's sections. Pending major Congressional realignment, which would be very difficult to achieve,  Smith proposed creating a Select Committee on each side of the Congress. This joint committee would have oversight over the entire Department - similar to that of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence.
Intelligence Implications and Questions
  • Smith suggested that an alternative approach to the existing intelligence system would be to create a domestic security agency similar to the British MI-5. In order to create such an agency, Smith felt the counter-terrorism and counterintelligence units of the CIA and FBI should be merged into one organization under the aegis of the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI) or the Attorney General. Officers from other agencies could be present on a rotating basis, to coordinate effectively with other branches of the intelligence community. To be most efficient, however,  Smith asserted that the counter-terrorist and counterintelligence divisions in the CIA and FBI should be combined into one.
  • Smith suggested that the new Department have an embedded intelligence function following the model of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department (INR). INR takes raw intelligence and intelligence reports from the intelligence community and produces actionable plans using their own information and perspective.


The following is a summary of the discussion which followed Smith's formal remarks:

  • Several attendees echoed Smith's view that the new counter-terrorism/intelligence agency not be given arrest authority. All prosecutorial powers should remain within the Justice Department and under control of the Attorney General. If the new agency is given arrest capabilities, civil rights concerns are presented. It is best if law enforcement and the intelligence communities maintain some separation.
  • One seminar participant discussed the difficulties in creating a single, joint, select Congressional committee. He noted that removing the "incestuous" relationship between Congress and the departments over which it has oversight would be a difficult task. 
  • Several seminar attendees expressed concern over the effective collaboration between local and national governments. Many homeland security issues are of national importance but are handled on the local level.  Smith concurred; stating that the least understood aspect of homeland security is how to coordinate federal, state and local government efforts. 
  • In response to another question,  Smith explained his belief that the DCI should be given more authority over the intelligence community. At present, under the terms of the National Security Act, the Director of Central Intelligence is head of the CIA and the president's chief intelligence advisor; however, he/she does not have statutory authority over the other diverse intelligence agencies that comprise the Intelligence Community. Many members of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) advocate giving the DCI more authority. This would separate him from the dual job of DCI and head of CIA - in effect creating a Director of National Intelligence. This move is supported by some senators and is advocated by  Smith. The DCI would then have powers similar to the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee in Great Britain. 
  • Smith concluded by stating that the task of creating a new Department of Homeland Security must not be underestimated. Interagency squabbling, turf battles and the lack of interoperability will make it difficult to attain a cohesive structure. Many in Congress are concerned about the speed with which the creation of the Department is proceeding. A more deliberate pace would help to ensure a successful transition.
Conclusions

The task of creating a new Department of Homeland Security is daunting. Interagency squabbling, territorial disputes and the lack of interoperability will make it difficult to attain a cohesive structure.

Smith reinforced his view that seams exist within the planned structure of the Department that may make the US more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These seams are manifested in gaps in communication systems, corporate culture clashes and the task of bringing over 170,000 people together into one agency. As the Department develops, those seams could magnify already existing problems with interagency cooperation and communication.

Many in Congress are concerned about the speed with which the creation of this agency is going forward. A more deliberate pace would help ensure a successful transition and a government agency that contributes to the fight against terrorism rather than add to the present difficulties. Clear language must be used when defining the leadership roles for the new agency. Weak language will only contribute to the confusion.

Congressional oversight is critical to long-term success; however, there are too many Congressional committees currently involved. The creation of one select committee for both the House and Senate will streamline the process and help minimize partisan political conflict.

Meeting Report by Josh Kolchins

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