Secretary Abraham Transcript

SECRETARY SPENCER ABRAHAM, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Hosted by the Eisenhower Institute on June 14, 2004

I'm very delighted to be with all of you today and I want to thank the Eisenhower Institute for its hospitality in hosting today's event. I also know that there are a number of other organizations that are represented here, groups who worked on issues that pertain to these very, very overarching nonproliferation challenges we face. To all of you I'd say thanks for your interest in these issues, for the work you do, for the ideas that you help us to develop and that have certainly led us in a number of very positive directions.

I want to say that preparing for the speech here today in the days leading up to today's program has been a little more challenging than I thought it would be, just because of events in the past week which have brought to the fore the memories of two of our most beloved presidents, men who answered the call and helped us defeat the two greatest challenges to peace and freedom the modern world has ever know. One, Dwight David Eisenhower, is the man whose life and work this organization honors, and of course he led the D-Day invasion at Normandy 60 years ago. In recent days, on the windswept beaches on the northern coast of France, we celebrated that anniversary, which has been described as having saved civilization in its darkest hour. The other great president, Ronald Reagan, a general of a different sort, led America to victory in another war, the war against Soviet Communism and expansionism. He was the quintessential American, embodying everything that was good and noble and optimistic about this great country. And his passing, as we saw, was met with profound sadness, not just by his countrymen but by people all over the globe. Indeed, because of these two heroes, millions upon millions of people all over the planet live in the bright sun of freedom today rather than cower in the dark shadows of totalitarianism.

The D-Day anniversary and the death of Ronald Reagan reinforce the old adage, freedom isn't free. The peace and security and freedom we cherish must constantly be secured and earned and won over and over, through resolve, determination, courage and sacrifice. Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan understood and appreciated that truth. Because they did, the United States and the free world faced down the twin evils of Nazism and Soviet Communism, the two scourges of the 20th century, and prevailed in that century's two epic conflicts. But we live in a new century and the defining conflict of this one has already been revealed. It's a conflict between the civilized nations of the Earth, steeped in freedom and progress, versus the retrograde terrorist and terrorist states that would use devastating weaponry and technology to destroy them.

Is civilization itself at stake, as in the Second World War or the Cold War? Perhaps not in the same way, yet this fact is nothing to minimize the threat at hand. The slaughters perpetrated on September 11, in a Bali, in a Madrid leave no question that what is at stake today are the lives and safety of literally millions of innocent people. We know there are terrorists whose ambition is nothing more than death and suffering. We know they're trying to acquire the means to achieve this ambition on the largest possible scale. We know they are in league with the world's most notorious thugs and despots. And we know that our challenge of thwarting their aims grows increasingly complicated in a world where technology and science make constant advances.

A century ago the great novelist Joseph Conrad wrote "The Secret Agent" about secretive anarchists who planted bombs in public places to sow terror among the populace of London. Today the threat we must guard against isn't just the anarchist placing a bomb in the downtown square. Now we must worry about the terrorist who places that bomb in the square but packed with radiological materials. Whereas once we had to worry about the madman whose ambition within the realm of possibility was to assassinate a world leader, now we must worry about the madman whose ambition is to destroy a world capital.

As President Bush said in a speech at the National Defense University in February, "The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons. America and the entire civilized world will face this threat for decades to come." The recent revelation of the complex network established by AQ Khan gives startling scope to the nonproliferation challenge we collectively face: the large quantities of uncontrolled or lightly controlled nuclear and radiological material of potential use in weapons have added an entirely new dimension to this worldwide threat.

Over 200 of the world's research reactors are nearing the end of their life spans. Four hundred reactors have already shut down or been decommissioned, creating large quantities of spent fuel and radiological sources that must be secured and/or disposed of. Our challenge could not be more clear. As the 21st century unfolds, the stakes are higher, the dangers are greater, the worries are graver, our challenge is more pronounced. A test of our resolve will be how we adapt to this new and evolving threat as the 21st century takes shape.

A decade ago in the wake of the Cold War, our nonproliferation programs were of a certain type. At the Department of Energy they were narrowly focused on securing nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material made vulnerable by the collapse of the Soviet Empire. That pretty much remained the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts by the time President Bush took office in 2001. Since then we have broadened and accelerated these programs. In part this has been a response to our own top-to-bottom review. In part, it has been a result of 9/11. And it also reflects the direct decisions made by the Russian atomic energy minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, and me as we assessed priorities.

Our efforts have been very successful. In a moment I will chronicle some of these successes, but first let me just say that they were achieved because of several things: first and foremost because President Bush and President Putin have made this a priority from the very beginning of their relationship, second because America has been successful in getting other countries to join this effort, and third because we have established a much better working relationship with our counterparts in the Russian government. This has been the case at all levels, but I think especially between Minister Rumyantsev and myself. I don't think it's any secret that the Department of Energy and MINATOM did not work closely on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis in the past, but we do now. In the three and half years since becoming secretary I've met personally with Minister Rumyantsev on a dozen occasions. We've developed a very effective partnership, and this close association I think has translated into great progress on many fronts, which I would now like to discuss.

First, we have substantially increased our nonproliferation spending. The president's most recent DOE budget request to Congress sought a nonproliferation budget of $1.35 billion, a nearly 70 percent increase over the last and largest budget request of the previous administration.

Second, we've accelerated and expanded a number of important nonproliferation programs. We've accelerated our efforts to secure 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material in Russia. By the end of this fiscal year we will have secured over 46 percent of this material as opposed to the 20 percent claimed by some. Perhaps more importantly, by the end of this year we will have secured 70 percent of the sites. During 2003 and 2004, we will have secured more material than in any other two-year period in the program's history. Indeed, since 2001 - fiscal year 2001, we have already secured 17 percent more material than the total materials secured in the programs' previous history. But most importantly, we will finish the work we have before us by 2008, fully two years ahead of the original schedule.

We have also accelerated the recovery of approximately 10,000 high-risk radiological sources in the United States. In the past 18 months, the program has doubled the number of sources recovered during the eight-year life of the program. We have also dramatically accelerated our work with the Russian Navy to secure their fuel and nuclear warhead sites. During my first trip to Moscow in 2001 I met with Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, the head of the Russian navy. He made a very personal appeal to me and to the United States to assist Russia with security upgrades at Russian navy warhead and high-enrichment uranium fuel storage sites on a faster, fuller basis. That day I gave him my commitment that we would move aggressively, and we have. I'm happy to report that we will have secured 100 percent of Russian navy fuel and nuclear weapons storage sites by the end of the year 2006.

Third, we have launched a number of key new initiatives to address the evolving nuclear security threat. In June 2002 the president proposed and the G-8 leaders established the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. This new 10-year program will bring important new resources to bear on nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety, and it will engage countries that previously had not been involved. The partnership has already secured almost $17 billion in pledges, 85 percent of the way to our target. We are working hard with our partners in Russia to reach the $20 billion target and to go beyond it. We believe that figure should be a floor, not a ceiling.

In the spring of last year we began a new program with Russia to upgrade security for its strategic rocket forces sites. By the end of this year, we will have secured the first two sites and we are working to secure the remaining 15 sites by the end of the year 2008. On May 31st last year, the president announced the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a program of counter-proliferation partnerships to allow the United States and its partners to interdict suspect cargo on land, at sea, or in the air, and to seize illegal weapons-related material or missile technologies. As a direct consequence of this initiative, Libya decided to abandon its WMD and long-range missile programs. Since last December we have worked with Libya, the IAEA, and other international partners to dismantle Libya's nuclear weapons program.

Last year we created the MegaPorts program, to place radiation detection equipment at the world's major seaports. This summer we will complete installation of the first of our programs of radiation detection at the largest seaport in Europe, the port of Rotterdam. Last years Minister Rumyantsev and I established a joint process to allow us to be an upgrading security at Russia's most sensitive sites without compromising Russian security interests. Under this cooperative effort we initiated a pilot program at a sensitive Russian site and we will assess the results this summer, paving the way, we believe, for access to the last remaining and more sensitive sites to be secured.

In 2002, at its annual convention, I called upon the member nations of the IAEA to establish a new international effort to account for, secure, and where appropriate, dispose of radiological sources that could be used in a radiological dispersal device. Last spring we launched this effort by co-hosting, along with the Russian Federation and the IEAE, an international conference for more than 120 nations. As a result of this conference, participant nations agreed to first identify high-risk radioactive sources that were not under secure and regulated control, including orphan sources; second, launch an international initiative to facilitate the location, recovery and securing of such sources; and third, call on all IAEA member states to enhance their own national regulatory bodies to address safety and security of radioactive sources in their countries. This conference set the stage for our new radiological threat reduction program, which is working in more than 40 countries to prevent the acquisition of radiological dispersal devices by terrorists.

Finally, just last week, the G-8, during America's chairmanship, endorsed a nonproliferation action plan that will further aid our progress. The G-8 partners actively affirmed their support to eliminate the use of HEU in research reactors and to secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel. And they also spoke strongly in favor of controlling and securing radiation sources as well as strengthening export controls and border security. Strong and growing G-8 support for this work is extremely important.

But ladies and gentlemen, we would be fooling ourselves and endangering our citizens to ever say that we have done enough. The continually shifting nature of geopolitics, the ever-forward advancement of science and technology, the hardened determination of terrorists to sow death and destruction, all of these demand that we continually reassess the situation, that we constantly revisit the topic at hand, and that we incessantly update our defenses and our plans to combat proliferation threats.

As the global proliferation threat continues to evolve, it has become clear that an even more comprehensive and urgently focused effort is needed to respond to emerging and evolving threats. Although we are accomplishing much, there is always more which we can do, and so for that reason I traveled to Vienna two weeks ago to address the International Atomic Energy Agency and to propose a new phase in our global nonproliferation work. To the director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, I announced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure, remove, or dispose of an even broader range of nuclear and radiological materials around the world that are vulnerable to theft. This Global Threat Reduction Initiative is concrete initiative to protect, collect, and secure materials not satisfactorily dealt with by existing nonproliferation programs. The idea is that the entire spectrum of nuclear materials must be addressed.

The GTRI, as we call it, reflects the realities of the 21st century that were so startlingly made clear to the world on that September morning three years ago, and it plugs the gaps that our current efforts do not adequately address. We will do this by securing, removing, relocating or disposing of these materials and equipment, whatever the most appropriate course might be, as quickly and as expeditiously as possible. Specifically, under the initiative we will first work in partnership with Russia to repatriate all fresh and spent Russian-origin nuclear fuel that currently resides at research reactors around the world.

In 1998 a small amount of fresh fuel was removed from a research reactor in Georgia. No further fuel retrieval occurred for four years. Then in 2002, we began working, on an ad hoc basis, to return fuel from the most dangerous of these reactor sources. As many of you know, working with the IAEA, the Russian government, and a number of other partners, we have been successful in repatriating to Russia 14 kilograms of fresh HEU from Romania, 17 kilograms of fresh HEU from Bulgaria, nearly 17 kilograms of HEU from Libya's research reactor, and 50 kilograms of fresh HEU from Serbia.

But it was clear to us that proceeding on this ad hoc approach it would take far too long to adequately secure all the materials needing to be addressed. During the last year we have been working with Russia to formalize this effort and put in place a plan to get the work done quickly under a formal government-to-government agreement. I'm happy to say that the very day after we announced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, we signed that government-to-government agreement with Russia to get the job done. Under this new agreement, Russian fresh HEU fuel will be returned to Russia for safe storage or disposition, not in three years or five years or eight years, but by late next year. We are also working under that agreement to repatriate all Russian origin spent HEU fuel. Presently there is around four metric tons at 20 reactors and 17 countries. We intend to finish this effort by 2009.

The second feature of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative will be to take whatever steps are necessary to accelerate and complete the repatriation of U.S.-origin research reactor spent HEU fuel, about 20 metric tons in all from over 40 locations around the world. Let me acknowledge up front that this DOE program has had a long history of not performing as well as it should. This program was assigned many years ago to the department's Environmental Management Division, which is very able in doing its work to remediate former U.S. weapons sites, but it did not have the international outreach capabilities to work with foreign governments on the delicate negotiations that are involved in this work and to get this job done at a sufficiently fast pace.

So in order to address this I recently moved this entire program from our Environmental Management Division to the Nonproliferation Division at our National Nuclear Security Administration. I made it clear to the people there that I want this job done as soon as possible, and assure you that it will be, but we confront a number of challenges in carrying out this work, including the need to extent our legal authority under NEPA to repatriate the fuel, the diplomatic challenges which we will encounter with several of the host countries, and the sheer magnitude of this enterprise. I believe it can be done in a very expedited fashion.

Indeed, an overwhelming share of this work will most certainly be finished within the next four to five years. The rest involves more complex circumstances that require a broader international focus. For that reason, in Vienna and in Moscow, I propose the convening of an international partners' conference later this year to enhance our ability to address special challenges. Both the IAEA and the Russian Federation have agreed to help host this effort, and we are moving ahead. I'm confident that this approach will succeed and will enable us to also expeditiously address work in these more complicated situations.

The third major feature of the Threat Reduction Initiative will be to convert the cores of 105 civilian research reactors that use HEU to use low-enriched uranium fuel instead. We will do this not just in the United States but throughout the entire world. We will first target those reactors where the threats and vulnerabilities are the highest. We've already converted or just about done converting roughly a third of those 105 reactors, and we believe we will finish another third in the next four to five years. The rest may not be able to be completed that quickly, given today's technology and given the constraints we have in terms of manufacturing the safer substitute fuel. I know some have implied that this work can be done quicker, but the people who make those assertions are simply ignoring the realities of science and the realities of what exactly a mission of this scope entails. Let me try to put this into perspective.

Changing a reactor core is not like changing the battery in your car. Not all cores are the same and we don't yet have a proven low-enriched uranium replacement fuel for every type of reactor. While we have developed LEU that works for some reactors, there are others for which we still have to perfect and license a workable substitute. We will do this, but it does take time, and until this happens, it is unlikely that other nations will give up the use of their research reactors willingly. Moreover, I should note that even after this fuel is perfected, we are still hindered by other technological limitations because there is only one place in the world where this new fuel will be able to be manufactured. This obviously will affect the speed with which we can convert these reactor cores. So those who say we can accomplish 104 core conversions all around the world in three or four or five years, or whatever, either haven't taken the time to learn these facts or they know them but apparently choose not to regard them. The simple fact is that this is not a political science challenge; it is a real science challenge, and we have real scientists working right now at our national labs to find the answers to some very vexing technological problems.

In short, this is neither a question of will nor a question of resources. If we find ways to speed up these activities, and we are determined to do so, we will not hesitate to move the clock forward because it is in our interest to accomplish these objectives as quickly and as thoroughly as the technology will allow. But for our part, we believe it is not appropriate to make time commitments, the fulfillment of which is problematic. The issues of nonproliferation demand honest, serious plans and timetables, and that is what we have offered. Anyone who says they have a plan for this work with a faster timetable than ours but without the scientific ability to address this replacement fuel impediment does not have a plan at all.

The final pillar of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative will be to work to identify other nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment that are not yet covered by existing threat reduction efforts. Once identified, we will secure, remove, relocate or dispose of these materials and equipment in the quickest, safest manner possible. We will rapidly address the most vulnerable facilities first to ensure that there are not any gaps that would enable a terrorist to acquire these materials for evil purposes.

Obviously the Global Threat Reduction Initiative is a very expansive, robust undertaking. To make it successful will require several things. First we need a single organization whose sole purpose is to make sure it is done on time. For that reason we have established such an office at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Second, we need resources. The United States is prepared to spend the resources necessary to guarantee success and we've already announced plans to contribute more than $450 million to this effort. That amount is sufficient in and of itself to complete the U.S.-foreign research reactor spent fuel return, the Russian research reactor fuel return efforts, and to also fund the conversion of all targeted U.S. and Russian-supplied research reactor cores under the Reduced Enrichment for Test, Research and Test Reactors Program. But we will need heightened international cooperation to finish the job.

Dedicated -- and the United States is -- to such an undertaking, it is clear that a truly effective non-proliferation regime is made up of the collaboration of efforts by as many nations as possible, not just a few. This is particularly true with the collection of materials that are not of Russian or American origin, or that may be located in places that pose certain challenges that the United States and Russia cannot address alone.

That's why in Vienna and in Moscow I also proposed the aforementioned Global Threat Reduction Initiative Partners' Conference. This conference will address material collection and security in places where a broader international effort is required. It will also focus on material collection and security of other proliferation-attractive materials not of U.S. or Russian origin, such as those located at conversion facilities, reprocessing plants and industrial sites, as well as the funding of such work. I am very confident that it will be successful.

As I said a little earlier, I'm very proud of what the Bush administration and DOE, in particular, have achieved, and what we have added to these programs during the last four years. Four years ago there was no comprehensive international effort to address radiological dispersal devices. Today there is. Four years ago there was no MegaPorts program to place radiation detection equipment at the nation's - at the world's major seaports. Today there is. Four years ago we weren't working with the Russian strategic rocket forces, and now we are working at 17 sites that will be finished in the next four years. Four years ago there was no mechanism to return Russian reactor fuel. Today we have a formal government-to-government agreement to accomplish this in an abbreviated time frame. Four years ago, there was no G-8 global partnership with $20 billion for non-proliferation programs. Today there is. And we now have a non-proliferation action plan that reinforces our efforts and gives global support for the president's non-proliferation strategy. Real progress is being made and will continue to be until the job is done.

Consolidating current programs, speeding the return of Russian and U.S.-origin fuel, securing the most dangerous materials worldwide to reduce the most perilous threats, working together on an international basis - that is the agenda before us. We will take these steps because we must. The circumstances of a dangerous world have thrust this responsibility on the shoulders of the civilized world. We do not have the luxury of sitting back and not taking action.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative is precisely the vehicle needed to take the necessary action now. It's ambitious, but it is realistic. It is bold, yet it is also practical. It builds on previous successes and positions us for new ones, and it is the strategy best suited to dealing with the defining threat of the 21st century.

I want to conclude today with the same message I gave in Vienna. It is a message that applies to all of the civilized members of the international community. It's a message that applies particularly to a nation such as ours that has always stood for peace and for freedom. And it's a message that I think particularly resonates given our recent reflections on the lives and work of Ronald Reagan and Dwight Eisenhower. That message is this: The responsibility falls to us to take necessary action to prevent the horrors of 9/11 being replayed, but on a nuclear scale. The responsibility falls to us to ensure that the civilized world continues to enjoy the peaceful uses of the atom in medicine, electricity generation and beyond, while minimizing or eliminating any dangers.

Like Dwight Eisenhower leading the Allied invasion to turn back Hitler's tide, like Ronald Reagan leading the West's great power in a clash with the forces of Soviet evil, we are charged with safeguarding civilization from those who want nothing more than to see it destroyed.

I'm optimistic that we can do this. We have a president who understands the awesome scope of the current crisis and - even when many others do not, and because of that resolve he has shown, I am confident that we will bring about the safety and security the American people deserve. And I'm confident we will be successful because, both in Vienna and in Moscow and in my other travels, I have seen that, throughout the planet, other nations share the same commitment that we have, are prepared to work together to be successful, and are prepared to make the tough decisions that are always bound in such an important step forward.

And so I thank you very much for having the chance to be with you today, to share these ideas, and look forward to working with all of you in the future. Thank you very much.

SUSAN EISENHOWER: First of all, I'd like to thank Secretary Abraham very much for what I thought was a very, very impressive presentation, and let me just say another part of the Eisenhower legacy is Atoms for Peace. And it occurred to me while I was hearing this presentation that this is exactly the kind of modernization of Atoms for Peace - Atoms for Peace for the next 50 years that is very much needed and welcomed, and I thank you very much for that terrific presentation.

Now I hope, if you have cards with some questions that you will pass them down to the end there, but I'd like to get the ball rolling here with a question for you about the global threat reduction initiative, and from an organizational point of view how this might work. I was gratified to hear that heightened international cooperation will be a part of this, and I wondering, aside from this partners' conference, is there any idea on the table at the moment of how the interaction would work since we have so many countries involved? And --

ABRAHAM: Sure. Okay, well, I'll - let me just begin by pointing out that in Vienna, in addition to speaking to the official representatives to the IAEA, which was the principal forum in which I made our announcement, I also had the chance to spend a considerable amount of time with Director-General ElBaradei and his team and then, as I mentioned in my remarks, just a day later was in Russia to spend time with Minister Rumyantsev as well as with Prime Minister Fradkov to discuss some of these issues with both of them.

I think that we are very optimistic - and I speak about all of us; that is, the IAEA, the Russian Federation and our government - that we can have the same kind of forward-moving success in this area that we enjoyed with respect to the radiological dispersal device effort that we launched in 2003.

You know, coming out of 9/11, we had a lot of issues that we had to address, most of it dealing with immediate questions of nuclear security, a lot of priorities that were either immediately in place or had already been suggested, but one issue that became sort of an emerging challenge to all of us was the issue of materials that had not been perhaps as much a focus of international control in the past, materials that could be used for RDDs.

In 2002, when I spoke to the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual conference, I proposed the idea that we add that to the focus of the IAEA, that we kick that off with a conference and use that conference to lay the groundwork for a - really a whole new area of undertaking. And happily that took place. In March of '03, we held the conference. We now have a number of project lines moving directly forward.

And I see the same kind of pattern ready to happen here. I think that, as I indicated in my speech, we really need a broader focus than just America, Russia and the IAEA. We need the help of other countries to work in terms of some of the diplomatic challenges which we face, but also to sort of build the consensus that will be needed. Clearly, if we're going to identify new materials and work to make sure they're properly secured, we have to have a broad international support for that effort. I think we can do that. I think, if we're successful, as we hope to be, in putting a conference together later this year to get this initiative moving forward that that will be an excellent launching pad for the effort.

Question & Answer Session

EISENHOWER: Thank you very much. We have lots of very interesting questions, very diverse questions here shall we say. If the - will the Global Partnership Conference, if implemented, address the contract dispute between U.S. and Russia about liability?

ABRAHAM: Well, I don't think the conference will address it. I - you know, this is a challenge that we're dealing with on a day-to-day basis. We feel that that's probably an issue that's going to only be successfully addressed on a bilateral basis. Minister Rumyantsev and I had great discussions about it again in Moscow two weeks ago, and I think we have identified some additional ways that we might proceed forward.

But I would envision the conference that we're talking about being a little broader in focus, mainly looking at the gaps that exist in the current international proliferation effort, identifying better ways to account for materials and to secure those materials that aren't properly secured at this time. And I suspect issues of this sort might be handled in the - probably on a bilateral basis perhaps at that session, but frankly, that's an issue that's getting ongoing attention and hopefully could be resolved even before we come to the conference.

EISENHOWER: Thank you very much. North Korea and Iran pose the most difficult non-proliferation challenges. How specifically will GTRI deal with these two?

ABRAHAM: Well, I - you know, I think that there's - it's pretty easy to draw a distinction here between issues that already are receiving sort of attention of the international community, whether it's in the form of the IAEA's efforts, which will of course be undertaken this week in their meetings, or the six-party talks, which are already addressing the challenges that relate to North Korea.

Here what we're talking about is something a little bit different. It's talking about focusing on issues that have not previously received the attention that they deserve; that is, from the international community. A number of people, organizations - some of whom are represented in this room - and people who are experts in this area have raised, and I think at various times, concern about how we deal with research reactor fuel and core conversion - have raised these issues before, but they've never been the focus of a central effort, either in our department or in terms of the IAEA. It's something that we've talked about with the IAEA in the last six months to try to move this ahead.

I view this conference and the GTRI as principally aimed at these areas that aren't already receiving attention. Clearly Iran and North Korea are receiving a tremendous amount of focus from the international community and from the six countries who are engaged in the six-party talks. So I don't see them as really, in that sense, comparable. I think this is breaking new ground in areas that have heretofore not received attention as they should.

EISENHOWER: When it comes to convincing nuclear facilities around the world to give up their nuclear materials under the GTRI, what incentives is DOE prepared to offer these countries' facilities? Specifically, will it offer to help them find new jobs for scientists and workers or help them with environmental clean-up?

ABRAHAM: Well, you know, the first incentive is that we - you know, for those people who are being asked to have their research reactor converted, obviously the most important incentive is the ability to continue the work that's done there, and so that's why, as I mentioned in my speech at some length, one of the real challenges we have is the whole challenge of developing an appropriate substitute fuel to be able to allow these reactor functions to continue in the future, only in a much safer setting. And so that's clearly a major part of the commitment that we are making.

The issue that - if we're successful in that, then - at least in theory - that would allow for the core functions to continue, which would in turn mean that people who are working in these roles as technicians and connected to this work would not have to find an alternative job or opportunity. And that's really the centerpiece of what we're trying to do.

As I mentioned, to a large extent, if you look at the 105 reactors, they really break into groups - groupings as follows: About one-third of the work we've already done; about one-third we can do today and are trying to move ahead fairly quickly; the remaining third of the reactors requires us to develop substitute fuel. And if we're able to do that - we believe we can - then obviously we won't have to address some of these other - these other challenges. But first things first. We need to secure the materials, we need to provide, you know, the ability for the research reactors to be able to continue operations. As we meet challenges beyond that, then we'll deal with them, I'm sure, as part of the ongoing discussions.

EISENHOWER: I'm going to offer two more questions here, and then we'll turn it over to the press.

Could the reactor security program be sped up if most of the world's aging research reactors were shut down as opposed to converted?  And the second question is how do you feel about the potential for partnerships with county and city governments? -- which is an interesting question that was different from some of the others.

ABRAHAM: You know, on the first question, obviously, as I said, we've got a - I think the question would be principally related to those places where we aren't capable today of converting the core and substituting a new fuel. I suspect that if there weren't an issue that related to core conversion that that would, you know, be treated on a different track than the track we're on. But we've made the assumption that most people will be interested in keeping their reactor functions - you know, going forward the research they're doing continuing. But obviously we are open to other possible outcomes if it turns out that people are prepared to - just to end their programs.

As far as state and local governments, I'm not quite sure now that will play out. I guess I'd have to - that's one I'll have to defer to the future to people who will be working on the programs, but certainly, you know, our goal is to try to accommodate the needs of the government units we deal with because obviously, for this to be successful, we need cooperation at all levels.

Q: My name is - (inaudible) - the Russian new agency, Tass. Mr. Secretary, last week, the leaders of G-8 took a number of steps at - during the summit at Sea Island, and in particular, they endorsed the freeze for new transfers of enrichment and reprocessing agreement for one year. And even U.S. administration officials briefing reporters at the Sea Island and in Savannah, Georgia, admitted that it is rather a controversial and complicated step that will need further diplomatic efforts and discussions.

Could you tell us what political and economic implications these initiatives can have and will have, and how can it affect various countries - not only G-8 countries, but other countries that probably are seeking on the legal basis this equipment? And what can be the economic implications for private companies, and particularly in the United States and in Western Europe? Thank you.

SEC. ABRAHAM: I missed the first part - maybe I'm not following -

Q: Well, the question was about this new initiative endorsed by the G-8 summit, the initiative to impose a one-year freeze on transfer of the enrichment and reprocessing equipment.

SEC. ABRAHAM: Sure. I think that - I think that - I'm not really capable of trying to speculate - I'm not going to speculate on what the broad economic ramifications will be. I think that, you know, obviously as I understand the question, the issues are, you know, trying to address some of these proliferation threats that are involved with certain kinds of capabilities being made available, and I believe that the conference was successful in trying - in getting some unanimity in terms of the concerns we have about certain types of access that may exist. Maybe I'm misunderstanding the question, but I think - but I'm not sure I can speculate that much on the long-term economic ramifications. At this point, obviously, our goals are more on the security side of the issue.

John?

Q: Mr. Secretary, I'm John Fialka. I'm with the Wall Street Journal. You mentioned this partners' conference coming up that will explore at least a couple of things. One of them will be nations to which you and Russia alone can't get access to that have research reactors. Could you give us a couple of examples of that?

And the second is you say that one of the pillars you haven't reached yet are other radiological devices that are not controlled. Can you give us any examples of that?

SEC. ABRAHAM: That - not necessarily devices but, you know, other possible locations - fuel fabrication sites, things of this sort, conversion facilities that are not necessarily, you know, getting the same attention. You know, I mean, the sort of history of the, you know, the effort is - began, in our department, at least, with the focus in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War on weapons, weapons grade materials and so on. And then we've been, as I indicated, expanding the focus of both America and DOE's programs, but also the IAEA's, to materials that could form the basis for RDDs. And it becomes clear as you kind of walk down that path that there's other types of materials, other types of facilities that have not really fallen within the sort of scope of some of the projects we've had in the past - research reactors obviously lead the list, but conversion facilities, fabrication facilities would fall into that category.

With regard to this broader international focus, what - you know, we know there are materials that would fit into those - that third category that may not have any connection to either the United States or Russia, and so you really - in our judgment, you need to have a broader international community working on that effort so that people hopefully can form a consensus that the right kind of security is needed to address those types of challenges.

You know, some of the fuel that's at research facilities that - where the origin of the fuel is U.S. or Russian happens to be in places where either the U.S. or the Russians may today not be in the best position to convince the host government to go through the process of fuel return and conversion. And so it's our belief that, in some of these instances, the building of a stronger international commitment to this would help facilitate where bilateral discussions or discussions just involving the U.S., Russian and a host country might not be enough.

Q: Is North Korea an example of the latter?

ABRAHAM: Well, I would - I'm not going to get into a specific country-by-country designation, but there are several countries that I think quickly leap to mind as places that - where the current situation would be difficult to approach just in terms of a tripartheid type of discussion.

Q: I'm Al Milliken, affiliated with Washington Independent Writers. Do you see any special considerations or factors at work when it comes to the nuclear energy that Pakistan has? Do the Muslim and Arab nations see Pakistan as particularly important to them since they do have special religious and cultural ties?

ABRAHAM: Well, I can't answer how the - you know, what the personal views are of other countries. I mean, obviously we, you know, are concerned about the proliferation program in a broad sense without - I mean, from the United States' point of view without consideration of the religious or cultural connections that are involved. I mean, our goal is to have a program that is effective on a worldwide basis. And hopefully, you know, I think we're going to see continuing progress in - with respect to, you know, all the targets of - that I've outlined here today, all of the projects that the Global Threat Reduction Initiative will encompass, including the research reactors and the other types of facilities that we've mentioned.

EISENHOWER: Well, again, thank you, Secretary Abraham, for being with us today. It was a real pleasure to have you, and thank you for coming.